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The argument in Plato’s Philebus presents three successive formulations of the
hedonist principle. Commentators often take Socrates’ argument in the dialogue to be
dealing solely with the third formulation, which states that pleasure, rather than
intelligence, is closer in nature to the good. I argue that, nonetheless, in the dialogue
Socrates remained concerned to provide a direct refutation of the first formulation, that is,
of the straightforward claim that pleasure is the good for all living beings.
Chapter One ascribes to the Philebus a conception of intrinsic good, which is then
shown to underlie the dialogue’s notion of true pleasures. Chapter Two examines in
detail the problem of the “one and many” concerning pleasure, and argues that this is the
problem of forms in relation to other forms, rather than that of forms in relation to
particulars. This interpretation is the one that is consistent both with Protarchus’
understanding of hedonism in the dialogue, and with the dialogue’s methodological
passages, i.e., the passages on the “god-given method” and on the four ontological kinds.
In Chapter Three, it is shown how division into forms is required by Socrates’ conception
of the nature of pleasure. Some of the forms of pleasure are ways in which falsity is
admitted into the nature of pleasure. Three accounts of false anticipatory pleasures
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ON THE ARGUMENT OF THE PHILEBUS
A. Three Versions of the Hedonist Principle
The argument of the Philebus is in the form of a contest between pleasure and
intelligence. When the dialogue opens, Protarchus is about to take over from Philebus
the defense of pleasure. The question that is to be settled is, whether enjoyment, having
pleasure, is the good for all living beings (dya^ov eivai x6 xai'peiv Ttdai d;cooiq, 1 lb4-
5)? It is thus assumed that all living beings are capable of having pleasure. On behalf of
pleasure, Protarchus is to defend the following claim;
(PI) Pleasure is the good for living beings.*
This is the first of three versions of the hedonist principle that will be considered in the
dialogue. As both Socrates and Protarchus understand (PI), (PI) involves two constituent
claims: (a) that pleasure is a good; and (b) that pleasure is the highest good for all
sentient beings. On the other hand Socrates is to argue, not that intelligence rather than
pleasure is the good, but that intelligence is better and more desirable than pleasure for all
living beings. Socrates is to defend the following claim;
2
(S) Intelligence is better than pleasure for any being that can partake in it.
1
In this chapter and in the next, I shall partially adopt the abbreviations of Socrates' and
Protarchus' positions used in Dancy 1984.
2
Thus it is not assumed that all living beings are capable of intelligence or mind; rather, (S)
holds that "intelligence, mind, memory, and the things that go with them, right judgment and true
reasoning ... [are] better and more desirable than pleasurefor all beings that are able to partake
in them" (aupTiaaiv oaaTiep auxwv 5uvaxd pcxoA-aPsiv, 1 lb9-cl). In the text, Plato uses
(ppovriau; and vouq interchangeably for the most part; here the former is translated as
1
(S) does not deny that pleasure is a good. Socrates means to examine later on whether
pleasure is a good, and if so, in what sense, but (S) only claims that intelligence is
better and more desirable (dpci vco Kai ^6co, 1 lb9) than pleasure. (S) likewise has two
constituent claims; (a) that intelligence is a good; and (b) that intelligence is a higher
good than pleasure.
At 1 Id- 12a, Socrates sets up the argument between (PI) and (S) in terms of this
question: Is there some condition of soul (e^iv \vvxf\q) that is capable of furnishing
for all men the happy life (tov pfov cubaipova, 1 ld6)? If there is, then this condition
is the good for man. Socrates’ claim is, that whatever this good turns out to be,
intelligence is more akin (auyyevfic;) to it than is pleasure (1 le-12a). Protarchus, it would
seem, ought to say that this condition of soul is none other than pleasure or enjoyment.
However, Socrates secures his assent to the view that some third thing, other than
enjoyment or thought, could turn out to be the good; in that case, all that Protarchus may
claim claim is that this condition is more akin to pleasure than it is to intelligence, so that
the life of pleasure “holds sway” (Kpaxsi) over the life of thought (1 le-12a). Thus, at
this point the question of the dialogue has become, whether pleasure or intelligence is
closer in nature to the good. The modified hedonist position is now the following:
(P2) There is some \\) such that; i) v|/ is a condition of soul; ii) v|/ causes life to
become eudaimon; and iii) pleasure is more akin to \\) than is intelligence.
This is the dialogue’s second formulation of the hedonist position. According to (P2), \\f
“intelligence” and the latter as “mind”. All translations here used, unless otherwise noted, are
mine. All quotations from Plato’s Greek texts are from Burnet 1901.
2
is some psychological property or state that, when present in a human life, is the cause of
that life s becoming eudaimon. Furthermore, the property v|/ is closer in nature to
pleasure than to intelligence. Accordingly, Socrates’ implied strategy is now to show (S)
by refuting (P2).
In fact, Socrates does not pursue that strategy. Nonetheless, (P2) introduces a
significant shift in the terms of the argument. (PI) is a principle that applies to all living
beings, including those that have the faculty of pleasure alone, and those that have both
the faculties of pleasure and intelligence. The former class, however, is not relevant to
the argument of the dialogue. It is possible to compare the values of pleasure and
intelligence only for beings that are capable of both, beings whose lives can be eudaimon
because of both pleasure and intelligence. In the move to (P2) we find a recognition of
this point. (P2) establishes a strong conceptual link between happiness (eudaimonia) and
the human good. However, there is no indication that Plato means to identify the human
good with happiness. (P2) explicitly identifies the good with that which causes a life to
become happy. Eudaimonia, however, seems to come about as a result of our possession
of the human good and is therefore not to be identified with that good.
At 20c-22c, Socrates introduces another strategy. He proposes to consider
pleasure and intelligence as items in two pure kinds of life, one a life of pleasure without
mind, the other a life of mind without pleasure. Protarchus quickly agrees that neither of
these lives is adequate or choiceworthy in itself, and neither life therefore can be the good
life. The good life is a mixed life, one that combines these two items in a certain way.
3
However, there must be a cause of the goodness of the mixed life;
Soc. ... (F)or perhaps each of us would assign a cause to this combined life (xdxa ydp
av TOO Koivou TOUTOO pioo aixiwpeOa), I that mind is the cause, you that pleasure is,
and if this is so, though neither of them would be the good ... perhaps one or the other is
the cause. ... Concerning this I would contend with Philebus still more that, in this
mixed life, whatever it is in taking which (oxi tox' eoxi xoOxo 6 XaPwv) this life has
become as choiceworthy as it is good, not pleasure but mind is more akin and more like
to it (oi)x fidovf) dXXa voOc; xouxcp auyyeveaxEpov xai opoidxspov eoxi) ... (22dl-7)
So now the question of the dialogue is, whether pleasure or intelligence is more akin to or
more like whatever it is that is responsible for the goodness of the mixed life. This
echoes the earlier question about what condition of soul is responsible for rendering a life
eudaiinoTi, but the two questions are quite different. The hedonist position is now
differently formulated;
(P3) There is some ^ such that; i) (|) causes the combined life to become good;
and ii) pleasure is more akin to ^ than is intelligence.
We are not told what sort of thing (j) is, unlike v|/, which we are clearly told is some
“condition of soul” (c^iv vj/oxfic;). But we are told that ^ is the cause of a certain kind of
life being the good life. Thus, (j) is some property or set of properties that also makes a
life good, but not as a psychological condition of that life, or as any psychological
component in it. Following Christopher Bobonich [1997, p. 124] let us call \\f and (|) the
3
“good-making” properties. The difference between the two is then that v;/ is a
psychological property, while (j) is another kind of property. And so the move from (P2)
to (P3) corresponds to the move from a psychological argument against hedonism to a
different one.
In his discussion, Bobonich applies the term only to what is here designated (j).
4
It should be noted that Philebus never subscribes to any reformulation of (PI)
(12a, 27e); nevertheless, (P3) is the final interpretation of hedonism that Protarchus
accepts and, since early in the dialogue Philebus turned over the argument for pleasure
entirely to Protarchus (11c, 12a-b), the discussion proceeds with (P3) as the agreed upon
statement of the hedonist position. However, I shall argue that there are good reasons to
think that Socrates, like Philebus, never abandons (PI) as the statement of the hedonist
position.
B. The Structure and Aim of the Argument
The ensuing examinations of pleasure and of knowledge proceed out of this
context. There is a need to examine both pleasure and mind in order to find out which
one is more akin or closer to that which makes the mixed life a good mixture. The
examination may be said to take the form of an analysis of pleasure and knowledge each
into its various forms, and this occupies about half of the dialogue, from 31 b-59c. The
bulk of this section, up to 55b, is devoted to pleasure. The analysis of pleasure thus
makes up nearly half the entire length of the dialogue. In view of this it is plausible to
claim, as N.R. Murphy does, that in the Philebus “Plato may have wanted to undertake a
fresh treatment of pleasure at least partly for its own sake...” [Murphy, 1938; p. 120].
But there is a series of sections preceding this, more than a third of the dialogue's
total length, which appear to be relevant to it. These sections are: (a) the discussion of
the One and the Many in 13e-15c; (b) the treatment of the method of Dialectic in 15d-
1 8d; and (c) the ontological division into the Four Kinds at 23c-26d. These are the
5
methodological sections of the dialogue, in which the concepts and methodologies
needed to solve the problem of the dialogue are introduced and discussed. In the rest of
the dialogue, these concepts and methodologies are applied towards a resolution of the
main problem. Of the three methodological sections, (a) and (b) are continuous, and
constitute the first major section of the dialogue. In this first major section, from 11a-
20c, the hedonist position is identified with (PI). (P2) is introduced early on but is
quickly set aside. Socrates then points out a problem entailed by holding (PI), namely
that to hold (PI) is to fail to account for the one-and-many character of pleasure and other
similar concepts. A method is proposed for dealing with one-and-many problems in
general, but this method is set aside. In the second major section of the dialogue, from
20d to31a, the hedonist position is redefined as (P3), and then a scheme is proposed for
classifying all existents into four kinds: the indefinite, the limit, the mixture of the
indefinite and the limit, and the cause of this mixture. Towards the end of the section, at
27e, it is contended that pleasure belongs in the class of the indefinite, and at 31a that
pleasure itself is indefinite. On the other hand, mind is asserted to be akin to the divine
wisdom that orders all things (30e), and it is concluded that intelligence belongs in the
class of the limit (31a).
One might think that at this point (P3) has been refuted and (S) proved true, and
so the dialogue could have come to a close. Instead, the lengthy analysis of pleasure and
knowledge follows at 3 lb-59c, and it is only at 59c-66a that it is finally shown that
intelligence is more akin to that which makes the mixed life a good mixture, and thus that
(P3) is false. A ranking of goods is then presented, in which pleasure—that is to say.
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some kinds of pleasure is assigned no more than fifth place overall. Intelligence, on the
other hand, occupies third place, and (S) is thus shown to be tme. The lengthy series of
sections from 31b up to the end of the dialogue at 67b comprise the third major section of
the Philebus. These sections, in my view, belong together because in them the problem
of the dialogue is solved by applying the different sets of concepts and methods
introduced in the first two major sections. The following is an outline summary of the
first two sections and an argument outline of the third section of the Philebus:
(I) : The First Methodological Section; lla-20c
1 la- 12b: The hedonist position is introduced as (PI), the anti-hedonist
position as (S); (PI) is modified to(P2).
12c- 13d: Pleasure as both one and many.
13e-15c: The general problem of the One and the Many.
15d-17a: Dialectic as the “god-given” method for solving one-and-many
problems.
1 7a-l 8d: Illustrations of the application of the god-given method in the
sciences.
1 8d-20c: The application of the god-given method to the problem of
pleasure is postponed.
(II) : The Second Methodological Section: 20c-31b
20c-22c: The hedonist position is reformulated as (P3).
23c-26d: An ontological classification of all existents into four kinds
is introduced; the four kinds are: the indefinite, the
limit, the mixture of the indefinite and the limit, and the cause
of the mixture.
26e-3 lb: Pleasure is assigned to the class of the indefinite (27c);
intelligence, on the other hand, is said to be akin to the cause of
the goodness of the mixed life (31a).
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(III). Analysis and Solution of the Problem of the Dialogue; 3 lb-67b
31b-32b; ( 1 ) Pleasure is always a replenishment, the restoration of a
disturbed harmony.
32b-36c: (2) Some pleasures are of the soul itself, and consist in the
pleasant anticipation of pleasant things; such pleasures
involve sensation, memory, and desire.
36c-40e: (3) Given (2), one way in which pleasures can hQ false is
when they are based on a false belief concerning that which the
pleasure is about.
40e-42c: (4) A second way in which pleasures can be false is when
they appear, in anticipation, to be greater or less than
they really are.
42c-44a: (5) A third way in which pleasures can be false is when what
are really neutral states are considered by us to be pleasures.
44a-50e: (6) Pleasures are generally mixed with pain; of these mixed
pleasures, some are of the body (44a-47b), others are of the
body and soul together (47c-47d), and still others are of the
soul alone (47d-50e).
50e-53c: (7) But there are pleasures that are unmixed with pain,
some involving the physical senses while others involve
only the soul; there are, then, true pleasures, for with
pleasures purity is the mark of truth.
53c-55c: (8) And yet pleasure is a process and not an end, and so
pleasure cannot be good.
55c-59c: (9) Knowledge, like pleasure, has many kinds.
59c-64a: (10) Though not all the kinds of knowledge are equal in
in value, we may admit all of them into the mixed life,
provided we have the best kind, namely that whose objects
are eternal and unchanging; we cannot, however, admit all
the pleasures, only the true ones.
64a-66a; (11) We can see why (10) is true, for the marks of
goodness are these; fineness, symmetry, and truth.
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66a-67b: (12) Thus pleasure does not win first prize, nor even
second or third; first prize goes to measure, second prize
to fineness and proportion, third prize to mind and
intelligence, fourth prize to science, crafts and correct
beliefs; finally, we may give fifth prize to the true pleasures
of the soul. [Therefore: (S) Intelligence is better than
pleasure for any being that can partake in it.]
The culmination of the dialogue’s argument is (S), with the implied rejection of
the main claim of (P3) that pleasure is superior to intelligence. Is it the central purpose of
the dialogue, then, to show that intelligence ranks higher than pleasure in the scale of
goods? It should be noted that (S) is compatible with the first component claim of the
original hedonist principle (PI), i.e., that pleasure is a good. As long as the main
question of the dialogue is whether pleasure or intelligence is the higher good, it is open
to Philebus to say that pleasure is in some sense a good. Is Socrates willing to grant this?
Consider what is involved in the refutation of (P3). (P3) asserts the superiority of
pleasure in terms of the good-making property (j), to which it holds pleasure to be more
akin than intelligence. What, however, is the nature of (j)? Towards the end of the
dialogue, Socrates enumerates the elements that make for goodness. Since, he says, “we
cannot catch the good with a single form” (pf) pia buvdpefta ibeqc to dyaftov
ftripcuoai, 65al), we need to grasp it by three things together. The good turns out to be
a unity of three ideas: fineness, symmetry, and truth (KdA,X,8i Kai auppexpia Kai
dA-riftefa, 65a2), and “out of their being good the [mixed life] itself has become good”
(8id TOUTO (he; dyaftov 6v xoiauiriv auxfjv yeyovevai, 65a4-5). The abstract properties
of fineness, proportion, and truth together account for the goodness of the mixed life.
9
These properties are ontological features of things. They are what make any mixture
whatsoever a good mixture, and any thing whatsoever a good thing. Thus fineness,
proportion, and truth are the good-making properties and are together equivalent to f
When Socrates reformulated the hedonist position as (P3) at 20c-22c, he had argued that
whatever is the good must be perfect (tePicov), adequate (iKavov), and worthy of our
choice (aipETOv). It is clear that these characteristics do not explain why the mixed life
is the good life; they merely mark out necessary conditions in our choice of what the
good life must be. The mixed life is good, rather, because the elements of the mixed life
possess the abstract, formal properties of fineness, proportion, and truth. And mind is
closer in nature to the good because mind possesses these properties to a higher degree.
The pure pleasures, nonetheless, have the good-making properties. They are
measured” (EfipETpcov, 52dl), and, like the objects in which they are taken, they have a
fineness (Ka^^dc;) all their own (5 Id). They are not cessations from pains (51a), and are
unmixed with pain in any way; their purity thus marks them out as true. One might think,
then, that for Plato, there is a class of pleasures that are good in themselves, since these
pleasures possess the good-making characteristics. And yet immediately after
enumerating the pure pleasures, Socrates gives an argument whose conclusion amounts to
a strong denial that any pleasures can be good in themselves. The argument appeals to a
distinction between being (ouaia) and becoming (yEVEaiq). Becoming is “for the sake
of’ (EVEKa) being, and it is being, not becoming, which belongs “in the portion of the
good” (ev xfi TOO dyaOou pot pa, 54c 10). Pleasure, however, is a becoming, “there is no
being to it whatsoever” (ouaiav 5e pr|5’ f|VTivouv auifit; civai, 54d5-6), and so
10
pleasure cannot belong in the portion of the good. The underlying thought is that the good
must be an end, it must be the sort of thing for the sake of which other things come into
being. Pleasure, because it is a process, a means rather than an end, is thus not the sort of
thing that can be good in itself. Socrates goes on to illustrate the absurd consequences of
supposing that a process such as pleasure could be an end. First, it would follow that we
ought to choose to suffer thirst, hunger and other similar states of deprivation, since these
states normally precede pleasurable experiences and are part of the coming-into-being of
pleasure. Protarchus assents to this, saying it would be the sort of great absurdity
(7ioA,A,f) dcA,oyia) that would result “if one sets down pleasure as the good for us”
(edv Tiq TTjv f|5ovf)v wq dya^ov ppiv TiOpTai, 55al0-l 1). Secondly, we would be
constrained to say that a man is evil (Kaxov, 55b6) whenever he is in pain, even though
he is a virtuous man, and that a man is outstanding in virtue insofar as he is in enjoyment
(55c). Here the contrast is between virtues, which are goods in an unqualified sense, and
pleasures, which are not. The contrast implies that virtues have being or are being,
whereas pleasures are merely processes of coming-into-being, and are always for the sake
of something else.
It is significant that Plato introduces these remarks just after he has enumerated
the true pleasures, and before he goes on to examine the forms of knowledge. It is also
significant that here, late in the dialogue, the hedonist position is stated as (PI). Hackforth
comments that this section has no obvious connection with what has immediately
preceded it [Hackforth, 1945; p. 105]. He finds it “puzzling” that Plato should revert to a
point of view which treats pleasure as a simple, i.e., to (PI), since this seems to ignore the
11
classification of pleasure into kinds that Socrates has just given in the long section from
3 lb-5 lb. Hackforth concludes that the pleasure-as-genesis view is not Plato’s own, but
rather represents the opinion of a group of “subtle” thinkers (KOjiVj/oi, 53c6) of Plato’s
acquaintance, and that its introduction in this part of the dialogue is by way of an aside,
one which a modem author would have relegated to an appendix.^ Socrates, in the
dialogue, then remarks that the Kopvj/oc; must be “laughing scornfully at those who assert
that pleasure is good” (54d6-7). Hackforth comments:
This conclusion, reached at 54d, clearly means not merely that pleasure is not the good,
the sole good or even the chief good, but that it is not a good, in fact that ‘good’ cannot
be predicated of any pleasure. Now it is certainly surprising that such a conclusion
should be reached, particularly at this stage of the dialogue. For that some pleasures are
good is admitted by Socrates at 13B, and implied at 28A; and although the pure and true
pleasures enumerated at 51Bff. are not actually called good, it is hardly possible to doubt
that Plato regards them as good, and we shall subsequently find them admitted into the
mixture which constitutes the good life [Hackforth, 1945; p. 106].
Hackforth suggests that Socrates’ conclusion that pleasure is a genesis is not to be
accepted as more than provisional, since it is stated, at 54c6, as a conditional premise:
“So then pleasure, if at any rate, it is a coming to be .
.
(oukouv f|8ovtj ye, einep
yeveaiq eaiiv ... ). It is similarly stated at 54dl.
4
J.C.B. Gosling takes a similar view: “This section, together with 55b, does not continue the
argument of the preceding passage. It is rather an abrupt introduction of a current view on
pleasure which is hostile to hedonism. One gets the impression Plato had this piece to hand, was
unwilling to abandon it, could not blend it in smoothly, so in desperation inserted it badly at this
point” [Gosling, 1975; p. 220].
5
Hackforth notes the shift to the singular in the text, suggesting, plausibly, that Plato had a
specific person in mind . Hackforth thinks Speusippus and his followers to be the most likely
candidate [Hackforth, 1945; pp. 106; 108].
12
It is true that the pleasure-as-genesis claim is advanced in the form of a
conditional, but Socrates is clearly endorsing that claim in this passage, and the claim is
consistent with the analysis of pleasures that he has given. Hackforth, however, thinks
that the remarks about pleasure being a genesis do not apply to the true pleasures, which
are shortly to be admitted as a class into the good mixed life. The use of the word
yev8CTi<; to apply to the nature of pleasure is no more than a change in terminology from
the previous sections, in which pleasure was analyzed as a kcvcoctk;, an emptying,
alternating with a Ti^ifjpcocic;, a filling up^ [Hackforth, 1945; p. 107]. Plato, Hackforth
thinks, has in mind when he declares pleasure to be a genesis the kind of coming-to-be in
which filling up alternates with a corruptive state (90opd ) of emptying [Hackforth,
1945; p.l07, n.]. And, since the true pleasures of the soul are exempt from the corruptive
alternation that characterizes the great majority of the sense pleasures, Hackforth thinks
that Plato does not mean to include the true pleasures under the pleasure-as-genesis view.
But, the point of the pleasure-as-genesis view is to exclude all processes from the
category of ends, and thus from the category of things that belong “in the portion of the
good.” The emphasis in the passage is on the fundamental distinction between two kinds
g
of states, rather than on the alternation of emptying and filling that constitutes pleasure.
The point is that only states that are not processes can be thought of as ends, that is, as
fulfilments, of human action. Only ends belong “in the portion of the good.” According
6
Notably, at 31e-32a and at 35a-35c.
7
At 3 1 e 1 0, for instance.
8
As Frede 1993, iv, points out.
13
to Plato s view, therefore, pleasure is not a fulfilment ofhuman activity, and cannot be its
proper aim.
Concerning the pleasures excluded from the good life, there is no problem about
why they are not ends, for their association with pain and falsity disqualifies them from
being good, and thus from being ends. But the true pleasures have neither pain nor falsity
in them: are they then fit to be ends of human action? However, there is clearly a
difference between being fit to be an end, on the one hand, and being a part of the good
human life, on the other hand. The fact that the true pleasures are elements in a good
human life does not imply that they are proper ends ofhuman action. Whenever the true
pleasures occur in a human life, this is not because they have been aimed at; something
else might well have been aimed at whose fulfillment is then accompanied by the true
pleasures. The true pleasures, while having a goodness all their own, are not to be aimed
at for themselves. The fact, therefore, that the true pleasures are not corruptive in their
emptying phase is not the relevant point; even the true pleasures are processes because
they involve a movement, from an initial condition of lack—albeit an unfelt lack—to a
subsequent filling. And, since they are included in the good mixed life, these pleasures
must be good in some sense. But if we take the pleasure-as-genesis view as Plato’s own,
then it would seem that the true pleasures are good not in themselves, but only insofar as
they are included in the good mixed life. They are parts of the good life without being
responsible for the goodness of that life. But in that case we need to ask what kind of
goodness it is that these pleasures share in.
14
C. Plato on the Kinds of Good
In a well known passage of the Republic (357b-c), Plato refers to “a kind of good
we welcome, not because we desire what comes from it, but ...for its own sake'" (auio
aoTOi) evsKa, 357b6). He gives, as examples, joy and the harmless pleasures that have
no results beyond the joy of having them. He contrasts these with a second kind of goods
that we choose partly for their own sakes, partly for their results. Thirdly, there are goods
that we choose not for themselves but wholly for their results. The fundamental
distinction at work here is the distinction between a kind of thing that is good because it
is valued for its owti sake, and a second kind of thing that is good because it is valued as
a means to something else that is valued for its own sake. Let us call the second kind an
instrumental good. Instrumental goods are means to the attainment of the first kind of
good, which we shall call 3.final good, to capture the point that its being valued is not to
be explained in terms of some other act of valuation but in terms of itself alone. Plato
expresses this by saying that a final good is something that we would welcome or desire
to have (6 av for its own sake (amo amoO evexa). Here, an
object’s goodness is tied to its being welcomed or desired. The following would then be
the definition of a final good:
(D1 ) X is afinal good = def. For someone S, S desires x & S desires x
for the sake of x.
(Dl) defines a final good as something that is actually desired, and desired for its own
sake. But Plato refers to an object that we would welcome or desire to have
(6 ccv lyje.iv, the optative with av giving subjunctive force). This seems to
me to include our actually desiring the object, but it also says that we would desire to
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have the object were we to be confronted with it. The crucial part of the definition,
however, is that a final good is desired or would be desired for its own sake, rather than
for the sake of something which it produces or something which accompanies it. Its
being desired for its own sake is what the goodness of the object consists in. In the
Republic discussion, that something is a final good is indicated by the nature of our desire
for it, the way m which we value it; the notion of a final good, therefore, is defined in
psychological terms.
Now on this conception, it seems that the pure pleasures of the soul of the
Philebus are final goods, since if they are desired, they are desired for their own sakes
rather than for their results. However, while the true pleasures are clearly not
instrumental goods, Socrates nowhere says that they are desired for themselves, or that
they ought to be so desired. Nonetheless, the true pleasures must be classified as final
goods, since, ifthey are desired or valued at all, they are desired or valued for their own
sakes. But then, exactly the same thing is true of mind and intelligence: these, too, are to
be valued and desired non-instrumentally. If the true pleasures are to be compared with
mind, we need to compare them either as different types of good or, if they are goods of
the same type, we need to be able to compare their relative values. The Republic's
contrast between final goods and instrumental goods, then, does not help us to understand
the distinction between pleasure and intelligence as goods. We must look elsewhere for
an instructive contrast between types of good.
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In the Laws, Plato divides goods into human and divine goods. Human goods are
such things as health, beauty, strength, and wealth (63 Ib-d). Divine goods are the virtues
of wisdom, moderation, justice, and courage. Some of the human goods are clearly
desired for their own sakes, and so are final goods by the Republic definition. In the
Laws, however, Plato is not interested in drawing a contrast between final and
instrumental goods. For he proceeds to argue, concerning the human goods, that
all these things are possessions of great value to the just and pious, but ... to the unjust
they are a curse, every one of them, from health all the way down the list. Seeing,
hearing, sensation, and simply being alive, are great evils, if in spite of having all these
so-called good things a man gains immortality without justice and virtue in general; but if
he survives for only the briefest possible time, the evil is less {Laws 661b-c) [trans.'
Trevor J. Saunders, in Cooper ed. 1997].
The human goods are good only conditionally, depending on whether or not their
possessor also has the divine goods. For this reason, the human goods have been called
dependent goods [Bobonich, 1997; p. 103]. The divine goods, on the other hand, are
good by themselves, whatever else we may or may not possess. The divine goods have
thus been called independent goods [Bobonich, 1997; p. 104].
The fundamental distinction at work in this contrast is between a type of good that
benefits us unconditionally, and a second type of good that benefits us only on condition
that we already have the first, more fundamental, kind of good. Is this contrast at work
in the Philebusl By the terms of this contrast, the true pleasures of the Philebus would
not be independent goods, so that if, for instance, they were to occur as episodes in the
life of a man who is bereft of the divine goods, then they would be evils. The tme
pleasures are dependent goods—they are goods at all only when they occur as episodes in
the life of a virtuous man. It is instructive that at Philebus 55b-c, a contrast is posed
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between pleasures and virtues. In this passage, Socrates contrasts pleasure and virtue as
goods whenever each of these is present in the soul. Socrates is here concerned to lay out
the absurd consequences that follow “if one sets down pleasure as the good for us”
(edv Tiq Tf]v f|6ovf]v d)q dyaOov f|piv TiOfjxai, 55al0-l 1). This comes towards the end
of the passage where it is argued that pleasure is a process, a becoming, rather than an
end. It would be absurd, Protarchus agrees, ifwe were to prefer a life of pleasure to a life
in which there was neither enjoyment nor being in pain, but the purest possible thinking”
(tov ev (i) jiTjxe ^otipeiv p,Tjx8 X,D7i8ia0ai, cppov8iv 8
'
f|v [buvaxov] cbq oiov X8
KaOapdixaxa, 55a6-8), for then we would be choosing corruption and genesis rather
than the state of being that defines pure thought. But there are even more absurd
consequences in supposing that pleasure is the good:
Soc. How, isn’t it absurd that there is nothing either good or beautiful in bodies or in
many other things except in soul, and that there pleasure alone is good, but that courage,
moderation, mind, or any other thing the soul assigns as good, is not of this kind?
Besides this, how, whoever is not enjoying, but is in pain, to be constrained to say that he
is then bad when he is in pain, even though he is the best of all men, and in turn he who
is enjoying, insofar as he enjoys, at the time when he enjoys to that extent he stands out
in virtue (55bl-cl).
The four absurd consequences of supposing that pleasure is the good [i.e., that (PI) is
true] are the following:
(1) that there is nothing good/noble in bodies, only in the soul [since, i.e., pleasure
is experienced in the soul];
(2) that, in the soul, pleasure is the only good thing; and courage, moderation,
reason and other goods of the soul are neither good nor noble;
(3) that anyone who experiences pain would be evil while she is in pain, even if
she is in fact virtuous; and
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(4) that anyone who is pleased, while she is pleased and to the extent that she is
pleased, is virtuous.
But, (2) seems surprising. Socrates is pointing out that (PI) implies the absurd claim that
pleasure is the only thing that is good for the soul, and that the virtues are not. But this
implies that pleasure is a good thing for the soul, whereas the whole point of the passage
from 53c-55c is to deny that pleasure is a good at all, since it is a genesis, a becoming and
therefore a means, rather than an end. This is clearly stated in the exchange at 54c-54d:
Soc. So, then, pleasure, if, at all events, it is a coming-to-be, of necessity would come-to-
be for the sake of some being.
Prot. Of course.
Soc. And, moreover, that for the sake of which whatever becomes for the sake of
something would always be becoming, this belongs in the portion of the good [ou evexa
TO evsKa Tou Yiyvopevov dsi yiyvon’ dv, ev xf\ toO dyaOou poipa skeivo eati]; but
that which is coming-to-be for the sake of something, my excellent one, must be set
down to a different portion.
Prot. Most necessarily.
Soc. Then we will be setting down pleasure correctly, if indeed it is a coming-to-be, if we
set it down into a different portion than the good?
Prot. That’s certainly most right.
Here it is made quite clear that pleasure does not belong “in the portion of the good.”
However, when Socrates says this of pleasure, he clearly means to refer to pleasure in
itself, that is, to pleasure as a unity. This is different from saying that all the many
pleasures are not goods for the soul, or that the many pleasures are to be excluded from
the good life. Socrates, therefore, can consistently hold that some pleasures are goods for
the soul and that pleasure itself is not the good.
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An important point, however, comes out of Socrates’ enumeration of the absurd
consequences of holding that pleasure is the good. In the examples given, we notice a
difference m the ways that two sorts of things can be present in the soul. When pleasures
or pains are present in the soul, it seems that they do not affect the soul itself But, with
such things as courage (dvbpeia), moderation (acocppoauvri), and reason (vouq) the soul
evidently has a different relation. The soul, we might say, is made good by the presence
of virtue in it, whereas, though some pleasures may be good for the soul, the pleasures as
such do not make the soul good. Points (3) and (4) in Socrates’ enumeration together
imply that Socrates holds virtues to be goods for the soul unconditionally. Unlike the
pleasures, the virtues are good for us to have, whatever other goods we may or may not
possess. Thus, the virtues are independent goods.
The Laws' contrast between independent goods and dependent goods is therefore
applicable to the Philebus discussion. Some pleasures are good, in the sense that they are
included in the good life; these pleasures are good, however, not by themselves but only
as part of a virtuous life. The pleasures of the virtuous man are good, not because they
are pleasures, but because they are the pleasures of a good man. However, it’s not that
the goodness of such pleasures is derived from the goodness of virtue; rather, such
pleasures are good on condition that the man who has them also possesses the
unconditional good of virtue. Thus, the true pleasures are good because they are already
part of a life that is unconditionally good. But this is to say that these pleasures are not
good in themselves.
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The virtues, however, are good in themselves. Here we cannot apply the
Republic^
s
conception of a final good as an object’s being desired for its own sake, since
the virtues are good independently of anyone’s desiring to have them. Nor can we equate
this with the Laws" notion of independent goodness. A stronger conception of good is
needed which makes the goodness of an object a property of the object itself. It is just
such a stronger conception that is presented by the notion of (|) as a triad of good-making
properties. Let us call this notion intrinsic goodness. The definition of an intrinsic good
would then be the following:
(D2) X is an intrinsic good = def. x is fine, or x has symmetry, or x is true.
To say that something belongs in the portion of the good, then, is not just to say that it is
included in the good mixed life; it is to say that it has its goodness in itself.^ This refers
back to the discussion of the four kinds in the second methodological passage, but the
notion of goodness there introduced is fully explicated in the discussion of the good-
making properties only much later in the dialogue. Whatever has a share in the good-
making characteristics is good in its being, not merely as features of a life. The virtues,
then, are good in themselves because they have the good-making properties, or, better
yet, they are the good-making properties as manifested in a human life. The virtues are
9
Christine Korsgaard notes that, “To say that something is intrinsically good is not by
definition to say that it is valued for its own sake: it is to say that it has its goodness in itself’
[Korsgaard, 1983; p. 170]. Thus the notion of a final good cannot be equated with the notion of
something that has its goodness in itself, and it is misleading to contrast intrinsic goodness with
instrumental goodness. The natural contrast is between intrinsic goodness and extrinsic
goodness. Extrinsic goodness is the goodness or value that an object gets from another source.
Instrumental goods are properly contrasted with final goods.
21
thus intrinsic goods in the sense of having in themselves the properties that define
goodness.
D. The Ends of Pleasure
In the Philebus, then, Plato is working with two distinct notions of good. The first
is the notion of an intrinsic good given by (D2), of something that is good in its being.
The second is a notion of conditional goodness, of something being good only if it is an
element in a life that contains the first kind of good. This second kind of good
corresponds to the Laws notion of a dependent good. A good human life will contain
both kinds of good, but will have the first kind necessarily, the second kind only
contingently.
Thus, when Socrates states at Philebus 13b that some pleasures are good, this is
not to be taken to mean that any pleasures are intrinsic goods. At 28a, Socrates implies
that some pleasures are good, and what he says apparently commits him to holding that
some pleasures are good in themselves. There Philebus has just argued that it is because
pleasure is capable of unlimited fullness and increase that it is “all good” (jidv dya&ov,
27e8). Socrates replies that pain in that case would likewise be “all evil” (ttccv KaKOv,
28al) but, since this is not the case, the evil of pain could not be due to its unlimited
character, nor the good of pleasure then to its lack of limit. Here, Socrates implies that
some pleasures have a share in limit, and this suggests that they are good intrinsically. I
shall argue in the next chapter, however, that this is not the case, and that the notion of
limit as a determinant of goodness is specified by the good-making characteristics that
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constitute what is designated (() in (P3). Contrary to Hackforth’s view, Plato can
consistently hold that no pleasures are goods in themselves.
Plato’s view, then, is that the true pleasures are goods insofar as they are elements
in a good life. Such pleasures are still not in themselves good, though they have a
goodness all their own. But whatever is good about pleasure has nothing to do with
pleasure as a process, if we take it as Plato’s view that only that which is ousia can be
good in itself. What is good about pleasure is due to that thing, for the sake of which
pleasure comes-to-be. At 54c6-10 Socrates suggests that there is some end for the sake of
which pleasure comes-to-be, and that it is this end which belongs ev xp xou ccyoc&ou
fxoipa, in the portion of the good. Since that which is good in itself must be an ousia, and
since pleasure is a genesis, there must be some being (xivoq oi)aia<;, 54c6-7), something
capable of being an end, for the sake of which pleasure comes-to-be. But this can hardly
be taken to mean that all pleasures have an end that is good in itself. What it can be taken
to mean is that pleasure, whenever it is a good, has an end which is a good in itself.
Thus, let i/-good = “dependently good,” and /-good = “intrinsically good” in the sense of
(D2). Then the following equivalence holds:
(El) p is a pleasure andp is t/-good = there is some y for the sake
of whichp comes into being, and y is /-good.
The class ofps that are ^/-good is the class of pleasures included in the good life, the class
of ys that are /-good includes primarily the virtues. If in the exercise of a virtue some sort
of pleasure comes about, such a pleasure is a good. But the pleasure is still a process, and
therefore is not a good in itself like virtue. Since it is a contingent fact that virtue is
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accompanied by any pleasure, it follows that no pleasure which accompanies a virtue has
the attributes of the virtue necessarily. The following example from J.O. Urmson may
help clarify Plato’s account:
Let us suppose that I am engaged in geometrical thinking and on the verge of completing
an important proof Certainly such a situation as this could result in a glow of excitement
and elation welling up within me ... (T)his excitement might well intercept and impede
my geometrical thought ... I might have to light a pipe and pace about until the
pleasurable excitement died down and I could again be absorbed in my geometrv
[Urmson, 1967; p. 328].
On Plato’s account, the physical glow of excitement in the example would not even
qualify as d-good. But this is not because it is a sensory pleasure. Socrates would
presently extend the list of pleasures that are part of the good mixed life to include some
bodily pleasures. But Plato would not allow, I think, that an experience which could
impede phronesis is good in any way, for then the pleasure would not befor the sake of
(ev8Ka) ihe phronesis. Occurring simultaneously with the physical excitement is a
purely mental enjoyment that accompanies the phronesis. This is what Socrates refers to
as a true pleasure of the soul. However, while both the physical excitement and the
mental enjoyment are merely contingently related to the phronesis itself, the latter
pleasures, but not the former, are t/-goods. The true and pure pleasures of the soul, far
from impeding phronesis, even enhance it. ^ Such pleasures are, as Socrates is shortly to
describe them, “almost dwelling with us” (axebov oiKeiaq ppiv, 63e4). This, I think.
10
While ‘(ppovTiaic;’ has been used throughout this chapter to mean thefaculty of intelligence,
I am using it here to mean intellectual activity. Plato’s usage, I believe, is inclusive of this. At
6 Id, for instance, Socrates contrasts f|5ovf|v and (ppovijasi as kinds of activities. Cf. Irwin
1995: “In the Philebus, as in the Republic, ‘intelligence’ does not refer simply to practical
reasoning but also includes the sort of intellectual activity that Plato admires so much in the
Republic: philosophical study and reflexion, and other theoretical activity undertaken for its own
sake” [Irwin, 1995; p. 337].
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IS Plato s way of saying that although the true pleasures of the soul are so intimately
connected phronesis or with virtue, they do not occur with them necessarily.
Perhaps we may see why (P2) is replaced by (P3) in the dialogue’s argument. It
seems probable that the psychological good-making element v|/ in (P2) can be identified
with virtue, since it is virtue which makes a life good or eudaimon, and virtue is a
condition of soul. If (P2) had been allowed to remain as the agreed upon statement of
hedonism, Socrates would have had to show that intelligence rather than pleasure is more
akin to virtue. But Socrates’ argument would then hinge on the claim that virtue is the
good. Since virtue and pleasure are both “conditions of soul,” that claim would simply
have begged the question against hedonism. For, Protarchus could just as well have
insisted in the beginning, at 1 Id- 12a when (P2) was introduced, that the condition of soul
that makes a life eudaimon is none other than pleasure or enjoyment. By adopting (P3) as
the hedonist position, however, Socrates is able to introduce further questions about what
makes not only a life, but anything at all, including pleasure, intelligence, and virtue
itself, good. The move to ontological considerations about goodness is thus a crucial one
for Socrates’ argument.
From the example just cited, it is evident that virtue is not the only good for the
sake of which pleasure can come about. Nor are the pure pleasures of the soul the only
pleasures included in the good life. Even before Socrates enumerated the good-making
characteristics, he had extended the list of pleasures that are included in the good life;
11
For a characterization of virtue as a condition or state of soul, see: Teloh 1981, chapter I;
Irwin 1978, chapter VIII section 9; and Penner 1973.
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f l n f “d mi"d once again: “Do you stand infurther need of pleasures in your mixture?”—we would say in questioning mind and
intelligence in turn. “What kinds of pleasures?”—perhaps they would say.
Prot. Probably.
tSoc. Then our speech after this is as follows. “In addition to those true pleasures,” we
shall say, do you need still further the greatest and most intense pleasures to dwell
with you? “And how, Socrates,” perhaps they would say, “when they put in our way a
myriad obstructions, disturbing the souls in which we dwell through fits of madness, and
from the beginning do not let us come to be at all, and the children bom to us for the
most part they wholly corrupt, creating forgetfulness in them through heedlessness?
But the pleasures you spoke of as tme and pure, recognize them as almost dwelling
with us, and besides these the pleasures that come with health and with soundness of
mind, and moreover mix in all those pleasures that attend the whole of virtue, just as
if she were a goddess and follow along with her everywhere; but those that always
come with thoughtlessness and all other evils, surely it is utter senselessness, for one
who wished to see the most beautiful and tranquil mixture and blending, to be engaged
in mixing them with mind, so that he might try to learn in this whatever by nature is
good in mankind and in everything, and whatever form he should divine that it is.”
Shall we not say that in the present statement, mind has answered thoughtfully and
sensibly, on behalf of itself, and also of memory and correct belief? (63c-64a)
Here, the physical pleasures that attend health and soundness of mind (xaq vyiEiaq Kai
TOO CTCotppoveiv), as well as those which accompany virtue, are included in the good life.
These pleasures are to be admitted because they blend harmoniously with the functioning
of mind. Thus, nous and phronesis are themselves ousia for the sake of which pleasure
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comes about. Together with the virtues, they make up the class of /-goods. The
pleasures which attend their exercise are thus goods too, though not goods in themselves.
When Socrates arrives at the final ranking of goods at the end of the dialogue, first
place in the ranking goes to “that which relates to measure in any way—the measured and
the seasonable and the everlasting, everything of that kind” (66a6-8). Second prize goes




to “that which relates to the symmetrical and the fine, the perfect and the adequate, and
everything that in turn are in these kinds” (66bl-3). In third place are mind and
intelligence {nous kai phronesis, 66b5-6). Fourth prize goes to “knowledges and crafts
and correct beliefs” (eTuaifipac; xs Kai xe'xvaq Kai bo^aq opMq, 66b9). In fifth place,
finally, are the pure pleasures of the soul, both those which follow upon knowledge and
those which follow upon sensations (66c4-6). This is a ranking oi actual goods to be
found in a human life. There is another ranking arrived at implicitly here, namely that
which awards second prize to mind, first prize having already been awarded to the mixed
life. Both rankings establish the superiority of mind over pleasure, and thus (S) is finally
shown to be true.
Yet Plato clearly had reservations about pleasure being a good at all. And he
seems to have been interested in showing more than that intelligence ranks higher than
pleasure in the scale of goods. Not only do these facts come up in the pleasure-as-genesis
passage, but a closer examination of the methodological sections of the dialogue and the
analysis of pleasures shows this to be the case. The formulation of hedonism that Plato
accepts and is arguing against is (PI), not (P3), and the rejection of (PI) requires that
pleasure be shown to be not a good in an ontological sense. Plato’s main aim in the
Philebus, therefore, is simply the refutation of hedonism, interpreted as (PI). In the next
two chapters I shall try to show this in greater detail, first by examining the
methodological sections and then by looking into the analysis of pleasure. I shall argue
that the notion of falsity plays the critical role in the analysis of pleasure, and that such a





The first methodological passage, which deals with the logical question of how
things can be both one and many, comes before the introduction of (P3), and cannot
therefore be intended as a response to it. The passage is meant, rather, to address (PI).
The second methodological passage, which proposes the division of all things into four
ontological kinds, comes right after the introduction of (P3), and is indicated in the text to
be a direct response to the just-reformulated problem of the discussion. Neither pleasure
nor knowledge is now going for “first prize,” since this has now been awarded to the
mixed life of mind and pleasure, but rather only for “second prize.” It is also indicated in
the text, however, that the results of the first methodological passage are by no means to
be abandoned; we should wonder, therefore, whether the problem that it addresses has
been abandoned too. I shall argue in this chapter that in fact the results of the
investigation into the nature of one-and-many problems is kept firmly in mind by
Socrates, not only through the analysis of pleasure, but also in the second methodological
passage itself Moreover, those results are a key to the solution of the central problem of
the dialogue. This problem is really none other than (PI). While the discussion has
moved on to (P3), Socrates is still concerned to refute a constituent proposition of (PI),
and thereby refute (PI) itself
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B. Pleasure as a One-and-Manv
1. Three One-and-Many Problems
Socrates claims that pleasure has a one-and-many character: “...as it is plainly
called, pleasure is some one thing (ev xi), but surely it has taken all forms (popcpdq) and
these are in some way different from each other” (12c6-8). This is Socrates’ own
characterization of the one-and-many problem (hereafter, 'OMP') concerning pleasure.
The problem is that the various forms of pleasure are different from each other, and yet
we call them all by one name, and so we think that pleasure is some one single thing, and
that the various pleasures have a common nature. But eventually Socrates gets
Protarchus to agree that there can be many, different pleasures, just as there are many
different forms of knowledge (14a). A little later on, at 14c, Socrates states the OMP
with no particular reference to pleasure:
Soc. I mean the argument that has turned up just now, and which has something
of an amazing nature. For, that the many are one and the one is many are amazing
things to say (SaopaaTOv A,£xOev), and it's easy to dispute anyone who takes up
either of these positions (14c7-10).
Just before this passage, Socrates had said that they must "establish this argument still
more" by agreeing on something, which turns out to be just the statement quoted
above, that the many are one and the one is many. Plato here is generalizing the OMP,
and asserting that it applies to other concepts besides pleasure. Protarchus responds with
a question:
Protarchus. Then do you mean that whenever someone says of me, Protarchus,
who has come to be by nature, that again the me's are many and different from
each other, the same me being both tall and short, heavy and light, and countless
other things (14cl l-d3)?
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Socrates replies that these are not the kind of one-and-many puzzles that he finds
amazing. These are the "commonplace puzzles" about the one and the many; they are
childish and easy, and are an impediment to discussion (14d). The important OMPs are
those which concern unities that do not come into being and perish. Socrates gives the
following examples of such unities: ox, humanity, beauty, and the good. Thus the OMP
applies to a certain range of concepts, namely those that denote non-sensible unities.
Evidently it is to this group that pleasure belongs, and "concerning these unities and
things of their sort much zealous controversy arises with their division" (Trep'i toutcov
Twv evdScov xai twv toioutcov f) noXX^ aTioobfi biaipeaecoq dpcpiapi^xriaK;
yiyvexai, 15a6-7). We must note here Socrates' concern with the division of these
. . 13
unities.
There then follows a much-disputed passage, 15bl-8, in which Socrates
enumerates some problems concerning these unities. There is a dispute about how many
13
Mirhady 1992 thinks that the phrase pexd biaipeaecoq is out of grammatical sequence in
this passage, and concludes that it is a late interpolation by someone who (incorrectly) anticipates
the discussion of division at 16dff (p. 172, n. 3). Mirhady denies that the OMP is introduced by
Plato as a philosophical problem about the non-sensible unities; instead, he thinks that for Plato,
the OMP is a social problem that results from the propensity of young men, untrained in
argument, to make divisions indiscriminately—taking delight in the confusion this creates (p.
1 73). Mirhady supports his view by pointing out the consistently ironical tone of the discussion
here; he also notes that the phrase f| 7io^X,f] anoudf) (which he translates as 'the great fuss') is
often, though not always, used by Plato with ironical intent, and that when he does so use it the
phrase connotes misspent effort (p. 172). It is quite possible, of course, that Plato saw the OMP
both as a social problem in Mirhady's sense and a philosophical one. But Mirhady also claims
that the method of division at 16d is a solution to the OMP only as a social problem, and not to
any philosophical concerns brought up in 15b (p. 173). However, if it can be shown that 15b 1-8
does bring up serious philosophical concerns, and that 16dff is a solution to these concerns, 1
don't see how 1 5b 1-8 can be held to address only a social problem of the one and the many. That
15bl-8 does bring up such philosophical concerns, and that these concerns affect the division of
pleasure, is what this section tries to show.
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questions are raised in this passage; there are also conflicting views about just what these
questions are. But Socrates has now referred to two OMPs. One of these, which we
will call OMPj, is the problem of explaining how
(a) xisF„xisF
2 , ...xisF„
is possible, where x is a particular and F,...F„ are its characteristics. OMP, is thus
concerned with how a particular can have many characteristics. Clearly, however, some
of the characteristics are different from the others, in the sense of being opposite, e.g.,
being both tall and short, heavy and light, etc. More precisely, therefore, OMP, is the
problem of explaining how
(b) X is F„ X is opposite-F„ ... x is F„
is possible, where F, and opposite-F, are contraries rather than contradictories. Socrates
has dismissed OMP, as being trivial and an impediment to discourse, and we may assume
both that it is not relevant to the central problem of the dialogue, and that 15b 1-8 does not
concern it.
The other OMP that Socrates raised, however, is clearly relevant to the dialogue’s
central problem. This is the OMP about pleasure having many forms (popcpdq). Suitably
generalized, this problem constitutes a distinct OMP, which we may designate
OMP2 ; it is the problem of explaining how
(c) (j), is F, (j)2 is F, ... (j)„ is F
is possible. Here F,...F„ and (j) are intensional entities, i.e., characteristics, forms, or
Hahn 1978 provides a comprehensive survey of the positions that scholars have taken on this
passage.
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kinds, of different types. Thus the problem of pleasure having many forms is represented
m (c), where ({),..
.(t)„ would be types of pleasure and F the Form Pleasure. We thus have a
clear sense in which the many are one, i.e., the many sub-forms of pleasure fall under one
Form. But could we not say of Pleasure itself that it participates in other Forms? OMPj
then could also be the problem of explaining how
(d) Fis0„Fis02, ... FisO„
is possible. Here F is any non-sensible monad like Pleasure and 0,...(t>n are other Forms
in which F participates. This gives another clear sense in which one Form is also many.
It would be surprising if 15bl-8 turned out to be irrelevant to OMPj, since in this
passage Socrates is purportedly enumerating the further questions that come up for
dispute whenever we talk about non-sensible unities like ox, humanity, the good, and
pleasure. As the text stands, the three questions raised in the passage are these:
1 . 15bl-2 : First. . .whether we are to suppose that there are monads of this kind
truly being (FIpwTov pev ci xivaq Sei xoiauxaq civai povdbaq
i)7roX,apPdvEiv dA,r|Od)q ouaaq);
2. 15b2-4 : Then again, how these, each one being always itself and admitting
neither of coming-into-being nor of perishing, nevertheless is most securely
one this (eixa 7i6q ai) xauxaq, piav eKdaxr|v ouCTav dei xf)v auxqv Kai
pT]X8 yEVEQiv pfjxE o^iE^pov 7ipoa5Exopevr|v opcoq Eivai PEPaioxaxa
pi'av xauxriv;)?
3.
15b4-8 : And after this, in turn, whether among the things that come to be and
are unlimited we must set [each one] down as scattered and become many, or
as a whole separated in itself, which it would appear is the most impossible of
all, one and the same thing coming to be simultaneously in one and in many
(pExd 5e xoux' ev xoiq yiyvopEvoiq ai) Kai dTiEipoiq eixe biEOTiaapEvriv
Kai noXXa yEyovuiav ftEXEov, Eift' 6Xr|v auxfjv auxfjq o Tidvxcov
d6uvaxc5xaxov cpaivoix' dv, xauxov Kai ev dpa ev evi xe Kai TUoX^-oiq
yiyvEaftai).
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Clearly, the first question is asking whether we must suppose that there really are such
unities. Most commentators agree with this interpretation, though Gosling thinks that the
question is more naturally interpreted as whether such monads are truly unitary, as
opposed to being pseudo-units such as ‘barbarian’ [Gosling, 1975; p. 147]. The third
question asks, what is the relation between these unities and the particulars which are
their instances? The third question thus introduces another OMP, OMP3, which is the
problem of explaining how
(e) X, is F, X2 is F, ... x„ is F
is possible. Here x, . . .x„ are particulars, and F is a characteristic common to them. Thus
OMP3 is a third and distinct OMP, that of Forms in relation to particulars. It will be
noticed that (e) has exactly the same structure as (c), with the many in question being
particulars rather than Forms.
While it is reasonably clear what the first and third questions are, however,
commentators are sharply divided on the interpretation of the second question. There are
two main difficulties: (a) whether the second question is distinct from the third, or else is
continuous with it; and (b) if the second and third questions are distinct, what is the
meaning of the second question? Nearly all the commentators who believe that the
second and third questions constitute a single problem agree that this is the problem of
how a single form relates to many particulars, i.e., OMP
3
.'^ Most of these
15
See Hahn 1978, pp. 159-60.
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commentators, accordingly, do not see Plato as having accepted three OMPs but only
two, namely OMP, and OMP
3
.*^
2. The Second Question
The second question presents a difficult problem of interpretation. The use of the
concessive adverb opcoq (usually translated "nevertheless") in line 4 poses what seems an
unintelligible contrast: A monad is said to be always itself, neither coming into being nor
perishing; nevertheless, the same monad is “most securely one this” (Pcpaiotaxa piav
xauxriv). Since xauxr|v is feminine and singular, it must refer to (each of) the povdbac;
m line 1, and so the concessive phrase is either "...each monad is most securely this one
monad," or " . . .each monad is most securely one monad." Both of these can be
interpreted as holding that each monad is most securely a unity, or that each one is most
securely the unity that it is. So, in either case the monad's unchanging character is being
contrasted with its unity.
Robert Hahn thinks that opcoc; provides a double contrast: (a) between xauxaq in
line 2 and piav xauxriv in line 4; and (b) between piav £Kdaxr|v in lines 2-3 and
|iiav xauxriv in line 4 [Hahn, 1978; p. 163]. Thus, in the first contrast, the plural "these
monads" (povctbac; xauxaq) is contrasted with "this one" (piav xaux-qv) monad.
Various commentators, including Hahn, have seen in this an attempt by Plato to contrast
the unity of all the monads taken together, on the one hand, with the unity of each monad
taken singly, on the other hand. Friedlander [1969, p. 319], for instance, thinks that the
16
An exception is De Chiara-Quenzer 1993, whose views will be considered below.
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second problem of the passage is: How are the separate monads, unchangeable as they
are, at the same time one monad, i.e., how can they be parts of the one (or unity) itself? A
similar view was proposed in 1901 by Archer-Hind, who thinks that the second question
is: How can it be that these monads, each being individually self-identical and eternal,
are yet one single unity? Archer-Hind further proposed that this question is really about
how the forms are related to the supreme Idea, i.e., to the amo 6 eaxiv dyaOdv of the
Republic and the auxo 6 eaxi ^coov of the Timaeus!^ Thus Archer-Hind saw in the
second question an attempt to ground the being of the forms in the being of the supreme
Idea. Hahn (1978) explicitly relates the being of the monads to the being of the Form of
the Good, which he identifies with the unhypothetical first principle of the Republic that
accounts both for the being and the unity of the forms, as well as for the relation between
the forms and particulars. Thus Hahn thinks the three questions of 15b 1-8 are
interconnected. The first question deals with the being of the forms, the second connects
their being with the source of that being in the Form of the Good, raising the questions of
how the Good allows the forms to be gathered together into a unity and also how it makes
it possible for each form to be a unity; and the third question raises the problem ofhow
the Good allows the unities to be related to the multiplicity of phenomena. Thus, Hahn
thinks that the point of the first contrast introduced by opcoq, that between xauxac;
povdbaq and piav xauxriv, is that to understand a single unity is to see that unity as
being related to the other unities. Plato means here to refer to the problem of “how
unit/e^ are so unified to be revealed as unities...” [Hahn, 1978; p.l63], to which the
17
Archer-Hind 1901: 231. Broos 1951, p. 1 14, accepts the same view.
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implied solution is that they are so unified by their connection with the Form of the
Good, which “gathers” the unities together into the same ontological order [Hahn, 1978;
p. 163]. The third question then asks how each form unites the multifarious phenomena
under itself, and to this, similarly, the solution is to be found in the way in which the
forms as non-sensible unities are related to the Form of the Good.
Against this interpretation it may be pointed out that Tauxaq in line 2 is in the
plural simply because it refers back to the plural povdbaq in the first question.'* As to
the second contrast posed by opcoq, the phrase ^ii'av eKCtarriv does stand in contrast with
friav TauTT|v; but the contrast is spelled out only in what follows the first phrase. The
function of opcoq is to render explicit the contrast indicated in or implied by a participle,
in this case ouaav. Thus, what opcoq contrasts are the following: Each monad's being
del xf|v auxf]v Kai |iqxe yeveaiv fr-qxe 6A,e0pov, and each monad's also being
PePaioxaxa piav xauxr|v. The problem, then, consists in discovering a sense in which
a monad's being always itself, its unchanging character, can be said to stand in contrast
with its being the monad that it is.
Commentators tend to assume that the contrast posed by opcoq must indicate that
the terms being contrasted are incompatible. They then find the question puzzling
because there is clearly no incompatibility here. To cite one example, R. Klibansky
18
Hahn agrees that xauxac; refers back to povdbac;, but insists that xauxac; is meant to
contrast with piav xauxT]v. See Hahn 1978, p. 163.
19
See Smyth 1956: sect. 2082.
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writes: . . . there is for a Platonist no sense in saying that a unit is ‘eternally self-
identical... is the unit that it is’; the last character is implied in the first”.
Klibansky then proposes to emend the text by transposing opcoq before dei in line 3, thus
yielding: then again, how each of these, though being one particular nature, is none the
less most assuredly always the same one that it is, subject to neither generation nor
destruction’.^*^
The difficulty with this solution is that it makes the being of the monad
problematic. On this view the second question is asking: How can a monad be a unity
and yet continue to exist unchanging and remain always itself? But it is doubtful whether
it is the being of the monads that Plato sees as problematic here. The first question of this
passage asks whether we are to suppose that there really are unities that neither come-to-
be nor perish. And yet there is no indication that Plato seriously means to suppose that
there really aren ’t any such unities, or that if there are such unities they do not have true
being. To the contrary, the second question proceeds on the supposition of their truly
being—whether this be interpreted as their really existing or as their being truly units—and
then goes on to ask, what follows ifwe suppose these monads to have true being?
That a monad does not come into being nor perish, that it is always itself, are
facts about its being, while, on the other hand, that it is this monad, that it is the unit that
In Klibansky’s edition of A.E. Taylor’s translation of Philebus. See Taylor 1956: 258.
Textual emendation has been resorted to by commentators ever since debate on this passage
began. For a survey, see Hahn 1978.
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It IS, IS a fact about its unity. Each of the monads is, i.e., has being, really is, or truly
exists, in that each one is unchanging and never comes into being nor perishes. That is
what It means to say that we can suppose a monad as dXr]^(oq ovaaq, truly being. But,
since all the monads are ungenerated, imperishable, and unchanging, then each one has
the samebeing as all the others. This might lead one to think that the monads collectively
are an undifferentiated unity. But then, the unity of each monad, the fact that each one is
distinctly piav xauxriv (one this, this one), implies that each monad is different from all
the other monads. However, it can hardly be said that the being of an entity is
incompatible with its unity. Hence, I think that the contrastive force of opcoc; indicates,
not incompatibility, but mere difference between the two terms being contrasted. The
line of thought, I suggest, is the following: We might think that the being of a monad is
the same aspect of the monad as its unity, but in fact the two aspects are different, and we
can therefore ask: Given that a monad has being, nonetheless how can it have unity? If
we suppose, in other words, that these monads have the being that they have, how do we
account for the uniqueness of each monad?
In the Phaedo, Plato does not make a distinction between the being of a Form and
its unity. The being (ouaia) of a form is what the thing that the Form designates itself \s.
Thus, at Phaedo 65d Plato writes that if there are such things as what is just (biKaiov),
what is fine (KaXov), or what is good (dyaOdv), then the being of (xfjq ouciaq) such
It is clear that this distinction is one that Plato makes, at least in the later dialogues. In the
second hypothesis of Parmenides, 142c-d, Plato refers to being (x6 eoxi) and unity (x6 ev) as
parts (pepri) of the one which is (xou evoc; ovxoc;).
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things just is what each thing happens to be” (6 Tuy^dvEi CKaaiov 6v). Farther on, at
78d, Plato refers to the ouaia of the Equal itself (auTo x6 ictov) and the Fine itself (auto
TO Kakov) as “unvarying, constant, and never admitting of any change whatsoever”
((haauTcoc; Kaid xama E/ei Kai oubenoTE oubapfj oi)5apwc; dUoicoaiv
oi)6E|iiav evSExexai); moreover, the being of a Form is “what each thing itself is, that
which is” (ai)x6 EKaaxov 6 eaxiv, xo 6v, 78d2-3). Thus, in the Phaedo the being of a
Form comprehends two things: (a) its real existence, the fact that it is unvarying,
constant, and admits of no change; and (b) what the Form itself is, its character as a
particular unity. At Republic 507b Plato says, of Beauty itself (KaXov auxo ) and Good
itself (ai)xo dyaOov), that the single form of each (ibeav p,iav eKdaxou) is “the being”
of each (“6 Eaxiv” EKaaxou); the singularity of a Form is contained, as it were, in its
being. In these two middle dialogues, then, Plato makes no distinction between the being
of a form and what the form is as the unit that it is. In these dialogues, to know a Form as
the entity that it is is the same thing as to be acquainted with its being. But in the
Philebus, a distinction is assumed between the being of a monad and its unity or its
uniqueness as an entity.
Philebus 15b2-4 can thus be seen as posing the question of how a Form, having
being, can also have unity. The question brings up the problem of how a Form can be
related to other forms since, in order to have unity, a form must be related to the form of
Unity, in order to have being, to the form of Being, and in order to be different from other
forms, a form must participate in the form of Difference with respect to the other forms.
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and so on. The second question, then, can be interpreted as stating OMP
2
in a general
way, with no specific reference to pleasure. But with reference to pleasure, OMPj is the
problem of how pleasure can be other things besides itself—for instance, how pleasures
can be good or bad, true or false. These and similar questions are properly formulated in
terms of the question how the Form Pleasure can participate in other forms. When he
introduces the OMP at 12c, Socrates says that although pleasure is called by one name, it
comes in many and different forms, fj,op(pd(;. The use of popcpaq makes it likely that
Plato is thinking of kinds, rather than instances, of pleasure. Thus OMP
2 with reference
to pleasure is also the problem of explaining how pleasure can have different forms under
it. Abstractly, OMP
2
is the one-and-many problem of forms in relation to otherforms.
But in regard to pleasure, OMP
2 addresses two distinct problems; (a) how the Form
Pleasure can participate in other Forms; and (b) how the Form Pleasure can have various
sub-Forms under it.
De Chiara-Quenzer [1993, p. 43] agrees that OMP2 is a distinct OMP and is the
problem of forms in relation to other forms. However, she restricts OMP
2 as it applies to
pleasure to (b), that is, to the problem how pleasure can have many, and contrary, sub-
forms. This problem, she points out, is implicit in the discussion in the opening pages of
the dialogue, at 12cl-14a9; but, she claims, it is explicitly referred to for the first time in
22
D.J. Casper similarly argues that Philebus 15b2-4 raises the question: How can the same
form have many characteristics [Casper, 1977; p. 20]? Casper argues that the contrast posed by
opcoc; is that between a monad’s being the monad that it is and its having characteristics. It is not
the particular characteristics (being always itself, unchanging, imperishable, etc.) that stand in
contrast to the monad’s being “this one” monad; rather, what pluralizes the monad is the fact of
its having any characteristics at all, so that aside from being itself, the monad is many other
things [1977, pp. 20-21].
40
the immediate sequel, at 14cl-15a6 [De Chiara-Quenzer, 1993; p. 43 ]. What is explicitly
referred to at 14cl-15a6, however, is the OMP itself, without reference to pleasure; there
Socrates declares that “the many are one” and “the one is many” are amazing things to
say. It must be noted that these expressions are not necessarily equivalent, and that in
fact Socrates refers to them in the plural, saying it is easy to dispute “either of these
positions” (tw TOUTtov OTioiepovouv TiOepevcp, 14c9-10). Socrates then goes on to say
that he is not interested in OMP,.
At this point in the dialogue, we do not know what is the serious form of the OMP
that Socrates is interested in, but the only possibilities that remain are OMPj and OMP
3
.
De Chiara-Quenzer thinks that there are two questions being raised in 15bl-8, and that
the second question is about OMP
3
. But she doesn’t think that this passage concerns the
OMP about pleasure at all. She thinks that in this passage, Plato is merely raising general
questions about the Forms, and in the course of doing so, mentions OMP
3 [1993; p. 43].
Most commentators who think that OMP
3 is raised in 15b 1-8, however, think that OMP3
addresses the OMP about pleasure.
In my view, it is unlikely that Plato would introduce a discussion of problems
concerning the Forms here if the discussion did not concern the OMP about pleasure at
all. This passage purports to be about difficulties concerning the type of unity that is
represented by Pleasure, since with the division of these unities "a great deal of zealous
controversy arises" (15a). If Socrates raises problems about the Forms at all, it is because
the discussion is confronted with serious difficulties concerning the division of Pleasure.
If OMP3 is the OMP that concerns pleasure, then we must understand how it does so.
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3. Why Pleasure is a One-and-Manv
The problem of the discussion at this point is whether monads like humanity, ox,
and the good are really subject to division. This in turn depends on the question how
these unities get pluralized, or become “many.” There is no problem about how
particulars, such as Protarchus, can be simultaneously one and many. A particular can
participate in many, even contrary. Forms. But concerning the unities that neither come-
to-be nor pass away, it is unclear how a one becomes a many. If a monad becomes many
by having many instances, then OMP3 is the relevant problem. In that case, the
philosophical difficulty concerns how pleasure can have many instances.
To this view, Philebus 15b4-8 is surely relevant, since here the question that is
being raised is, how a unity such as a Form can be present in its instances. The text gives
two possibilities. The first is that in having many instances, the one Form itself is
scattered and becomes many (5ica7raap£vr|v xai noXXoL yeyovuiav), and thus the
whole Form is present in each instance. The second possibility is that the Form becomes
separated in itself (6A,riv auxT)v auxfjq xcopi'q), so that only part of the Form is present in
each instance. The second option, Socrates thinks, would appear to be the “most
impossible of all” (tuxvxcov dSuvaxcoxaxov), since the same entity would then as a
whole come to be (i.e., would be present) simultaneously (dpa) in one (in itself) and in
the many (in its instances).
These are, in fact, the difficulties that present themselves when we suppose that a
unitary Form is present in its instances. If a Form is to be present in its instances, then
either the whole of the Form is present in each of the instances, or only part of the Form
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IS present in each. At Parmenides 1 3 1 a-e Plato had put into the mouth of Parmenides the
objections to both alternatives. If the whole Form is present in each of its instances, then,
being one and the same (pia Kai t
]
amii, 131b3-4), the Form will at the same time be
separate from itself (auxf) auific; xcopiq, 131b4-5). But, in that case the Form would not
be one and the same, i.e., the Form would not be unique, since there would be
numerically as many Forms as there are sensible instances of it. Each of the instances
would then be the Form itself. If, on the other hand, only a part of the Form is present in
each of its instances, then, Parmenides objects, the Forms themselves are divisible
(pcpiaxa auid id ci5r|, 131c5). And in that case, as Socrates readily agrees, the one
Form is really divided (d^ri^eioc p8pi(!^Ea0ai, 131cl0), and, consequently, the Form will
not be one (ev, 1 3 IclO). But, if we hold that only part of the Form is present in each
instance, then we could not justify subsuming the instance under the Form, and therefore
we could not explain predication. For predication to be possible, the whole Form must be
present in each instance, but then this would mean that the Form is not unique. Either
alternative has unacceptable consequences for the unity of the Form. These objections
are echoed in the Philebus passage, and both alternatives are there rejected as a solution
to OMP3.
Thus OMP3, as Plato presents it in Philebus 15b4-8, is a problem whose solution
so far has eluded him. OMP3 is an ontological problem; it is the problem ofhow a monad
becomes pluralized in particulars. But if the problem in this part of the Philebus is that of
explaining how monads are subject to division in our discourse, then the relevant sort of
pluralization does not seem to be that of pluralization into particulars. The monads are
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plurahzed in our discourse by their involvement in other monads, not by having many
instances. If particulars are relevant to the issue of division at all, it is only because they
fall into different kinds. Pleasure is to be divided into kinds, and it is the kinds, not the
particular instances, which constitute the many of pleasure.
Gosling suggests that the OMP is a problem about the multiformity of units, but
that the multiformity becomes obvious in and even perhaps arisesfrom the occurrence
of those features in the changing world of instances" [Gosling, 1975; p. 144, underscoring
supplied] . It seems undeniable that the multiformity of particular instances becomes
obvious in the occurrence of features that distinguish one instance from others in the
changing world. But, that the multiformity of instances could arisefrom such
occurrences in the world seems to me contrary to Plato’s view, for it doesn't seem to be
necessary in Plato's view that there be actual instances of sensible particulars which
display the different characteristics of a Form. It seems sufficient that the Form can be
divided in our discourse, in two ways: first, in terms of the other Forms in which it
participates and which are its characteristics and, second, into the other forms which are
its different sub-kinds. Thus, the OMP concerning pleasure is best seen as OMPj. It is
the twin problem of how a monad, while remaining a unity, can have other
characteristics, and how it can have other forms under it. It is thus the problem of how
forms are connected with other forms, in such a way that discourse becomes possible.
The point of the OMP, then, is that dividing the pleasures is equivalent to showing
how the form Pleasure is both one and many. And very early in the dialogue, it becomes
apparent how Socrates wishes to divide Pleasure. It is with moral differences among the
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pleasures that Socrates is concerned, as he shows when he proceeds to contrast the
pleasures of the intemperate man with the pleasure that the moderate man takes in being
moderate (12d). What concerns Socrates is not merely that pleasure takes many forms,
but that its various forms reveal moral differences, so that it would be ‘thoughtless’
(dvoTiToq, 12d5), for instance, to say that the pleasures of the moderate and those of the
intemperate man are alike. Socrates’ complaint against Protarchus, then, is this:
Protarchus is arguing that pleasure is the good without first having distinguished its
different kinds, but an examination of the forms of pleasure readily discloses that there
are good as well as bad pleasures. The basic distinction Socrates vvishes to make, then,
is between good pleasures and bad pleasures as kinds of pleasures.
The distinction has a direct bearing on (PI), for Socrates is reminding Protarchus
that if (PI) is true then the following is also true:
(G) All pleasant things are good.
But Protarchus does not wish to deny that the pleasures of the intemperate man are in
some sense bad; he replies that in Socrates’ example the pleasures are from contrary
conditions (octt’ evavxicov 7ipaypdTcov,12d7-8) whereas, in themselves, the pleasures are
not contrary. Pleasure, “this thing itself’ (touto amb eauxco, 12el), could not possibly
be unlike pleasure (12d). Protarchus would not go from (PI) directly to (G); rather, for
him the following conditional holds:
(PGl) If pleasure is the good, then pleasure itself is good.
And so too, this further conditional:
Cf White, 1982; pp. 55-56.
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(PG2) If pleasure itself is good, then all pleasant things are good.
Thus, Protarchus accepts the link between (PI) and (G) on the assumption that there is
such a thing as the pleasure itself, and it is this, pleasure in itself, which he thinks is good.
Considered in itself, pleasure is “most like pleasure” (12e), and pleasure cannot be
contrary to itself.
Socrates replies by raising an analogy: Color, too, is like color, and yet its parts
(pepri) can be contrary; black not only differs from white but “happens to be the most
contrary to it” (tw bidcpopov eivai Kai evavxicoTaxov 6v Tuyxdvei, 12e5-6).
Similarly, the parts of pleasure, its kinds, can be contrary. The point of the analogy with
colors is that a unity can contain opposite, even contrary, parts and still be the unity that it
is. However, if good pleasures and bad pleasures are contrary kinds subsumed under the
umty ‘Pleasure,’ then clearly there is a problem. For, this is incompatible with saying
that pleasure is the good, since if pleasure is the good then by definition all pleasant
things are good. Socrates thinks of the unity of pleasure in terms of what kinds may or
may not fall under the Form Pleasure. If pleasure is the good, then we ought not to be
able to find among its sub-kinds the kind ‘bad pleasure’. But this is simply to say that
pleasure must have no connections with evil.
Protarchus thus agrees to the color analogy on the assumption that pleasure is
something that in itselfalready has a nature. Protarchus thinks that pleasure, considered
in itself, does not divide into kinds; and, since pleasure in itself is good, then there are
really no bad pleasures. It is only as it is called in speech that pleasure may divide into
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kinds; some of the kinds are even ealled bad pleasures, but this is because they arise from
bad conditions, not because they are in themselves bad. Protarchus thus accepts the Unity
of Good Principle too, but he thinks of the unity of pleasure differently from Socrates.
For Protarchus, the articulation of pleasure into kinds is misleading; it conceals the true
unity of pleasure.
C. Protarchus’ Hedonism
I think we can clarify the unity of pleasure from Protarchus’ point of view by
asking whether there is some feature that all instances of pleasure have in common.
Socrates holds that, if there were such a feature, this could not be the feature being a
pleasure, since, similarly, all colors are alike in being a color and yet colors may differ to
the extent that some are even opposites (12e-13a). For, there is no one feature that all and
only colors have, and it won’t do merely to say that colors are all alike in being colors.
Protarchus apparently accepts this claim in regard to color, but his position is that, unlike
color, there is such a feature which all and only pleasures have, and that this accounts for
the unity of the kind Pleasure. Furthermore, for Protarchus this feature is necessarily
good, either by being identical with the quality goodness or by being necessarily a good
feature. Therefore all pleasures are pleasures by virtue of possessing this feature, and all
pleasures are good by virtue of this feature possessing the further quality of goodness or
being identical to the quality of goodness. Protarchus thus accepts, but Socrates rejects,
the following principle:
(R) IfX and y are F, then x cannot be unlike y, and x cannot be contrary
to y.
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Does (R) express Protarchus’ position adequately? Protarchus’ view is that, if x and;; are
both pleasures, then x cannot be unlike;; in sofar as x andy are both pleasures, and so
they cannot be contraries. Thus we can make (R) more precise:
(R
1 ) IfX and ;; are F, then x cannot be unlike y in being F, and x cannot
be contrary to;; in being F.
Thus the pleasures of the intemperate man and those of the moderate man do not differ
qua pleasures; for Protarchus, they differ only in that they arise from contrary conditions.
Furthermore, it seems that for Protarchus pleasure is something that accompanies
an activity [Gosling 1975, p. 74; Frede 1993, p. xviii]. If this view is correct, then the
following further revision of (R) more closely approximates Protarchus’ position:
(R2) IfX and y are F, then there is some ^ which accompanies x and also
y, and x and jv; are F by virtue of having f
If (R2) adequately represents Protarchus’ position, then we can say that Protarchus thinks
of the unity of pleasure in terms of something that all instances of pleasure have in
common. Thus, what unites various pleasures into one kind is that there is some one
thing which accompanies all pleasurable experiences. Moreover, Protarchus is
committed to the claim that the
(f)
in (R2) is always in itself good. Thus, that pleasure is
the good for human beings entails that there cannot be any pleasant experiences which,
qua pleasant, are not good, so that for Protarchus, (G) is implied by (PI). (G) is in fact
directly attributed by Socrates to Protarchus, in 13b4-5 (“...for you say that all pleasant
things are good...”).
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Socrates, however, evidently rejects (R2), for immediately after attributing (G) to
Protarchus he challenges him to name that one feature which both the good and the bad
pleasures have, “and by which you call all pleasures good” (13b). Protarchus rejects
Socrates’ demand:
Prot. How do you mean, Socrates? Do you really think that someone will
concede this, having set down pleasure to be the good, and allow your saying
that some pleasures are good, while some others are bad?
Soc. But then at least you will say that they are unlike one another and some
are contraries.
Prot. Not at all, insofar, at least, as they are pleasures (13b6-c5).
Protarchus will not be led into making the apparently contradictory claim that bad
pleasures are good. His view is that all pleasures, in sofar as they are pleasures, are
good, and this can be interpreted as the claim that whatever that feature is which
accompanies all pleasures has the quality goodness. This means that all pleasures are,
qua pleasures, alike. Thus all pleasures are good only if all pleasures, qua pleasures, are
alike.
On the other hand, Socrates’ position implies that if there were some feature that
all pleasures possess by virtue of being pleasures, then this feature would have to be
shared by both the good pleasures and the bad. Their character as good or bad would
supervene upon the feature that is common to all pleasant experiences, so that moral
differences among pleasures entail a difference in what the pleasures are. Thus, even if
Socrates were to grant that some one feature
(f)
accompanied contrary pleasures, the
(f>
would not individuate the pleasures. Moreover, given (R2), (PI) would not entail (G),
since (R2) neither states nor entails that the feature <zJis good. The instances of which
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accompany contrary pleasures could just as well be contraries, for instance if some of
them are good and some bad. A pleasant <z>is not eo ipso good; its goodness, if it is good,
would be due not to its pleasant character but to something else.
An impasse is avoided when Socrates points out that, in regard to intelligence, it
could likewise be said that there are many knowledges {epistemai), and some are
contrary to each other:
Soc. All the knowledges taken together will be thought to be many and some of them are
unlike one another, if indeed some turn out in some way to be contraries, would I be
worthy of conversing right now if, fearing this thing itself, I declare that in its coming to
be, no knowledge is unlike any other knowledge, and then in this way our argument, just
as if it were a myth, would perish and be lost,’ while we ourselves are saved on the
grounds of some absurdity? (13e9-14a5)
It is at this point that Protarchus concedes that there are many and contrary kinds of
pleasure, just as there are “many and unlike knowledges” (7ro?L?iai 5e eTriaxfiiiai
Kai 5id(popoi, 14a8-9). Protarchus now grants that there are contrary kinds of pleasure
because he sees that Socrates will similarly encounter contrary kinds of knowledge;
Protarchus is confident that just as there won’t turn out to be bad kinds of knowledge,
Socrates will see that there really aren’t any bad kinds of pleasure. On the other hand,
Socrates is confident that even if the kinds of knowledge were laid out and some kinds
turned out to be contraries, there still wouldn’t turn out to be kinds of knowledge that are
bad in themselves, whereas there would turn out to be pleasures that are bad in
themselves.
Thus, if pleasure is the good then pleasure must be a unity. And if pleasure is a
unity, then all pleasant things must be good, and they are good in so far as they are
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pleasant. If not all pleasant things are good qua pleasant, then either pleasure is not the
good, or else pleasure does not possess a single nature. Protarchus, therefore, is
concerned to maintain that all pleasant things are good in so far as they are pleasant. We
have seen that this can be interpreted as the claim that there is some feature that all
instances of pleasure possess, and which makes them all pleasures. The claim that
pleasure is the good then entails the claim that this common feature is by definition good.
If pleasures differ, it is not qua pleasures that they differ but as arising from contrary
conditions. This is why, I think, Protarchus makes the concession that Socrates had
earlier (13c) asked for, namely:
(M) The pleasures are many and some are contrary to each other.
That is to say, Protarchus thinks that (M) is compatible with saying that all pleasures are
alike in sofar as they are pleasures. For Protarchus, this is not the empty claim that all
pleasures are alike in being pleasures; it is the claim that they are all alike in possessing
whatever it is that makes them all pleasures, and therefore that contrary kinds of pleasure
arise from contrary conditions of occurrence rather than from contrary natures. Thus (M)
is consistent with a principle which Protarchus has just reasserted in 13a, namely:
(I) Pleasures are all, qua pleasures, alike.
Socrates’ position, however, makes (M) incompatible with (I), that is to say, if the
pleasures are many and its kinds are contrary, then it cannot be the case that all pleasures
are alike qua pleasures, i.e., they must differ in their natures. If (M) entailed the falsity of
(I), we would have the following, valid, argument:
1 . If pleasure is the good for living beings, then all pleasant things are good.
(Pl)^(G)
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2. All pleasant things are good only if pleasure is some one
(G) (O)






If the pleasures are many and some are contrary to each other,
then pleasures are not all, qua pleasures, alike. (M) -> ~(I)
The pleasures are many and some are contrary to each other. (M)
Therefore: Not all pleasant things are good. ~(G)
Therefore: Pleasure is not the good for living beings. ~(P1).
But Socrates does not have, nor does he claim to have, the fourth premise. In order to
have the fourth premise, he needs to show that pleasures can differ in a way that makes
them unlike one another qua pleasures. If he can show this, then he will have shown that
for pleasures (though not for knowledges), contrariety in kind means contrariety in
nature, not merely in attendant conditions, and thus that some pleasures can be bad in
their nature. It is just this that the notion of a false pleasure is intended to show. The
demonstration that there is a genos of pleasures that are bad in their natures constitutes a
refutation of the claim that all pleasant things are good, and therefore of (PI). At this
point Socrates announces the need for further examinations of both pleasure and
intelligence: “. . .let us be daring (xo^iimpcv) and find out whether, being questioned
(e>L8yxdp8voi) in some way, they would reveal whether one ought to say that the good is
pleasure or thought or whether it is some other third thing” (14b3-4).
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D. The God-Given Method and the Divisions of Pleasure and KnowleH^P
The method of this examination is the god-given method (Oewv eiq dvOpcortouq
56aiq, 16c5). It is the method, Socrates says, whereby everything that belongs to techne
has been discovered. Some commentators see a Pythagorean provenance to the method,
but the ensuing description of the method makes it sound similar to the method of
Collection and Division prominent in Plato’s late dialogues. The method is based on the
claim, purportedly revealed through a divine source, that “whatever things are said to be
always come out of the one and many, having within themselves both limit and
unlimitedness”(e^ evoq pev Kai 7roX>.d)v ovtcov tqv dei ^.syopevcov eivai, Ttepaq
6e Kai dTtcipiav ev auxoiq aupcpuTov exovxcov, 16c9-10). The method involves
positing (Oepeiv) a single form (piav ibeav) for each one of the things that are
generated out of the one and the many. That is to say, faced with an indefinite plurality
we must look for one idea under which to unite the members of the plurality, i.e., we
must collect the multiplicity of phenomena or particulars under one idea. After we get
hold (pciaXaPeiv) of this one idea we next posit two ideas, and examine “whether they
are in some way” (ei Ttcoq siai, 16d3). This sounds like the method of division, or at any
rate it is a method of systematically arriving at the various articulations of a concept. If
this is division, however, Plato is clearly not claiming that the division is necessarily
bifurcatory, for he continues: “and if not, three or some other number,” and we must also
examine these, “until we see of the original one not only that it is one, or many, or
unlimited, but also how many they are (pexpi^^P to Kax’ apx^q ev pf) 6xi ev xai
noXXoc Kai dTieipd eaxi povov iSp xiq, dXXcc Kai OTioaa, 16d5-7). What is essential to
the method, then, is the positing of one idea over an indefinite manifold, and the
articulation of this idea into subordinate ones, until we reach a definite number; only then
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can we apply the form of the unlimited to the manifold (too dTicipoo i6eav npbq
7rA,fjao(; ... Tipoacpepeiv,! 6d7-8). When we have seen the entire number between the
unlimited and the one (xov dpiOpov auxoC Trdvxa ... xov pexa^u xoO dTieipoo xe
Kai xou evoq, 16d8-el), then we may “let loose” all of the intermediate ones into the
unlimited (eiq x6 driEipov pe&evxa xctipeiv edv, 16e2). Thus one should not dismiss
an indefinite plurality before one beholds (KaxiSp) the exact number of ones that are
between (pexa^u) the initial one and the unlimited. I suggest that these ones or units are
intermediates of some sort (forms, kinds, characteristics—i.e., intensional entities)
between the initial one and the elements in the indefinite manifold, and as such they are
parts of the one under investigation. Thus, all that Plato need be saying here is that to
understand a unity is to know its parts well. If we maintain this minimal interpretation
then we can make sense of both the examples that Socrates proceeds to give, and see the
relevance of this passage to the problem of the dialogue.
Socrates’ first example of the application of the method is that of letters. Sound
((pcovf]) is one, i.e., vocalized sound is a unity that we can hold in our minds. But to be
knowledgeable about letters is not merely to know this, nor is it merely to know that there
are indefinitely many vocal sounds producible by humans. Rather, what makes us
knowledgeable (aocpoi) about letters is that we know, concerning vocal sounds, how
many they are and what their nature is (oxi noaa x’ eaxi Kai OTioia, 17b8-9). Socrates
attributes to a certain Theuth in Egypt the discovery of the craft of grammar
24
Plato uses the phrase peSevxa xotipsiv eav, which implies that the “setting loose”
(peftevxa) is a dismissing (xai'peiv) of the unlimited plurality from one’s mind, putting it away
or renouncing it. See the entry on xaipca (v, 2) in Liddell and Scott.
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(Ypan^aTiKTjv xe^vriv, 1 8d2). Theuth was the first to grasp vocalized sound as the
proper domain of this techne. He divided vocal sound into vowels (id (pcovfjevxa), of
which some have sound, i.e., are voiced, and others, while unvoiced (cpwvric; pev ou,
18cl), partake of some noise ((pOoyyou 5e pcxexovxd xivoq, 18cl). These two vowel
forms make up two kinds of letters (ypappdxwv, 18c2). A third kind (ei8o(;) of letters
are the mutes or consonants (dcpcova, 1 8c4), which are both unvoiced and do not partake
of any noise. Then, Theuth divided (bifipci) each kind as far as each single unit
(pexpi evoq eKdaxou, 18c4), and he gave the name “element” (axoixeiov, 18c6) to
“each one and all of them together” (cvi xe EKdaxw Kai cupTiaai, 1 8c6). An exactly
similar scheme is amved at in the case of musical sound (17c). Musical sound is divided
into three kinds of pitch or tone (dwpEv): low (papu), high (6^i5), and even pitch
(opoxovov). Further analysis consists in grasping the number and the nature of the
intervals that are possible from one end of the scale to the other, and finding out what
systems of notes are possible given these intervals. Schematically, both analyses may be
represented in this way:
O
There can, of course, be any number of cps, and any number of subdivisions within each
(p, but the feature to note here is that the various cps are not isolated but rather are linked
together, through their further divisions, in a continuum, so that each of the subdivisions
is a definite position on the continuum, with each position representing a definite ratio
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between the two terminal points. The lowermost level of the illustration may be
represented in this way:
Thus the lowest units are linked from one end of the scale to the other. The schema also
provides a sense in which the original one (to Kax’ ccpxaq ev, 16d5) can be, not only
many, but “without limit” (dTieipa, 16d6), even though it has a definite number (oTioaa,
16d7). For, the number of possible positions on the continuum is indefinitely many,
since a continuum is indefinitely divisible. Any techne will, however, pick out a
definite collection of points on the continuum as stoicheia; thus, for any techne the
number of actual positions on the continuum is a definite number. Only when we have
identified this definite number may we dismiss the indefinite plurality from our attention.
Thus, the god-given method promises to resolve one-and-many problems by
displaying the limit (Trepaq) and the indefmiteness (ccTieipov) that all things have within
themselves (16c-d). For pleasure and intelligence, accordingly, the problem is to state
“how each of them is one and many, and how each one is not unlimited straightaway, but
at some point acquires for itself some number prior to its having become unlimited
(tiox; eaxiv ev Kai noXXa. ai)xd)v eKdxepov, Kai tiux; pf) drcsipa euSuq, aXXd xivd
25
Thus, Mitchell Miller supposes that in the letter example, the ends of the continuum are, on
the one hand, maximal release of breath, for the voiced vowels, and, on the other hand, maximal
cutting off of breath, for the (unvoiced) consonants. The unvoiced vowels mark a middle
position. The nature of a letter consists in how far breath is released and how far it is cut off
when the sound of the letter is uttered. Each letter is then a specific balance of two opposites.
See Miller, 1990; p.331 ff
26
As Gosling 1975, p. 169 ff. points out. See also Miller 1990, p. 334.
56
7TOTC dpi^fiov eKdxspov e^TTpoadev KCKTrixai xou dTieipa ai)xd)v CKaaxa
ycyovevai, 18e9-19a2). One sense, therefore, in which pleasure is indefinite is that it has
many forms (ei6ti fi6ovfiq, 19b2), and the relevant task is that of finding out whether
these forms “are or are not, and how many they are and what kinds” (eixc eaxiv eixe pfj,
Kai OTiOCTa eaxi Kai orroia, 19b3). But another sense in which pleasure is indefinite
that also comes out of this passage is that, in the beginning of an inquiry into pleasure,
each of the kinds of pleasure is an as yet undetermined ratio between the phenomena at
the two ends of the scale. Understanding whether these kinds “are or are not” then
consists in specifying the definite ratio that constitutes each kind. Suppose we think of
one end of the scale as maximal purity of pleasure with no admixture of pain, and the
other end as minimal pleasure with maximal admixture of pain. Then we can think of
each kind of pleasure in terms of a definite ratio between pleasure and pain.
Does Socrates apply the god-given method to the analyses of pleasure and
intelligence in 3 lb-59c? Unable to see the relevance of Socrates’ discussion of the
method to the problem before them, Philebus and Protarchus each express some
impatience (18d, 20a). Finally, Protarchus asks Socrates to decide, on his own, whether
or not to divide the forms of pleasure and knowledge (21a5-8). Even before this,
however, Socrates had remarked that they will have no further need of matters concerning
the division of the forms of pleasure (xf]v Siaipeoiv eibwv fiSovfis, 20c4-5). On the
face of it, all this seems to mean that the entire discussion of the god-given method is
being set aside and that the method will no longer be applied to the problem of the
dialogue. This, in turn, would imply that (PI) was being abandoned altogether. And yet
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if we look at the divisions of pleasure and intelligence that make up 31 b-59c, the
divisions can be seen as following the structure of the examples in the passage on the
god-given method. A simple schematic illustration of the divisions in those passages can





Purely ^chic Of the soul and Pm^ bodily
body together
The Division of Pleasure, 31b-52b.
Knowledge
Dialectic Technai concerned with The manual technai
The mathematical The mathematical More precise Less precise
technai of the technai of the many technai technai
philosophers
The Division of Knowledge, 55b-59c.
It is natural to see the divisions as a breaking down into infima species. However, a
striking feature of the structures is the horizontal continuity of the ultimate kinds of
pleasure and of knowledge. In each case, there is a gradation of purity from one end of
the scale to the other. Thus, the truest pleasures are those which are unmixed with any
pain whatsoever and, in addition, are experienced in the soul alone. Pure bodily pleasures
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that are unmixed with pain are better than those pleasures experienced in the soul alone
but which are mixed with pain. The latter, in turn, are better than those pleasures mixed
with pain and are experienced together in both the soul and the body. The lowest species
of pleasure are those that are mixed with pain and are experienced in the body alone.
Thus, the classification grades pleasures along two dimensions of purity: in terms of
admixture with pain, and in terms of involvement with the body, the first dimension
being more important. At a point on this continuum Plato draws the line between the
good pleasures and the bad ones. The two major divisions under Pleasure, i.e.,
unmixed/true and mixed/false, correspond respectively to good pleasures and bad
pleasures, of which the former are to be included in the good mixed life and the latter to
be excluded.
The “division,” then, is not so much a genus-species classification as an
elaboration of a determinable into its determinates, with the ultimate determinates
27
making up a continuum of possibilities on a scale. Each determinate is therefore both
an ultimate kind of the thing under classification, and a specific balance of the two
28
opposites being combined. Thus, any two subsets of the ultimate kinds may be
opposites if they fall far enough away from each other on the scale.
27
The distinction between a determinable and its determinates is due to W.E. Johnson [1921,
chapter 10]. A more recent discussion of the distinction is Searle 1959.
28
This seems to me to be what Julius Moravcsik is actually suggesting in Moravcsik 1979, p.
88 ff, contrary to Dancy 1984, who writes: “Moravcsik (1979, 87ff.) seems to think that the
Philebus' divisions are concerned exclusively with determinates and determinables” [Dancy
1984, p. 186 n. 57]. In fact Moravcsik states that the classification in the Philebus is a “hybrid”
form of the two different schemes of classification [Moravcsik, 1979; p. 88].
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This brings the classification into line with the analogy that Socrates used when
the OMP was first introduced at 12e. There, Protarchus says that since pleasure is most
like pleasure, the various pleasures must be like one another, because they are all
instances of the same thing. In reply, Socrates says that color, too, is like color, and yet
various colors can differ and be contraries. The various colors, however, are related to
color not so much as species to genus as various determinates to a determinable.
Similarly, pleasure and knowledge can both be thought of as determinables whose
determinates are ultimate kinds arranged along a scale.
The means for dividing pleasure and knowledge are therefore on hand by the
conclusion of the passage on the god-given method. Why, then, isn’t the division of
pleasure and of knowledge carried out at that point? The hedonist position at that point is
still (PI), and it is clear that a division of pleasures that yields a class of pleasures that are
bad in themselves would have been a decisive refutation of (PI). But, refuting (PI) does
not by itself establish (S), i.e., to say that pleasure is not the good for all living beings is
not to say that intelligence is better than pleasure, even for the limited class of beings that
are capable of both pleasure and intelligence. If the purpose of the god-given method is
to refute (PI), then the method is not sufficient to establish (S). The introduction of (P3)
as the reformulated hedonist position, however, resets the terms of the argument, since
the denial of (P3) entails the truth of (S).
In introducing (P3), Socrates claims to have previously heard, or perhaps dreamt,
that whatever is the good must be perfect (icAeov), sufficient (iKavov), and worthy of
our choice (aipexoc;) [20b6-21e4]. The shift is from the question, what is the good for
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living beings, to the different question, what kind of life is the good life for such beings.
The good life for human beings must combine the different human capacities in a certain
way, and since pleasure is one of these capacities, it follows that pleasure is an element in
the good life. But it doesn’t follow that pleasure in itself or by itself is a good. Neither
intelligence by itself nor pleasure by itself can render a human life good. The good is that
element in a good human life that accounts for that life’s being perfect, sufficient, and
worthy of our choice. And, either pleasure or intelligence is closer in nature to this
element. At this point, Protarchus concedes that pleasure has “collapsed, just as if struck
down by the present arguments” (22e5-6). But it must be noted that when Protarchus
says this, the acknowledged hedonist position is still (PI), and it is (PI), then, which is
refuted by the argument that Socrates has just given. (PI) is refuted by this argument
because (PI) is a claim for the “victor’s prize” (first prize) on behalf of pleasure.
Intelligence, on the other hand, never contended for the victor’s prize but only for second
prize. However, with the adoption of (P3) as the reformulated hedonist position, pleasure
is no longer claiming first prize; like mind, it is now claiming only second prize. And so
if (P3) could be shown to be true, then pleasure would still turn out to be superior to
mind. Thus Socrates says there is still a need to examine pleasure, to apply to pleasure
“the most precise inquiry by torture” (Tf)v dKpi(38ax(XTr|v TipoacpepovTa pdaavov,
23a7), and “to bring her to the test by paining her” (abxfj e^8A,eyxovTa A,u7i:8iv, 23a7-8).
He then remarks what a long argument still remains for them, and that they must have
“another contrivance . . . weapons, as it were, different from the previous arguments, in
going for second prize on behalf of mind” (23b7-8), but then immediately adds, “perhaps
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some are the same ones” (23b9). In saying this, Socrates is surely referring to the god-
given method. But the new contrivance is the classification of all existents into four
ontological kinds.
E. The Four Ontological Kinds and the Good
Socrates proposes to divide “all the things that are now in the whole” (Ttdvxa id
- » , - ^ 29
vuv ovxa ev xo) rravxi, 23c4) into four kinds. The first two kinds, the indefinite
(x6 drieipov) and the limit (x6 Tiepaq), are clearly fundamental. When Socrates
introduces them he makes an unmistakable reference to the discussion of the god-given
method, for he asks, “We were saying that surely the god showed the indefinite in beings,
and the limit?” (Tov Qeov c>.£yopev ttou x6 pev dneipov xwv ovxcov xo
5e Tiepaq;—23c9-10). This clearly refers to the statement in 16c9-10 that “whatever
things are said to be always come out of the one and many, having within themselves
both limit and indefiniteness” (e^ evoq pev Kai 7roA,A.(i)v ovxcov xchv dei Xeyopevcov
eivai, Tiepaq 5e Kai driEipiav ev auxoiq aupcpuxov exovxcov). So here we are told
that everything that is has both the indefinite and the limit in them. This anticipates the
third ontological kind, the meikton or the mixed kind, which is a combination of the
apeiron and peras.
A significant logical feature of the new classification, however, is the division of
the kinds themselves into one and many. The apeiron and peras, we are told, are
themselves each both one and many (23e3-6). The one of the apeiron is its simple nature,
which consists in being subject to the more and the less (xo paA,A,6v xe Kai ijxxov, 24a9).
29
Throughout the discussion in this section of the dialogue, Socrates refers to the four kinds
indifferently as ei5r| or yevr| of things.
62
That is to say, the apeiron itself, viewed as a unity, is simply this condition of being
subject to indefinite quantity. This condition, in turn, has many forms: the many of the
apeiron are the different modes of being subject to the more and the less, such as: being
hotter and colder (24b), drier and wetter, greater and less, quicker and slower, bigger and
smaller (25c), high and low, fast and slow (26a). These examples are all of qualities
along a scale, so that the relation between the one of the apeiron and its many may be
said to be that of quantity to the different sensed qualities which are its manifestations.
This distinction between the one and the many in each of the ontological kinds is missed
by some commentators. Schipper 1965, for instance, identifies the apeiron with “the
limitless sensed qualities, varying in degree, the ‘hotter and colder,’ the ‘more or less,’
the ‘more violent and more gentle,’ the ‘greater and smaller,’ and the other felt and
opposite qualities” [Schipper 1965; p. 47]-i.e., the many of the apeiron only. The
apeiron, however, is not simply the gradation or continuum of sensed qualities; it is the
very process of shifting along the continuum of qualities, with the underlying absence of
definite quantity. It is of the nature of an apeiron to be always seeking completion but
never coming to it; when it finds completion, the apeiron itself would have come to an
end (24b). Plato is thus describing what it means for something to be a process. The
apeiron is the ontological principle that is at work in all things that are in process.
Processes come to an end when “the so much” (to noaov, 24c3, 6) is established, i.e.,
when a definite quantity or magnitude comes about. This amounts to the imposition of a
limit on the process. Thus, on the other hand, peras is the principle of limit that halts
process and brings about definite quantity in things (24c-d). As to the many ofperas,
Socrates gives these as examples: the Equal and Equality (to laov xai iaoTr|Ta, 25a7);
and, the Double (to 5i7iA,daiov, 25a8). These, when imposed upon an indefinite, “puts in
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number” (ev^EiGa dpi&iaov, 25e2) and causes things to become commensurate and
harmonious (auppeTpa Kai aupcpcova dnepYCxCeiai, 25el). Thus, the one of the limit
"its nature—consists in the imposition of number. When number is imposed upon an
indefinite quantity in process, the result is that “certain becomings” (yeveaEiq xivdq,
25e4) emerge. That is to say, things as we know them come-to-be. Thus we have the
third ontological kind, x6 peiKxov or the mixed kind, which results from combining the
limit and the indefinite. This kind comprises all the things that are said to be, including
all objects and phenomena in the world. The many of the third kind are thus the
innumerable things that come to be (xtjq yeveaecoq, 26c8-9) whenever limit is imposed
upon an indefinite. The one of the third kind is the coming-into-being (yeveaic; eiq
ouaiav, 26d8) which constitutes the combining of the peras and the apeiron. Here is a
summary of the one and the many of the first three ontological kinds;
1. The Indefinite One : indefinite quantity in process
Many: various qualitative opposites on a scale
2. The Limit One: number/ratio
Many: various definite ratios
3. The Mixture One: genesis into determinate being
Many: various becomings
Up to this point, what the classifications explain is how things are generated out
of the indefinite, i.e., how things come into being. It will be recalled, however, that
Socrates, in describing the imposition ofperas upon the apeiron, at one point describes
the result as causing things to become “commensurate and harmonious” (25el). Now this
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seems to say more than that things come into being when limit is imposed upon an
indefinite, it seems in addition to say that when such imposition takes place, things are
constituted as commensurate and harmonious, and therefore as the orderly and good
things that they are. Such, in fact, is the view held by John Cooper (1977). Cooper notes
that Socrates gives as examples of the meikton such things as health (25e8), music (26a4),
the seasons (26b 1), beauty and fine qualities of character (26b6-7), and the pleasures
included in the good life, such as the pleasures of learning the truth (52c4-dl). Cooper
then remarks:
In fact, in placing these things in the third genus Socrates seems to imply (though he does
not openly state) not just that all the members of this genus are good things but that their
being the good things they are is a consequence of their being constituted by a
combination of Tiepaq and dneipov. That is, he seems to adopt the view that to be a
good thing just is to be such a combination [Cooper, 1977, p. 715; emphasis in the
original.]
30
It is evident that the text of the four kinds passage supports this interpretation.
However, in the transition from the four kinds passage to the analysis of pleasure,
Socrates makes it clear that pleasures and pains both arise in the meikton. Here is the
exchange at the beginning of that passage:
Soc. So, then, is it to you just as it seems to me concerning the origin of these things?
Prot. What things?
Soc. It would seem that by nature pain and pleasure arise, at the same time, in the mixed
kind [ev xco koivw yevei].
Prot. My dear Socrates, remind us what ever you mean by the mixed kind you have
mentioned. ...
30
Barker 1996, p. 156, and Moravcsik 1979, p. 98, also maintain this view based on
consideration of the passage on the four kinds.
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Soc. Well, then, the mixed kind answers to that which, of the four, we spoke of as the
Prot The one you mentioned after the indefinite and the limit, and in which you put
health and also, I think, harmony?
Soc. You speak most finely (3 1 b8-d 1 ).
In saying that pleasure arises in the mixed kind, Socrates is surely referring to the many
of pleasure, that is, to the different kinds of pleasure as they arise in us. He is in fact
about to enumerate and discuss these kinds. As to the one of pleasure, this is shortly to
be defined in the ensuing discussion; but, already, the one of pleasure has been assigned
to the apeiron in the preceding passage on the four kinds, at 27e. There, pleasure was
characterized as being by nature indefinite in its fullness and increase” (ccTreipov
ETuyxavc TiecpuKoq Kai Kai xm pdUov, 27e8-9), that is, it is intrinsically
subject to the more and the less. Socrates now reminds Protarchus of their agreement on
that view:
Soc. And also the kind [to yevoc;] to which pleasure belongs came to light some time
ago.
Prot. Indeed.
Soc. Then let us remember this too about both, that mind was akin to cause and nearly of
its kind, but pleasure is indefinite in itself and of that kind [xou yevouq] which in and by
itself neither has nor will have a beginning, middle, or end (3 1 a5- 1 0).
As it will turn out, all the many pleasures, both the good and the evil ones, and also both
those which are part of the good life and those which are not, belong in the meikton.
Notwithstanding the nature of the examples of the many of the mixed kind in the passage
on the four kinds, the many of pleasure clearly includes both its good and its bad kinds.
Moreover, pains likewise arise, and thus belong in, the mixed kind. Thus, to be a
member of the mixed kind is not the same thing as to be a good thing-contrary to
Cooper’s view.
66
What, then, is the one of pleasure? What, in other words, is the nature of pleasure
itself? In the section where pleasure is analyzed, this question is the first to receive an
answer. Pleasure, according to Socrates, is e^plerosis, the filling up or replenishment that
restores a living being to physical harmony. In Socrates’ words, pleasure “in and by itself
neither has nor will have a beginning, middle, or end.” Pleasure, in other words, is a
process; the one of pleasure is this process of restoration to physical harmony.^ ^ The
many of pleasure, on the other hand, are the various “becomings” (geneseis) that emerge
when some limit is imposed on this process. These geneseis correspond to the various
types of true and false pleasures whose discussion constitutes Plato's analysis of pleasure
in the Philebus.
I suggested in the previous section that, in regard to pleasure and intelligence, the
claim that everything has within itself both limit and indefmiteness has at least two
meanings: (a) that pleasure and intelligence each have an indefinite but determinable
number of different forms; (b) that each ultimate form is a determinate ratio between two
contrasting elements. Clearly, it is in the sense of (b) that all things can be said to have
the apeiron in them. For, everything that comes into being is a definite ratio of the
limiting element and the indefinite. This, we may assume, is true of each of the kinds of
pleasure and of knowledge.
Thus the one of pleasure is not simply [the fact] that it belongs in the class of the apeiron
or that it is a process, but what process it is. Dorothea Frede thinks that the ‘generic definition’ of
pleasure is [the fact] that pleasure in itself belongs in the apeiron and lacks a beginning, middle,
or end [Frede 1996, p. 230]. But, if that were the case, then everything that is in the class of the
apeiron would have the same generic definition. The lack of a beginning, middle or end, i.e., the
fact of its being a process, I have argued here, is the one of the apeiron itself, not of pleasure.
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If my account of the first three kinds is correct, however, it is the coming into
being (yeveaiq eic; ouaiav) of pleasures, not their being good or evil, that is explained
by the combining oiperas and apeiron. We still need an explanation of what makes any
particular thing good. In the passage on the four kinds, we are told that the right
combination (opOf) Koivcovi'a, 25e7) oiperas and apeiron generates health, and also the
most complete and most perfect music (pouaiKpv aupTiaaav TEX,Ec5xaTa, 26a4). The
right combination also takes away “the much too much and the indefinite” (to noXh
Xiav Kai airEipov, 26a7); when these are taken away, then the measured (to eppEtpov,
26a7) and the commensurate (to cuppEtpov, 26a8) are produced. This suggests that not
just any ratio ofperas and apeiron will generate a good thing. Indeed when Socrates
first speaks of the coming-into-being of things out of the combining ofperas and apeiron,
he refers separately to “the so much,” i.e., definite quantity (to Tioaov, 24c6) and “the
measured” (to pstpiov, 24c7). He describes the more and the less as capable of making
TO Tioaov vanish, but also capable of taking in to Tioadv. When the apeiron takes in
definite quantity, then the apeiron ceases to be, but the resulting mixture is not
necessarily a good mixture. It is, however, a determinate quantity or, in other words, a
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definite ratio of the limit to the indefinite. Thus, the presence of a limit does not by
A point raised by Neil Cooper in Cooper 1968, p. 13.
Here is my translation of this crucial passage (24b4-d7):
Soc. And always, we say, the more and the less are in the hotter and the colder.
Prot. Certainly. (continued)
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Itself determine a thtng to be a good thing; a limit is not what makes a thing good but
what makes it determinate. Without a limit nothing can he a good thing, but only things
that have the proper limits are good things.
Soc. Well, then, our argument always indicates to us that the pair does not have a
completion (pf) xiXoc, and I suppose being without completion it becomes
absolutely indefinite (TiavxdTiaaiv dneipco yiyveaSov).
Prof. Extremely so, Socrates.
Soc. Well said, friend Protarchus, you’ve taken it up well and recalled that this “extremely”
so which you uttered, and “slightly” too, have the same power as the more and less (xfiv
auxf)v buvapiv ex^xov xw pd>.X6v xe xai nxxov); for, wherever the pair is, it does not
allow each to be so much (oi)K cdxov sivai noaov CKaoxov) but, always imposing more
extreme than more slight, and the contrary in every condition, it creates the more and less
and makes the so much vanish (pf) dtpaviaavxe x6 noaov). For, as just now stated, if it
does not make the so much vanish, but allows this and the measured to come-to-be at the
base of the more and less and the extreme and slight (ev xfj xou pd^Xov xai rjxxov xai
a(p65pa Kcd fipepa e5pa eyyEveaSai), they will be driven from their own place, where
the pair was (ai)xd Eppsi xaOxa ex xfjq ai)xd)v x^paq ev f| evfjv). For, once it takes the
so much, it no longer is either hotter or colder; for the hotter is always advancing and does
not abide, and likewise the colder, but the so much stands still and ceases to advance. So,
according to this argument the hotter and its contrary would become indefinite (aneipov
yiyvoix’ av x6 &8pp6xepov xal xouvavxiov apa).
In this passage there is no suggestion that every definite quantity (rroaov) is a correct ratio
of limit and indefinite. Henry Jackson long ago suggested what seems to me to be the correct
view, namely, that x6 pexpiov is one type of xo rroaov [Jackson 1881; pp. 278-281]. However,
Jackson draws further conclusions from this. According to Jackson, all the various noad which
fall short of the appropriate pexpiov on a scale, being deviations from the standard, “are
consequently incapable of being known” (p. 278). Furthermore, such noad, because they fall
short of perfection, do not really exist, “for perfection and existence are identical, and the further
anything is from perfection, the further it is from existence” (pp. 278-279). But then, Jackson
goes on to claim that those noad which fall short of the appropriate pexpiov “must have
something of order or goodness in them, or they could not be existent” (p. 279). And so, they do
exist. Jackson’s view implies that some existent things that belong in the mixed class cannot be
fully known, since they fall short of the goodness of the appropriate measure that defines the
class to which they belong. But this is unacceptable, given the careful elaboration by Socrates of
the kinds of pleasure that are excluded from the good mixed life, i.e., the false and the mixed
pleasures. Such pleasures, though not good, are fully knowable in their nature. Plato’s text falls
short of Jackson’s reading.
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A further indication that Plato does not equate the goodness of a thing with the
presence of a limit in that thing is that Socrates proceeds to introduce a fourth kind, the
cause of (xfjv aixi'av) the combination of the limit and the indefinite. Were the
explanatory scheme complete, or in other words ifperas were a sufficient explanation for
the goodness of a good thing, it is reasonable to expect that the classification would have
ended with the mixed kind. But, clearly the aitia has an explanatory task of its own. The
aitia, we are told, is the cause “of the mixture and the becomings” (xfiq Kai
yeveaecoq, 27b9), that is, of both the one and the many of the third kind. The aitia,
therefore, is responsible for there being any processes at all. It is also responsible,
however, for processes coming to a halt, both (presumably) when a definite quantity has
been reached and when the right definite quantity is imposed on an apeiron.
The aitia itself, however, is merely a category to which nous is assigned, and it is
evident that the real force that drives mixtures to come-into-being is nous itself, that is to
say, not individual nous or the nous in us, but universal Nous. Here is a summary of the
text that follows, i.e., of the final section of the passage on the four kinds;
(1) The universal Nous orders all things [28d5-e6].
(2) The universal Nous is the cause of things becoming orderly, fine, and pure
[30a9-c7].
(3) Therefore: The universal Nous belongs in the kind cause {aitia) [30dl0-e3].
(4) The nous in us is akin to universal Nous [29b3-d5].
(5) Wisdom and mind (aocpia xa'i vouq) come-to-be (ycvoiaOriv) through soul
(il/uxfiq) [30c9-10].
(6) The universal Nous acts by causing souls to come-to-be [30dl-4].
(7) [Wisdom and mind in us are activities of soul.]
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(8) [Therefore: The nous in us comes-to-be through the
In this last section, it is argued that our souls are akin to the universal mind or Nous. (2)
seems to anticipate the specification of the good-making properties as the triad of
fineness, symmetry, and truth at 65a. But, if the aitia is the cause of the coming-into-
being of everything in the mixed kind, then it is also the cause of the coming-into-being
of the good things in the mixed kind. However, this is not the same thing as to say that
the aitia is the cause of the goodness of those good things. The goodness of things in the
mixed kind must be due to the nature of the universal Nous itself. The aitia is, to use
Aristotelian terminology, an efficient cause, while universal Nous is the final cause of the
35
goodness of the good things in the mixed kind. With the fourth kind we are no longer
given a one-many distinction. Instead, we are given a distinction of aspect according to
function.
It is thus with the fourth kind that we reach an explanation of why any member of
the mixed kind is good or bad, and therewith, of a resolution of (P3). Socrates quickly
reminds Protarchus of this;
Soc. Come then, what is our argument after this? Wasn’t it that we were finding out
whether second prize belongs to pleasure or thought? Was this not the case?
Prot. Indeed it was.
Soc. Then would it not perhaps now be the case, after we have divided in this way, that
we would carry out more firmly the judgment concerning first and second prize, since
concerning this we had initially taken opposing stands (27c3-10)?
34
Statements in brackets are those I deem to be implied though not openly stated in the text.
35
Thus, I think that Benitez 1995, p. 122, is mistaken in claiming that in this portion of the
Philebus, Plato conflates final and efficient causes. The aitia is universal nous as efficient cause;
in itself, universal nous is final cause.
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Socrates ftirther reminds Protarchus that the mixed life itself belongs in the mixed kind
(27d); of Its two components, however, pleasure is clearly more akin to the apeiron (28a),
and mind is akin to the aitia (28e). The aitia is responsible for the very order that we find
in things (30b).
F. Conclusion
At the end of the passage on the four kinds, (P3) has been refuted, but only in a
rather generalized way. Pleasure in itself, the one of pleasure, belongs in the apeiron and
is of the nature of the apeiron while, on the other hand, mind is closer in nature to the
cause of the coming-into-being of all mixtures, including the good mixed life. But the
many of pleasure remains to be examined. What needs to be shown is, which among the
many of pleasure may be admitted into the good mixed life, and why these kinds of
pleasure may be admitted.
The argument of the second methodological passage really ought to lead us to
expect that there is some analogy between the good pleasures and that which makes the
mixture good. That is to say, we should expect that if any pleasures are good at all, this is
because such pleasures have a share in the nature of nous, which is what makes any
mixture a good thing. Indeed it may be said that one main purpose of the section on the
four ontological kinds is to give an account of what it is that provides “some part of the
good” (xi pepoq dyaOoO, 28a3) to pleasure. Certainly the presence of limit in a good
thing is part of the explanation for why it is a good thing; but it is my view that in the
case of pleasure, nous is the more fundamental part of the explanation. For, nous is that
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for the sake of which (cvcKa) the many pleasures that come-into-being in our souls are
enabled to reach their proper limits. It is on account of nous, therefore, that some
pleasures become part of the good human life.^^
The ensuing detailed examinations of the many of pleasure thus constitutes an
integral part of the task of the dialogue. Socrates’ declared resolve to bring pleasure to
the test by “paining” pleasure seems more than a play on words. To “pain” pleasure is to
examine the intricate structures of its many kinds in terms of their connections with their
opposite, pain. Thus he declares, in the beginning of the examination of pleasure, that
pleasure cannot be sufficiently examined apart from pain (3 lb5-6). But it is not the
connection with pain alone that is examined. The connection with falsity is looked into
as well. This suggests that pain and falsity are both playing a criterial role in the
elaboration of the kinds of pleasure. Socrates is not so much dividing pleasure into kinds
as showing the possible mixings of pleasure with falsity and with pain. This point will
emerge more clearly in the next chapter.
Thus, it could be said that the one of the kind Cause is universal Nous', its many are the
various individual minds for the sake which there are true pleasures. There is no need to posit a




A. Division and the Nature of Pleasure
Many commentators believe that Plato revised the middle period theory of Forms
in response to the objections to it that Plato himself had raised in Parmenides. The
objections revolve around questions of the unity of a Form, given that a Form must in
some way hQ present in its many instances. This, I noted in Chapter Two, gives rise to
one of two serious forms of the one-and-many problem, OMP3. In the Parmenides, the
many of a Form are particulars whose ostensible participation in the Form generates
an ontological OMP. In the Philebus, the OMP regarding Pleasure concerns the relation
of a Form, not to its instances, but to other forms. This point requires that the problem
about the unity of a Form be interpreted, not so much as a problem about its ontological
status, as a problem about the explanatory function of the Forms in discourse. Indeed, if
an OMP about Pleasure comes up at all, it is because in our discourse we presuppose
certain views about how Pleasure combines with other forms. The divisibility of a Form,
and hence its one-and-many character, must then be seen in terms of: (a) its connections
with other forms; and (b) its articulation into its subordinate forms or sub-kinds. On
these hinges the explanatory function of a Form. It is, I think, Plato’s view of the
explanatory function of the Forms that underwent a revision from the middle dialogues to
the late ones. De Chiara-Quenzer offers the following summary account of the revision
in Plato’s view:
In the Phaedrus, Sophist, and Statesman there is a development in Plato’s view of the
forms. Every form is not one. Some forms are divisible and thus are many. With this
evolution in Plato’s theory of forms, there is a corresponding evolution in Plato’s view of
what constitutes knowledge of a subject matter. No longer does knowledge of a subject
matter entail understanding only one form. Rather, since a general form is not simply
74
one, but is one-and-many, knowledge of that general form entails understanding every
specific fom ^any) between the general form (one) and the tokens of the specific forms
(infinite) [De Chiara-Quenzer 1993, p. 51],
I would add that understanding a specific form involves, in turn, tracing the connections
of the specific form with other general Forms. This is shown in the following illustration:
Here O, 4^, and Y are general Forms and (|),...(1)„ are sub-forms of O, some of which
combine with 4^ and others with Y. A Form that has sub-forms may also connect directly
with other Forms qua unities. This is represented below:
In this illustration, the higher level Forms 4^ and Y are connected to <t> qua unities. 4^ and
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Y could be, for instance, more abstract forms than O.
Julius Moravcsik (1992, p. 228) sums up the one-and-many puzzles of the Philebus in these
two questions:
API : How can one Form fall under several higher, or more generic. Forms?
AP2: How can one higher, or more generic. Form have many abstract parts? {continued)
75
In the Philebus, the many of a Form are generated by the articulation of the Form
into Its sub-kinds, and from the combinations of those sub-kinds with other Forms. Thus,
to understand a Form as many involves understanding how each of its kinds combines
with other Forms, and to see all these combinations together. But, does the unity of a
Form require that its sub-kinds share a single common characteristic? In the beginning of
the dialogue, at I2e, Protarchus claims that all pleasures are alike in being pleasures. But,
being a pleasure, which is a characteristic of each of the many of pleasure, is not what
renders it problematic that the one Pleasure is also a many. To say that pleasure is one-
and-many because “Every pleasure is Pleasure” fails to specify the sense in which it is
problematic to say that the many pleasures are one and that the one of pleasure is also a
many—both of which Socrates had characterized as being “amazing” statements to make
(14c7-I0). The sense in which a particular characteristic of pleasure effectively pluralizes
the Form pleasure must, then, be one which takes into account the contrarieties found
among the many of pleasure. Thus, Protarchus’ claim that all pleasures are alike in being
pleasures is immediately countered by Socrates: “But... color, too, is like color; according
to this, color as a whole would not admit of differences, though we all perceive black and
I take API to include my own question, how a Form is connected with other forms qua unities or
monads—whether those other forms be higher, i.e., more abstract, forms or not. In the one-and-
many passage of the Philebus (13e-15c), Plato refers to the Forms as povctbaq rather than as
eibr). This is to emphasize their character as unities, since Plato is contrasting this with their
character as pluralities. Plato’s question, then, is: Do Forms connect qua unities? Moravcsik,
however, would include under API my question, how a Form can be articulated into its
subordinate forms or sub-kinds (1992, p. 228). AP2, for Moravcsik, is the different question,
how such highly abstract forms as Goodness and Fineness can cross-cut into the classifications
specified by API, so that such forms can themselves have abstract parts. My own view,
however, is that this latter question is better seen as the question, how the sub-kinds of a given
Form can connect with other, more abstract. Forms. This is what I wished to illustrate in the first
illustration in this chapter.
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white, and we perceive that black not only differs from white but happens to be the most
contrary to it. And moreover shape is most like shape according to this; it is all one in
kind, but as to the parts, the parts themselves are the most contrary to each other, and
surely they happen to admit of countless differences, and we will discover many others
that are like this. So. . .do not rely on this kind of talk, which makes all the most contrary
things one. I’m afraid we will discover some pleasures that are contrary to other
pleasures” (12e3-l 3a5). This reply indicates that Socrates is looking for a sense in which
the members of a kind, though one in being members of that kind, may yet be contraries
qua members of the kind.
Edith Schipper, however, treats Protarchus’ claim that pleasures are alike in being
pleasures as if it were Socrates own. She writes; ^ In the P/n/cftwj'... the many things,
though many in so far as they differ from each other, are one in so far as they have the
same characteristic; the many beautiful things are also one in being beautiful. This is
presupposed through the discussion, and in the statement in 15b that an impossible
alternative to the impossibility of one form being dispersed in many things is that it
would be ‘apart from itself,’ i.e., ‘apart from itself as somehow identified with the many
things.” But Socrates’ reply shows that he does not think this to be the relevant sense in
which it is problematic to say that the many pleasures are also one. A form, after all, can
have many instances without any of the instances being different from the others. In such
a case there would be no one-and-many problem in the required sense. It is not the fact
38
Schipper 1965; pp. 44-45. Schipper thus thinks that the one-and-many problem concerning
pleasure is OMP3.
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that a Form has instances that gives rise to a one-and-many problem about pleasure; it is
rather the fact that the many instances of pleasure are instances of different and contrary
forms. Indeed, the many of a form can be different in such a way that, qua many, they
need not have any one characteristic in common. The one of a Form is the abstract
nature of that Form, and not some single characteristic shared by all its instances.
Accordingly, the one of pleasure, its unity, is not some characteristic by virtue of which
the many kinds of pleasure can be held to be all good or all evil.
In contrast, Protarchus’ view in the beginning of the discussion is that pleasure
can be shown to be identical to the good, and for Protarchus this means that there is some
quality that all and only pleasures have, and that this quality and goodness are one and the
same quality. Protarchus thus supposed that pleasure and good are identical qua unities
because they share a single common quality, or are the same quality. Socrates has now
shown, however, that the one of pleasure is simply the nature of pleasure—what pleasure
is—in the abstract. What this nature is is stated at 31b-32b, just before Socrates begins
his analysis of the many of pleasure. Pleasure, according to Socrates, is a replenishment;
it is the process of restoring a living being to a condition of harmony following a
40
disruption of that harmony. Thus, it is by virtue of being all replenishments that the
Cf Minardi 1983, pp. 418ff. Minardi thinks that in the Philebus, the purpose of the
diairesis is in fact to reveal that the different instances of a Form all resemble differently one
eidos (p. 419).
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Pleasure therefore necessarily implies this disruption of harmony, i.e., the condition of lack
(kenosis), felt or unfelt, of which pleasure is the subsequent filling (plerosis). For the view that
the Philebus presents a unified general account of the nature of pleasure, see Frede 1992; 1993,
both of which challenge the accounts given in Gosling and Taylor 1982, and in Hampton 1990.
For a defense of Frede’s account against those of Gosling & Taylor and Hampton, see Tuozzo
1996.
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many pleasures are one. And thus, pleasure qua unity has a single nature, or rather, it is
that single nature. Qua many, however, pleasure exhibits the most contrary
characteristics. It is such characteristics that make Pleasure both many and one. The
following summarizes the one-and-many character of pleasure:
Socrates now needs to show Protarchus by an explicit discussion that on the level of the
many, the connections between pleasure and good reveal that pleasure cannot be identical
to the good.
We may recall that, in the passage on the one-and-many problem, Socrates had
grouped Pleasure together with other “monads” or unities like Ox, Humanity, and Good.
What these unities have in common is that they neither come-to-be nor perish. Consider,
now, what it means for the Form good to be a unity. The Philebus" explicit view of the
unity of good may be represented in this way:
Here, the good-making properties could not be subordinate species of good, nor are they
determinates of good. When we “divide” good in this way, we are not dividing it as a
one-a«<i-many. The good, rather, qua unity is a one-/n-many, a unity of three ideas
together (auv xpiai, 65a2). Each good-making property is not identical to the good, but
each property when present in any object makes the resulting mixture a good thing. Thus
Pleasure One: Replenishment in living beings
Many: Various kinds of replenishment.
Good
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we can say that the good-making properties are aspects of the good, so that the unity of
the good is a unity of aspect rather than of kinds.^'
Kenneth Sayre proposes that in the Philebus, Unity is identical with Limit [Sayre,
1987; p. 64], and the Good is identical with Unity [1987, p. 55; 1983, pp. 168-174].'^^
The good for any being is the Limit that is proper to that being, and this appropriate Limit
corresponds to the Form of the being in question. From Socrates’ remark at 32a9-bl, that
“out of the indefinite and the limit naturally arises the form of living things” (ck xfiq
ocTieipou Kai Trepaxoq Kaxd (puaiv epv}/uxov yeyovoq eidoq, 32a9-bl), Sayre infers that
the Form of a living being is itself a combination ofperas and the apeiron, a specific
ratio of the Limit and the Indefinite. The Form of any living being is the Limit that
defines its flourishing or well-being as a kind. Limit is thus responsible for the unity of
any living being, and any transgression of this limit is a disruption of its unity. The
disruption is felt as pain, while the restoration to the Form, to the proper Limit, is
pleasure. The good for any living being, therefore, is the condition of unity that is
specified by the Form that is proper to its being [Sayre, 1987; p.64j. This view, however,
entails that pleasure is always a good for living beings, since according to it pleasure by
nature is the restoration of any being to its proper limit. This contradicts the conclusions
41
Plato’s language at 65a is suggestive of aspect. “Then ifwe cannot catch the good with a
single form (oukoCv ei pf| pia dovdpeSa idea x6 dyaSov SripeCaai), let us grasp it by three
things together...” Seth Benardete translates the initial clause thus: “So ifwe are not able to
track down the good with a single look...” [Benardete, 1993; p. 82]. The use of lookio translate
‘idea’ renders particularly well the point that fineness, symmetry, and truth are aspects of the
good rather than kinds of good.
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Richard Kraut [1992; pp. 13-14, p. 45 n. 51] similarly suggests that in the Philebus, Plato
equates Good with Unity.
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of the dialogue, and it is also difficult to reconcile with Socrates’ claim that pleasure in
itself belongs to the apeiron^^
What emerges from the above discussion is that the good, qua unity, is a one-in-
many. But the good is also a one-and-many, since there are many kinds of things that are
good. The good, however, is not a kind like Ox or Humanity, i.e., it is not divisible into
sub-kinds as these forms are. As a Form, the Good cuts across genus-species
classifications and determinable-determinate specifications. The Form of the good is
parceled out among the natural kind sub-divisions, its many articulated across the
44
various kmd-classifications. Thus, the one-and-many of the good may be summarized
in this way:
The Good One: Unity of fineness, proportion, and truth
Many: Various mixtures with proper limits (id pexpia).
The good is a unity in the sense that it unites three forms under itself This, however,
does not mean that the Good and Unity are identical Forms. Indeed, it is hard to see
43
Sayre also intends thereby to provide his own answer to a question that has preoccupied
many commentators on the Philebus, the question, namely, whether the Forms of the middle
dialogues may be found among the four ontological kinds, and if so, in which of the four kinds.
Over a long period this has engendered much controversy, and 1 shall not attempt to deal with the
problem here. Benitez 1989 discusses the various positions that commentators have taken on this
issue. Davis 1979 is an earlier similar discussion. It seems to me, however, that the passage
quoted by Sayre (32a9-bl) only weakly supports Sayre’s inference that each kind of living thing
has an appropriate Form that is a combination ofperas and the apeiron. The passage could
instead be interpreted as saying that living things come out of the peras and the apeiron as having
a definite form. On the other hand, the Form of each living thing, in the sense of the Limit that is
proper to that kind of thing, could be identical to the limiting element in it, i.e., its peras.
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Cf Anscombe 1966, and Moravcsik 1992, chapter 6. See also Joseph 1948, pp. 70-73.
These commentators all explain the interweaving of the forms in terms of one class of Forms
being divisible in the manner of a downward branching into sub-kinds, and other Forms being
parcelled out across, or cutting into, the downward branchings. One of the forms that may cross-
cut into the downward branchings is the form of the Good.
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under what conditions Plato would have said of any two Forms that they are identical
forms. By virtue of each being one form, it would seem that Unity and Good each
participate in Unity, and that both participate in the form Difference with respect to each
45
other. What its being a unity does mean, however, is that the various good mixtures
that constitute the many of the Good have something in common: they all have one or
more of the abstract good-making properties. The good mixed life, accordingly, is
included among the many of the good, as it is also included among the many of the class
of the Mixture. The many of the class of the Mixture thus divide into two parts: those
which are good mixtures, and those which are not. The first class is clearly that of all
those mixtures whose Tioact are also pexpia.
I argued in Chapter II that the division of Pleasure into its sub-kinds resembles the
elaboration of a determinable into its determinates. This may be illustrated in the
following way:
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The participation of the Form Unity in Unity would, of course, raise problems about self-
predication. I shall not, however, be concerned with that problem here. Richard Kraut says that
Plato comes closest to identifying the Good with Unity when Socrates asserts at 65a that the good
is a unity of three ideas. Beauty (fineness) and symmetry (proportion). Kraut says, are tied by
Plato to “some notion of unity,” since fineness and proportion are what result when a limit is
placed on what is unlimited and excessive {Phil. 24a-26b); and so, “goodness (insofar as involves
beauty and measure) is conceptually connected with unity (insofar as what is limited is thereby
unified)” [Kraut 1992; p. 45 n. 51]. One problem here, again, is the distinction between limit and
proper limit. Presumably, for Kraut it is when the proper limit is reached that fineness or
proportion results, and a living being is then “unified” in the sense that it is in the condition that it
should be in. But there is a prior sense in which a limit is necessary for something to come into
being at all. In this sense, limit does not necessarily unify an organism in the sense that Kraut
intends. There is also the problem of distinguishing the notion of unity that Kraut attributes to
Plato, from theform of Unity. This will determine what we will suppose to be the exact
‘conceptual connection’ between the good and unity.
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Here, any pair among the determinates
(j)i. ..(})„ may be contraries. This clearly could not
be the case with Good in relation to the good-making properties. It is the case with
Pleasure, however, with the distinguishing feature that its “determinates,” i.e., the kinds
of pleasure, form a continuum from maximal pleasure with no admixture of pain to
minimal pleasure with maximal admixture of pain or falsity. In the case of forms like Ox
and Humanity, no problem arises concerning their unity because we are not concerned to
judge their connections with the good; it is enough that they be articulated into their
subordinate forms. But the case with Pleasure is different. There is a problem about
Pleasure because the hedonist is claiming that pleasure is identical to the good. Thus, at a
very late stage in the discussion (60a7-b5) Socrates states the problem in this way:
“Philebus says that pleasure has been the right aim for all living beings and that everyone
ought to aim for it, and moreover this same thing is the good for all, and the two names
(8do ovopaxa) ‘good’ and ‘pleasant,’ correctly set down, are some one thing and possess
one nature (evi xivi xa'i (puaei pia exeiv), but Socrates says they are not one thing but
two just as their names are, and the good and the pleasant possess different natures from
each other, intelligence (TTjv (pp6vr|aiv) partaking of a greater portion of the good than
does pleasure. Is this not what was stated then, Protarchus, as it is now?” (60a7-b5)—to
which Protarchus assents: “ Exactly so” (S9(56pa pcv ouv, 60b6). The problem as stated
here is, how we can say more than that ‘Pleasure is pleasure,’ but also ‘Pleasure is good.’
The problem is whether ‘pleasure’ and ‘good’ name the same thing—a view ascribed by
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Socrates to Protarchus both in the passage just quoted as well as in the passage on the
one-and-many problem, at 14dff.'" But, Gosling thinks that the view that ‘pleasure’ and
good name the same thing is attributed by Socrates to Protarchus/or the first time at
60a7-b5—“unless 13a7-b5 is taken to do it implicitly” [Gosling, 1975; p. 126]. However,
Socrates’ prefatory remark to the preceding quote (“That which we also mentioned
previously”-*'A Kai Tipoiepov EpyiiaOripev, 59el0), as well as Socrates’ question at
the end (“/s this not what was stated then, Protarchus, as it is now?''-o\> xaux’ eaxiv
T8 Kai -qv xa xoxe T^eyopeva, w npG)xapxe;-60b4-5), strongly indicate that Socrates is
merely restating something that they had already previously agreed upon concerning the
interpretation of Protarchus’ view. And Protarchus for his part seems to accept this
characterization of his own position throughout the dialogue. Protarchus thinks that the
unity of Pleasure is compatible with its being the good, because the terms ‘pleasure’ and
‘good’ straightforwardly name the same thing or quality. This, however, does not mean
that (PI) is a definitional truth as either Protarchus or Socrates conceives of (PI). That
‘good’ and ‘pleasant’ name the same thing is consistent with saying that they have
different meanings in a language, and I think it is an assumption of the discussion in the
Philebus that ‘good’ and ‘pleasant’ do not have the same meaning. Protarchus wants to
show that, notwithstanding, the two terms refer to the same object and should,
accordingly, be equated in language. Thus, for Protarchus it is a matter for conceptual
discovery, so to speak, that pleasure is the good for living beings. Socrates needs to show
him that such is not in fact the case. The god-given method is the method that will reveal
46
Cf Hamlyn, 1955; pp. 292ff
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what sort of unity pleasure is, by displaying the relations between the many forms of
pleasure and the good, i.e., by showing its true one-and-many structure.
But is the god-given method of Philebus 15d-18d the method applied by Socrates
in the division of pleasures and knowledge later on in the dialogue? Is the method used at
least implicitly, if not explicitly, in the divisions? Mitchell Miller thinks the latter a
fascinating question,” but declines to offer an answer [Miller, 1990; p. 323 n.3]. In
contrast, De Chiara-Quenzer [1990; 1993] thinks that the god-given method is the method
that is at work in the divisions of pleasure and of knowledge. Furthermore, she thinks the
method is there applied quite explicitly, in order to show that pleasure is both one and
many on the level of forms. Thus, the god-given method is intended to solve OMP
2 ,
which is the one-and-many problem that concerns pleasure. Here is De Chiara-Quenzer’
s
explanation ofhow the god-given method addresses the OMP about pleasure:
This one and many problem concerns forms. It is asking how many forms can be one
form and how one form can be many forms. Thus it is a one and many problem which
pertains to forms and remains at the level of forms. The discussion of the method at
16b5-18d2 provides the answer to how one form is many forms or many forms are one
form. One form is many because the one form is a general form which can be
distinguished into a definite number of more specific forms. This makes the one form
many. Many forms are one because the many forms are specific forms of a more general
form. This makes many forms one. The method described at 16-1 8 of the Philebus
explains how a form can be one and many, and it provides a way for determining the
many of a general form. Thus the purpose of the method described at 16-18 of the
Philebus is to explain how pleasure and knowledge can each be one and many, and to
provide a way for determining the many of pleasure and the many of knowledge
[De Chiara-Quenzer 1990; pp. 363-364].
Again, what needs to be added is that pleasure is thereby revealed not only to have many
kinds, but that its kinds are contrary in a way that shows that pleasure is not the good,
since some of the kinds will not combine with good. Unlike the contrary kinds unified by
the determinables Color and Shape, the kinds of pleasure are contrary, not to each other,
but to the good itself.
85
Why is the god-given method of the Philebus needed to solve the OMP about
pleasure, and how is it different from the method of diairesis of the Sophist and
Statesman! Commentators have often supposed that there is an important similarity
between the god-given method and the diairetic method of the Sophist and Statesman,
and some have held that the very same method of division is employed in all these
47
dialogues. Nevertheless, there are clear differences between them that call for
comment. The division in the Sophist is bifurcatory, that is, it proceeds by a downward
division of a kind into two subordinate kinds, successively until the real definition of the
sophist is reached. The same thing is done in regard to the definition of the statesman in
Statesman. The god-given method of the Philebus, however, is not exclusively
bifurcatory. Recall that, confronted with an indefinite plurality, we are supposed to begin
by positing a single form (piav i5cav, 16dl), and then after this two, three, “or some
other number” (fj xiva aXkov dpiftpov, 16d4) of forms under the initial one, until we
reach the exact number of its sub-forms. This is not the familiar scheme from the Sophist
and Statesman.
I have already mentioned a second difference, namely, that the divisions of the
Sophist and Statesman terminate in definitions. Thus, in the Sophist the final definition of
the sophist is “woven” together out of the differentia separated off in the course of the
47
For instance, Hackforth 1945, p. 21; Ross 1951, p. 131; and Sayre 1983, pp. 122-130. See
also McGinley 1977, p. 32.
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discussion. There, the structure of the division-eollection is:
O
where the forms on the right side constitute the differentia included in the definition, and
those on the left are the excluded forms. In the Sophist and Statesman, the definition of
the Form is the end result of the analysis and is reached via a collection (auvaycoyf]) of
the differentia that are separated off by the diairesis. But in the god-given method of the
Philebus the division culminates, not in a definition of the initial one being analyzed, but
in the laying out of its constituent forms in their precise number. The definition of the
48
The final definition of ‘sophist’ is reached at the very end of the dialogue, at 268c5-d5:
Eleatic Stranger. Shall we weave his name together from start to finish and tie it up the
way we did before?
Theaetetus. Of course.
Eleatic Stranger. Imitation of the contrary-speech-producing, insincere and unknowing sort
of the appearance-making kind of copy-making, the word-juggling part of production that’s
marked off as human and not divine. Anyone who says the sophist is of this “blood and
family” will be saying, it seems, the complete truth.
Theaetetus. Absolutely, [trans. Nicholas P. White, in Cooper 1997.]
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initial one is not the outcome of the division.''^ In the division of pleasures, the definition
of the initial one of Pleasure is given at the outset of the diairesis rather than reached at
the end of the divisions; the definition is certainly not the result of a collection of
•
differentia. The elaboration of the many of pleasure recalls the structure of the
examples in the discussion of the god-given method; in those examples (at 17a-18d), the
49
Although in the examples of the god-given method, the nature of the initial one under study
is discerned through a collection, i.e., by surveying the indefinite plurality oUnstances and then
“collecting,” in a somewhat tentative manner, some abstract feature by which the mind can grasp
the nature of the initial one. Donald Davidson describes this initial collection as “the somewhat
fumbling act of divining, through a process sometimes of sampling, sometimes of intuiting, the
nature of the unity to be defined or studied” [Davidson 1949; pp. 33-34]. This, it seems, is’in fact
how Socrates arrived at a definition of pleasure before he began its division into sub-kinds.
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D.J. Allan, however, says that the diairesis in the passage on the god-given method results
in an “exhaustive definition” of the class being defined [Stenzel 1964; xli]. While this is clearly
true of the divisions in Sophist and Statesman, I don’t think that the enumeration of the many in
the discussion of the god-given method, and afortiori the subsequent description of the many of
pleasure, is a definition at all. Each one is, rather, an analysis of the structure of the Form under
discussion.
Similarly, Constance Meinwald thinks that in the Philebus, Plato is concerned to arrive at
definitions according to the same sort of genus-species classifications that mark the divisions in
the Sophist and Statesman [Meinwald 1992, pp. 378-79; 1991, pp. 67-69]. Meinwald bases her
view on her claim that in the Parmenides, Plato had introduced a distinction between two kinds
of predication, and that he is applying that distinction in the later dialogues. The first kind,
predication pros heauto (“in relation to itself’), holds by virtue of a relation internal to the
subject’s own nature, and thus reveals the internal structure of that nature [1992, p. 378]. This is
typified by such sentences as “The Just is virtuous,” “Triangularity is three-sided,” “Dancing
moves,” and “The Just is just” [1992, p. 379]. Meinwald’s aim is to provide an account of self-
predication in terms of predication pros heauto (hence the fourth example). The other kind is
predication pros ta alia (“in relation to the others”), which holds by virtue of a relation that a
subject has to something other than itself. It is typified by sentences like “Aristides is just,” and
“The Triangle is intelligible” [1992, p. 380]. Meinwald does not address the question whether
the division of pleasures in the Philebus is an application of the god-given method, and her
remarks are meant to apply to the examples of the god-given method at 17a-18d. However,
neither the examples at 17a-l 8d nor the division of pleasures proceeds in the manner of a genus-
species elaboration. I think it is crucial that in both the examples of the god-given method at 17a-
1 8d and in the subsequent division of pleasures, the definition of the one under analysis is not
reached as a result of the divisions, as they are in Sophist and Statesman. Thus the distinction
between predications pros heauto and pros ta alia does not mark the difference in the structures
of the divisions performed on the initial one.
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initial one is also posited as known. It is the many sub-forms of the initial one that are
collected together under it. This constitutes an important difference between the
Philebus' god-given method and the diaireseis of the Sophist and Statesman. In arguing
for her view that the god-given method is the same method of division that is employed
in the Sophist and the Statesman, De Chiara-Quenzer claims that differences in the
method of division that Plato employs are to be explained in terms of the aims of the
division rather than as differences in the nature of the divisions themselves.^' While this
is a plausible view, it doesn’t explain the differences I have just pointed out. These
differences indicate that it is not the aim alone of the divisions that determines the method
of division to be used; in the Philebus, the nature of the initial one to be divided seems
likewise to have determined the mode of division to be used. Here we have a type of
diairesis where the initial one is already known, or at least intuited, qua unity. The
purpose of the diairesis is to make possible an analysis of its many, by laying out the sub-
kinds of a Form, preparatory to tracing out the connections between its sub-kinds and
other Forms. Thus the analysis of the many of a Form consists not simply in laying out
its sub-kinds, but also in discerning the connections of the sub-kinds with other Forms.
Nonetheless, an important similarity in both divisions is that, in the one case,
there is a correct definition to be reached and, in the other, there is a correct number of
sub-forms to be laid out. Both divisions, therefore, purport to give us a true account of
the nature of the object of the investigation, either by establishing its connections with
other forms, or by laying bare its internal formal structure. In doing so, both methods
De Chiara-Quenzer 1990, pp. 365ff; 1998, pp. 100-103.
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may be said to aim at carving reality “at the joints.” This is a significant similarity,
though it is far from proving that the two modes of division are identical.^^
Attempts to state precisely the nature of Plato’s method oidiairesis meet with the
difficulty of specifying what exactly a Form is.^^ In the Philebus, the kinds of pleasure
are referred to for the most part as cidrj (19b2, 20a6, 20c4, 32c4, 33c5, 51e5), sometimes
as yevT] (52e6) or popcpij (34dl), and sometimes are indicated simply in reply to the
interrogative noioq (“Of what sort?”) [19b3, 42c8, 63c8]. Still, throughout the
discussion of the different kinds of pleasure, there is no hint that the divisions could be
arbitrary, or that they refer to anything but the real nature of the thing being divided. For,
8i8ri and y£vr| are terms that normally function in Plato to indicate natural kinds. Plato’s
term for a unit in division qua unit is to pcpoq, “part.” A part may or may not be a
natural kind, but an eiSoq or a yevoc; is a natural kind. Referring to Statesman 263a-b,
Gail Fine observes: “Plato draws an important distinction between the parts and the
Mitchell Miller holds that the god-given method of the Philebus constitutes a new and
distinct mode of diairesis, different from the standard bifurcatory mode of the Sophist and
Statesman. Miller also thinks that the Eleatic Stranger’s final diairesis in Statesman (287bff.) is
an application of the god-given method of the Philebus [Miller, 1990; pp. 341-359]. Both of
Miller’s positions are opposed by De Chiara-Quenzer 1990, 1993. Kenneth Sayre thinks that the
god-given method is not simply the method of collection and division of the Sophist and
Statesman', “(i)t is this method coupled with an ontological principle regarding the constitution of
things” [Sayre, 1983; p. 129]. Sayre adds that the divisions which result from application of the
god-given method must reflect the relative contributions ofperas and apeiron to each of the
various kinds enumerated in the division (p. 130). But, this means that the divisions must reflect
the nature of those things as they really are; thus, Sayre’s position is compatible with the view
that the god-given method carves reality “at the joints.”
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See Cohen 1973. This is a reply to Moravcsik 1973a. Moravcsik replies to Cohen in
Moravcsik 1973b.
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forms of a genus or class. Every way of dividing a class succeeds in dividing it into
parts; but not every part is a form. Only those carvings that ‘cut reality at the joints’ cut
reality according to forms. Every form is thus a part; but not every part is a form” [Fine
1 980, p. 225]. I believe the same distinction holds in the Philebus. The only place in
Philebus where Socrates refers to the sub-kinds of a yevoq as pepr] is at 12e7-13al
where the various shapes (axTjpaxi) are referred to as pepr| of the yevoq Shape
(axfjpa). Socrates never refers to the kinds of pleasure and knowledge as pepp, but
nearly always as 8i5r| or yevr|. This seems to me to indicate that he is dividing them
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according to their real kinds.
Jacob Klein holds that in the Philebus there are no 8i6r| of pleasures “in the strict
sense of this word” [Klein 1972, p. 170]. Citing the text at 28a, Klein says that not only
does pleasure in itself belong to the class of the apeiron, but the pair pleasure-pain is an
“indefinite dyad” (p. 170), i.e., a pair of qualitative opposites on a scale. This would
make pleasure-pain an instance of the many of the apeiron. It is in consequence of this,
in Klein’s view, that there are no 8i5ri of pleasure in the strict sense. But the text at
Philebus 28a merely indicates that if any pleasures are good, it cannot be because of their
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The fact that he refers to the kinds of shape as pepri suggests, it seems to me, that Plato is
uncertain whether the various shapes are kinds of shape in exactly the same way as different
kinds of oxen fall under the kind Ox, or various kinds of men are sub-kinds of Humanity. The
point seems to be that determinates can be the most contrary to each other (xa evavxic5xaxa
dA,^fjA,oic;) and still remain unified under their determinable term, whereas a putative kind ofOx
can only differ so much from the other species of Ox before it ceases to be classifiable as
belonging to the genus Ox. It makes sense to ascribe to Plato here an understanding of the
distinction between genus-species classifications and determinable-determinate specifications.
The divisions of pleasure and of knowledge, however, are not simply determinable-determinate
specifications, even though they share some of the features of determinable-determinate
relationships.
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indefinite character, and that it is not therefore the apeiron that provides “some part of the
good to pleasure. On the other hand, thought, knowledge, and mind (cppovTiaiv Kai
e7uaxf)pTiv Kai vouv, 28a4) are intrinsically of the nature of limit, whereas, to be an
indefinite dyad is to be a member of the many of the apeiron, and thus to be intrinsically
subject to the more and the less, i.e., to be indefinite. The many of the apeiron has been
clearly specified by Socrates in terms of abstract qualitative opposites along a scale, as I
have tried to show in the previous chapter. Any pair of indefinites can come to an end
with the imposition of limit, and pleasures are sometimes capable of admitting proper
limits. But for any pleasure that arises, there is already some combination oiperas and
apeiron involved. Thus Socrates claims later on that “by nature pain and pleasure arise,
at the same time, in the mixed kind” (ev xm koivco yevei aga A,U7it| xc Kai fi6ovf)
yiyvecrSai Kaxd (puaiv, 31c2-3). Here, “at the same time” (dga) could hardly be taken
to mean that pleasure and pain constitute opposite ends of a scale of indefinites. The
remark occurs when Socrates is about to begin his examination of the forms of pleasure
and knowledge, and it clearly means that Socrates is assigning the forms of pleasure and
pain—as they actually arise or come into being in us, and as he will enumerate them in
his discussion—to the class of the meikton. All such forms are already combinations of
peras and apeiron, for everything that arises in the meikton is by nature a combination of
peras and apeiron.
Klein’s position, I think, is based on the view that there can be ci5t] only of things
that have proper limits or due measure—this apparently is the strict sense in which alone
Klein says there can be sibrj of pleasure at all. It is not clear, however, that this is indeed
Socrates’ view in the Philebus. If my interpretation is correct, the various forms of
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pleasure that Socrates proceeds to discuss are not just pepr] of pleasure; they are
objective articulations of the many of pleasure, and in that sense are ei6r| of pleasure, and
Socrates often refers to them as such. Pleasure has ci5ri because its sub-kinds are definite
enough to be identifiable and intelligible as determinations of pleasure. There is no
reason to restrict the use of ei6r| to apply only to forms of things that have proper limits,
and Socrates I think does not do so.
Nor is there good reason to restrict the use of the term diairesis to refer to division
into the infima species that are the ultimate differentia in a genus-species classification.
Trevaskis [1960] assumes that such divisions into infima species are the proper ftmction
of Platonic diairesis, and because of this he denies that the god-given method involves
diairesis. He points to the absence of the characteristic terminology of diairesis in the
passage on the god-given method, i.e., such terms as eibri, pepri, biaipew, xepveiv, and
their cognates [Trevaskis, 1960; p. 40]. However, Trevaskis also claims that diairesis is
not what is at work in the division of pleasure into false pleasures at 38aff. And yet the
terminology that Trevaskis claims to be characteristic of diairesis is applied in the
passages on the division of pleasures, as well as in passages where Socrates is referring to
the division of pleasure. On the basis of terminology, one cannot therefore infer that the
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I have already cited Socrates’ use of the term 8i5ri to refer to the forms of pleasure. At
20c4 Socrates speaks of ‘biaipsaiv eibwv f|5ovf)(;.’ In the discussion of malice (cpSovoc;) at
48bff, referring to the different ways in which we can fail to know ourselves and so out of this
ignorance to enjoy the false pleasures connected with malice, Socrates speaks of “cutting” into
three (auxo xoOxo xpixf) xepveiv, 48d4), or “dividing” (6ie^ea9ai, 48d6), the ways in which
we can lack self-knowledge. Here he refers to the objects of the division as “forms of experience
in our souls” (el5oc; x6 xwv ev xaiq v|/uxai<;, 48e8-9). Further on he divides (xepvo|Li8v, 48a9)
malice into two forms, and divides (5feA,8, 49b6) malicious persons into two kinds. He concludes
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division of pleasures is not an application of diairesis. From the absence of the
characteristic terminology of diairesis in Philebus 16-17, Trevaskis draws the reasonable
conclusion that in that passage Plato is concerned, not with diairesis specifically, but with
classification in its more general aspect [Trevaskis, 1960; p. 42]. I think we can go
further and say that Plato is there concerned to discuss a more comprehensive method that
may involve diairesis into £i8r|, but is not necessarily restricted to this. It is a method
that involves dividing an idea into its parts, whether these parts be 8 i6ti or something
Perhaps, then, the method of diairesis need not be seen in terms of the theory of
Forms of the middle dialogues, or with some particular interpretation of 8i8r| in mind.
Platonic division might be seen rather as a variety of types of analysis whose exact form
depends on the type of term to which it is being applied. Thus, in the Philebus Plato
finds himself with a type of term whose analysis cannot be carried out by classification
per genus et differentiam, unlike the terms being analyzed in Sophist and Statesman.
Nor is the term Pleasure exactly like determinable terms such as Color or Shape. The
purpose of the dialogue, moreover, is not to come up with a definition of Pleasure, but to
decide whether pleasure is the good. For this, it necessary to lay out the many kinds of
that ignorance of oneself “occurs in three forms” (ev xpiai-v eibeoiv yiyvsadai, 49el). Here,
surely, is language that, on Trevaskis’ view, is characteristic of diairesis, and is applied in
delineating one of the forms of (false) pleasure.
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It is just such a method that Moravcsik thinks Plato is concerned with here and in other late
dialogues. See Moravcsik 1992, chapter 6.
57
As John Ackrill argues. See Ackrill 1971, p. 390.
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pleasure, and then to trace out the combinations of each of these kinds with the good. It
is thus on the level of sub-forms, i.e., of the many, that the connections of Pleasure both
with good and with evil are to be discerned. And the precise role oidiairesis is to
58
articulate the sub-forms of pleasure.
In the Philebus, it can be said that the aim of the division is to divide the many of
Pleasure into two classes: those included in the good mixed life and those excluded from
it, i.e., into good pleasures and bad. We can see how this aim does determine the
structure of the divisions, just as De Chiara-Quenzer says it does. Thus, ifwe were to
simplify the diagrammatic sketch of the divisions presented in the previous chapter we
might come up with the following illustration:
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The god-given method of the Philebus is to be identified, however, not with diairesis
itself but with dialectic, which includes diairesis. Platonic dialectic thus comprises two distinct
movements: division (biaipeau;) and collection (auvaycoyf)). Davidson 1949, chapter 2,
includes ‘combination’ in Platonic dialectic. In the Philebus, combination refers to the
subsequent mixing together of all the elements that are included in the good mixed life, after
these have been separated by diairesis. But division is clearly the more crucial element in
dialectic. Thus, at Philebus 17a Socrates contrasts dialectic with eristic in this way; In eristic, we
proceed haphazardly or too quickly from the one to the many instances; in dialectic, we take care
to discern the intermediates (tcc peaa, 17a3) between the one and the indefinite number of
instances. The discernment of the many forms that fall under the one is thus the critical part of
dialectic. With reference to the sound and letter examples, Socrates concludes: “But by neither
of these are we yet wise, either because we know the unlimited of it or because we know the one;
but what makes us knowledgeable about letters is this, that we know how many the sounds are
and what their nature is” (17b6-9).
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Pleasure
Good Pleaauics Evil Pleasures
Pleasures unmixed Pleasures mixed with falsity
Pleasures niixeu wim
propositional falsity
Pleasures mixed with pain
This illustration incorporates the cross-cutting of the forms of good and evil into the
division of pleasures. What it shows is that it is on the level of the tnany that pleasure
combines with good and with evil. But the nature of the initial one to be divided has also
determined the mode of division to be used. Pleasure qua unity unifies both good and
bad pleasures under itself, and so it is necessary to show the connections on the level of
the many. The connections may be illustrated in this way:
This shows the precise points on the level of the many where the cross-cuttings occur. It
shows that it is not on the level of the one that pleasure combines or else fails to combine
with the good. For that to be the case, replenishment, which is what pleasure is qua
Pi
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unity, must be shown to be intrinsically good or intrinsically evil. But evidently Socrates
does not think that replenishment in a living being is the good, or that it is intrinsically
good which is what it means to say that pleasure qua unity combines with good. It
seems rather that for Socrates, replenishment is neither good nor evil. But replenishment,
being a process, is capable of combining contrary things, some good and some evil, and
this is what Socrates demonstrates in the examination of the forms of pleasure. Pleasure
cannot be the good because pleasure combines with evil on the level of the many. This
fact cannot be learned from the definition of pleasure as replenishment. But
replenishment is a process, and a process is inherently subject to combination. It must be
shovm, then, that at the level of the many where such combinations do take place,
pleasure actually does combine contrary forms under itself, in such a way that pleasure
turns out not to be the good.
Some pleasures, accordingly, turn out to have the characteristics of good. The
true pleasures are good in spite of their being replenishments and therefore in spite of
being processes. It should be remembered, however, that in their case the underlying lack
is unperceived. A pleasure that does not involve the perception of a lack is thereby not
subject to anticipation, and hence not subject to falsity. But the existence of kinds of
pleasure that do not combine with falsity and evil does not mean that Pleasure in itself
can be good, only that some forms of pleasure can be mixed in with the good human life.
I have suggested in Chapter One, however, that the coming-into-being of such pleasures
isfor the sake ofnous or mind, and that this is what accounts for their being good. We
cannot see the good with a single look (pia idea, 65a 1); yet it is easy to see that falsity is
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contrary to the good, since it is the contrary of one of the good-making properties. That
is to say, for Plato falsity itself is a kind of evil or badness.^^ Thus, if the many of
Pleasure mingles with falsity, then Pleasure as one cannot be good. The many ways in
which pleasure comes-to-be demonstrate how other pleasures combine with things that
are not good, such as falsity. The “division” of pleasures in fact shows the many ways in
which pleasure combines with aspects of both good and evil. Thus the resulting contrary
forms that get unified under the Form Pleasure are shown to be contraries by showing
their connections with contrary forms.
When Socrates enumerates and examines the many of pleasure, he and Protarchus
had of course already decided by a different argument that pleasure is not the good.
Nevertheless, the detailed discussion of the many of pleasure aims to demonstrate how,
given the sort of unity-in-multiplicity that pleasure is, pleasure cannot be the good. For,
the good cuts across only some of its parts. The enumeration of the many of pleasure
shows this in detail. In the remainder of this chapter, I will discuss the various types of
false pleasures, and I will argue that their enumeration constitutes an independent
argument against (PI).
B. Pleasure and Desire
Pleasure, then, becomes incompatible with the good by admitting into its kinds
forms that are contrary to good. We should recall that according to the Philebus^ notion
of intrinsic good as defined in (D2) of Chapter One, the good is a unity of the three
Cf McLaughlin 1969; p. 57.
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abstract properties of fineness, proportion, and truth—so that the presence of any of these
formal properties in an object makes that object good. Any process as such is not
intrinsically incapable of possessing the good-making properties. But for any process it
needs to be shown where the mingling takes place with elements that are contrary to the
formal properties of good.
For certain pleasures, the possibility of mingling is introduced by anticipation.
Anticipation plays a crucial role in desire. Thus the discussion of the first type of false
pleasures is preceded by a discussion of memory and recollection in their relation to
desire. The latter discussion sets up the notion of anticipatory pleasure, which is brought
in for the first time before the discussion of memory, recollection, and desire, at 32b9-c2:
Soc. Well, then assume, in the soul itself, the expectation of these experiences—the
sweet hope of pleasant things, and the bold, yet fearful and grievous expectation of
painful things.
The hope of pleasant things (e?iTci(!^6p8vov fibu) is itself “sweef’ (fibecov), i.e., pleasant.
Anticipatory pleasure consists in a pleasant expectation or a pleasant hope. The ensuing
discussion clarifies what it means for an experience to be in the soul itself, and this leads
to the identification of the soul as the seat of desire. According to Socrates, certain
experiences arise in the body and are extinguished (KaiaaPcwupeva, 33d3) in the body
without ever getting through to the soul, leaving the soul unaffected. In other words, the
soul is oblivious of some of the body’s experiences; such experiences do not register in
I propose the following interpretation of Socrates’ statement that the good is a unity of three
ideas: The statement claims nothing more than that the three good-making properties are akin to
each other. The presence of one good-making property in an object does not entail the presence
in it of either of the other two properties; but the presence of one good-making property in an
object is incompatible with the presence of the contraries of the other two good-making
properties in the same object.
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the soul at all. Socrates proposes to call this condition of the soul anaisthesis, absence of
perception, rather than forgetting On the other hand, aisthesis or perception
“arises in a single experience jointly in the soul and the body” (ev evi 7rd»£v xfiv
yuxiiv Kai TO ad)|ia Koivfj yiyvopevov, 34a3-4), also moves both soul and body
together (KOivfj Kai KivciaOai, 34a4). Perception as defined here is a simultaneous
motion (kinesis) in the soul and the body. Socrates then defines memory as the
preservation of perception (acoiripi'av aiaarjaecoq, 34a). One might expect Socrates to
draw the following contrast: By memory (pvfjiiTi), the soul calls up past experiences that
it has had jointly with the body; by recollection (dvd|iVT|aiq), the soul calls up
experiences that it has had by itself alone. Instead, Socrates describes dvd|ivr|ai(^ as
“whenever the soul...without the body, recalls by itself... what it has experienced in
common with the body” (oxav a pcxd xoO acopaxoc; ...r\ v|/uxi •••'cotux’ dveu xoO
ac5)iaxoq ai)xf) ev eauxfj... xoxe dvapijivfjcTKeaOai, 34b6-8). In memory, the soul and
the body jointly recall the remembered experience. In recollection, the remembered
experience is recalled without the involvement of the body, even if the experience was
originally had by soul and body together. The difference, then, is that memory involves a
recalling, jointly by the soul and the body, of a previous experience; recollection, in
contrast, is an act of the soul alone. Recollections are remembrances whose original
connections with the body have been severed, and thenceforth are experienced as being
purely of the soul. This contrast is clearly drawn, but in the ensuing discussion Socrates
does not in fact use the distinction he has drawn between the two terms. He proceeds
instead to use the word fivijpri to refer to all acts of remembering by the soul.
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Socrates brings up the example of a man who experiences a kenosis for the first
time, and has no memory of the filling that is involved in the particular experience he is
having (35a). In his own mind, this man would “lay hold of’ (ccpdrixoiT’ av) the filling
that will end his emptied state; but he cannot do so, Socrates says, either by perception or
by memory (ek’ aiaOfjCTsi sue lavTipp), since he has never had the requisite experience
of replenishment (35a6-10). But, nor can he do so by anamnesis, as Socrates has defined
this term, since anamnesis consists in recalling, in a purely mental way, an experience
that one has had in the past. Now, however, Soerates declares; “Then the only thing that
remains that can lay hold of filling is the soul, and this clearly by memory (xf) pvT^pp);
for by what else can it be laid hold of (35bl 1-cl)?” If Socrates is referring to a particular
type of kenosis, e.g., thirst as distinct from hunger, then it is possible that in this instance,
the memory of which Socrates speaks is either: (a) memory of a similar filling of a lack;
or (b) memory of past fillings in general. It seems likely, however, that the example
refers to a situation where a man has never had any kind of experience of kenosis at all,
and in that case the conclusion seems to contradict the premise of the example, namely,
that the man has no memory of any past fillings at all. Such a man would be incapable of
desire, since desire necessitates laying hold of a past experience by perception or by
memory. And yet Socrates seems to be claiming that such a man could mentally lay hold
of the requisite filling—and this by memory.
To this apparent difficulty J.M. Lee proposes the following solution. At 35ac6-
10, Plato wants to draw the reader’s attention to two separate theses: (a) the impossibility
of desire at the first experience of kenosis', and (b) the necessity, in desire, of mentally
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laying hold of replenishment by either perception or memory [Lee, 1966; p. 33], Having
already showm (a) from 34e9-35a5, Socrates proceeds to argue for (b) from 35bl-10.^'
From hereon, however, Socrates uses the word pvfjpri to refer to acts of remembering by
the soul, whether these involve memory or recollection as he had just defined these terms.
At the conclusion of the brief passage on memory and recollection, Socrates remarks that
the reason he goes into all these distinctions is, “that we might grasp the pleasure that the
soul has apart from the body most excellently and most palpably” (34c). Thus, what
Socrates is interested in is the act by which the mind lays hold of the experience of
fulfillment whenever it is experiencing a lack. Such laying hold of an experience in
one’s mind is, in Plato’s sense, an aiaSriaic;, a perception. Both iivtjpr| and
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Thus the argument goes:
1 . 34e9- 1 5e5: Thirst is a desire to be filled; therefore desire is always for the contrary
of what one is experiencing.
2. 35a6- 1 0: But one who experiences being empty for the first time could not mentally
lay hold of the experience of being filled, since he neither has the perception of being
filled at the moment, nor has he any memory of having been filled in the past.
3. 35bl-10: In desire, what lays hold of the filling is the soul, not the body.
4. 35bl 1-cl : Therefore if the soul has no present perception of what it lacks, then it is
only by memory that it lays hold of the requisite filling.
The argument is consistent with holding that when the soul experiences, say, thirst for the very
first time, it experiences no desire; but, subsequently, when it has had an experience of thirst
followed by replenishment, it mentally lays hold of the experience of replenishment based on
memory. The soul perceives the memory of replenishment as something present to itself This
laying hold of an experience by the soul is part of the movement of desire. Socrates is claiming,
then, that in desire the soul lays hold of the object that it lacks, and if that object is not present,
i.e., if there is no perception of the object that will fill the lack, then the soul does so by memory.
But, Socrates need only be claiming here that once the mechanism ofdesire is set going, the soul
perceives the objects of its desire either by having the object actually presented to it, or else by
memory.
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Rather than a sensation or, more broadly, sense-perception. The term aiaOriaiq as used by
Plato is often translated “sensation” but, as Michael Frede has shown, for Plato the verb
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ocvd^vriaK; are therefore aiaOrjoeic;. A preserved perception, when called up and laid
hold of once more in the mind, becomes again a presently perceived experience. Such
aistheseis play an important role in desire, and are perceptions of the soul itself.
The discussion of memory and recollection sets up the claim that there are
pleasures which are “of the soul itself’ (6 xf\q vi/uxfiq auxfic;, 33b5-6). It also justifies
Socrates’ claim that desire (eTuOupi'a) is not of the body but of the soul (35c-d). Thus, a
man who has never had any experience of kenosis followed by replenishment would not
be capable at all of laying hold in his mind of the experience of fulfillment that
constitutes pleasure. Such a man would be incapable of desire. Desire is a complex
condition of the soul that involves perception, memories or recollections, and
anticipation. Briefly, the mechanism of desire is as follows: When the soul experiences
an emptying, it remembers or recalls a past experience in which that empty state had been
filled, which then gives rise to the anticipation of a filling up of the lack in the future.
This hope for replenishment constitutes desire, and the anticipation of the fulfillment is a
pleasure (35a-b). That is to say, the anticipation of a pleasant experience is itself a
pleasant experience. Anticipation is therefore a component of desire: desire involves the
anticipation of a future pleasurable experience.
aisthanesthai means to be aware of something—howsoever this awareness may come about.
This may involve sensing, noticing, realizing, or understanding something; but in every case what
is meant is a grasping, a taking hold of some object, by the mind. “Perception” is the word that
often does duty in translating many of these uses of the term ^^aisthesis” in Plato. In dealing with
the Protagorean view that knowledge is sensation in Theaetetus, Plato uses aia&rioic; with the
narrower meaning of sense-perception, but, as Frede argues, this is because Plato is there
contrasting sense-perception with knowledge. See Michael Frede 1987.
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Desire also involves the experience of pain, since pain is involved in the
experience of lack. Socrates proceeds to give an example of anticipatory pleasure. The
example also raises the contrast between remembered experience and present experience.
A thirsty man who remembers past occasions on which he has replenished his thirst
experiences a double pain (to biTiXoCv Tfjq ^^UTiriq, 36a7), the first on account of his
present painful thirst, the second on account of the soul’s longing for the object of its
desire. In thirst, the experiences of pleasure and of pain are somehow mingled:
Soc. How, Protarchus, do you mean twofold pain? Is it not the case that when
one of us is emptied, he is sometimes in manifest hope of being replenished, and
on the other hand at other times he is hopeless of being so?
Prot. Yes indeed.
Soc. Don’t you think, then, that in longing for replenishment he feels pleasure by his
remembering, but at the same time, being empty he feels pain at these moments?
Prot. Necessarily (36a-b).
Socrates says that the pleasure in this case involves the memory of a past occasion on
which the man’s thirst has been filled; but then, this memory is pleasant only if it is
accompanied by some hope of replenishment in the future. Thus, for Plato, desire is a
complex state of soul that involves the present perception of many elements. Pleasure is
an element in desire; there is the pleasure involved in recalling past occasions of
replenishment, and there are the pleasures involved in anticipations and hopes for future
replenishment. As it will turn out, moreover, anticipations and memories themselves
involve yet other acts of the soul.
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C. Falsity and the Objects of Pleasure
Plato now makes an explicit transition from the previous discussion to the topic of
false pleasures:
Soc. Let us now use this examination of these experiences (xwv TiaaripdKov) in this
way.
Prot. How?
Soc. Shall we say that these pains and pleasures are true or false (d^rj&eiq f\ v|/Eo5sic;)?
Or rather that some of them are true, others not? (36c3-7)
What Socrates says here clearly proceeds from the previous discussion, where desire has
been depicted as a complex state of the soul. When Protarchus objects by asking how
pleasures or pains can be false, it is natural for Socrates to reply by asking in turn, how it
is that fears, anticipations, and beliefs can be true or false—these, after all, are similarly
elements in desire.
Protarchus, however, will concede only that beliefs can be true or false, but not
that pleasures and pains can be false. Protarchus does not object to saying that pleasures
and pains can be true, only that they can be false. Now an obvious way of interpreting
this is to say that for Protarchus, the truth of a pleasure that involves belief or anticipation
just consists in the occurrence of the pleasure. There is evidence to indicate that this is
indeed how Socrates understands the point that Protarchus is making, since presently
Socrates remarks: “Neither in a dream, then, nor when awake, as you assert (wq (ppc;),
neither in frenzy nor in derangement of mind, is there anyone who ever yet thinks he is
enjoying, but is not enjoying at all, nor again thinks he is in pain, but is not” (36e5-8).
Here, it seems to me, Socrates is ascribing to Protarchus the claim that no one can be
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mistaken about thefact that he is enjoying or that he is in pain. If this is a correct
interpretation of Protarchus’ position, then the correlative notion of falsity that Protarchus
invokes is simply non-occurrence. Thus, Protarchus objects to calling any pleasures false
because to call them false is merely to say that they have failed to occur, and since
anticipatory pleasures are occurrent pleasures, there is no sense in which these could be
termed false. If such pleasures are connected with a belief, then it is the belief that is
false, not the pleasure.
In response, Socrates introduces the doxazein-hedesthai analogy. To believe, he
says, is something (eaxiv ii, 37a2-3), and to take pleasure is also something; moreover,
that which is believed is something (to 6o^a(;6pcv6v ectti ti, 37a7), and that in which
pleasure is taken (to f|86p£vov) is also something. And so: “that which believes,
whether it believes rightly or not, never ceases to be really believing” (37al 1-12), and
“that which takes pleasure, whether it is pleased rightly or not. . .never ceases to be really
taking pleasure” (37b2-3). Here, the analogy is drawn between that which is believed
and that in which pleasure is taken as both being objects of their corresponding states of
soul. Socrates now asks: How is it that, while both beliefs and pleasures equally have
their share in being (5’ ovTcoq dpcpdiepa opoicoq, 37b7), only beliefs can be true or
false, while pleasures can only be true? One possible reply is that beliefs are the sort of
thing that can have qualities, while pleasures and pains “are only what they are, they do
not become a certain kind” (povov amp taxi, tcoic5 live 8e oi) yiyvEaOov, 37c5-6).
Socrates rejects this reply, pointing out that pleasures and pains too can have qualities
like intensity and magnitude (peyaA,ai xe Kai apiKpai Kai c(p65pa eKdxepai
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yiyvovTai, 37c9-10). And if pleasures can have, for instance, the quality of badness
(Tiovripia), then so can beliefs (37d2-4). And so, finally: “(W)hat if rightness or the
opposite of rightness (opSoiriq ^ xouvavxiov 6p06xr|xi, 37d6) attaches to any of them?
Shall we not say that the belief is right, if it has rightness, and this too of pleasure?”
(37d6-7). This connects pleasure and belief in a way that, Socrates thinks, Protarchus had
not previously recognized; and, as he concludes, “it seems that pleasure often arises for us
not with a right belief (bo^rjq opOriq), but with a false belief’ (bo^riq vj/EuboCq) [37el0-
11]. But to this Protarchus once more replies that, in that case, the belief is false, but the
pleasure itself no one would call false (37el2-38a2). That is, he rejects Socrates’ claim
that rightness or wrongness are qualities of pleasures as they are qualities of beliefs.
At this point, the argument is back where it started: Protarchus is unconvinced
that there is any sense, other perhaps than their non-occurrence, in which pleasures can be
said to be false. But so far, Socrates has merely pointed to a formal analogy between
taking pleasure and believing: in both, there is something by virtue of which the taking
pleasure (hedesthai) and the believing (doxasthai) take place—respectively, x6 f|56p8vov
and x6 bo^a^opevov. Now Socrates extends the argument by invoking two further
analogies: first, that of a scribe (ypappaxeuq) within us who writes speeches (A,6yoi) in
our souls, and second, a painter (^coypdcpoq) who paints pictures or images (eIkovec;) in
our souls. The point of the new analogies is that our experiences (Tiadfjpaxa) write
speeches and paint images of themselves in our souls. In the case of the scribe, the
mechanism is as follows: “When memory coincides with perceptions, these and the
experiences connected with them seem to me then to come close to writing speeches in
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our souls, and whenever these experiences write true things, what happens from it is that
true belief and true speech arise in us; and whenever this scribe within us writes what is
false, the result is the contrary of these things” (39a3-7). Thus, our experiences inscribe
propositional contents (A,6yoi) in our souls, and the consequent writings in our souls, i.e.,
the memories and recollections, are true or false depending on whether or not they
coincide with the perceptions that gave rise to them. Similarly, the zographos paints
pictures of our experiences in our souls, and the pictures are true whenever they are
pictures of true beliefs, false whenever they are pictures of false beliefs (39c4-5).
Socrates goes on to claim that these writings and pictures are not only about the past and
the present, but about the future as well, and that it is in this way that anticipatory
pleasures and pains concerning the future come about in us (39dl-5). Thus, Socrates
assimilates false pleasures of anticipation in general to pleasures connected with false
beliefs. In particular, anticipatory pleasures arise in the form of hopes {iXnibsq); we are,
Socrates observes, “through our entire lives, always filled with hopes” (39e4-6).
Thus, anticipations and hopes can be inscribed or painted in our souls, and they
are perceived by the soul as writings or images. These writings and images become
perceptions of the soul that play a role in desire. The scribe and the painter analogies are
thus intended as accounts of how beliefs that play a role in desire are represented in the
soul. The train of thought thus far may be summarized in this way:
(i) There are writings of beliefs in the soul (38b-e).
(ii) Writings of true beliefs are true (39a).
(iii) Writings of false beliefs are false (39a).
(iv) There are pictures of beliefs in the soul (39b-c).
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(v) Pictures of true beliefs are true pictures (39c).
(vi) Pictures of false beliefs are false pictures (39c).
(vii) Pictures of true writings are true pictures [from (ii) and (v)].
(viii) Pictures of false writings are false pictures [from (iii) and (vi)].
(ix) Pleasures often arise with false beliefs (37e).
(x) Whenever these writings andpictures are false, the pleasures connected
with them arefalse (40d-e).
(xi) There are, in the soul, writings and pictures about the future (39d).
(xii) We experience pleasures concerning the future (39d).
(xiii) Pleasures concerning the future often arise with false beliefs (39d-e).
(xiv) Pleasures concerning the future are connected with the writings and the
pictures in the soul (39e-40a).
(xv) Whenever these writings andpictures are false, the anticipatory
pleasures connected with them arefalse (40d-e).
Socrates extends this to apply to other mental states. He says that “the same account”
(6 auToq Xoyoc;, 40e2) holds concerning fear and anger, “that such things are also
sometimes false” (d)c; eaxi Kai vj/Eubf] ndvxa xd xoiauxa evioxe; 40e3-4). Some
pleasures, that is, are similar to other pathemata that play a role in desire. It is shortly
before this, at 40c8, that Protarchus fully indicates his agreement with Socrates’ view; he
accepts the claim not only that anticipatory pleasures can be false, but that in general
those pleasures are false that are accompanied by false beliefs, whether these beliefs be
about the past or the present.
It has been a matter of some controversy how to interpret Protarchus’ conversion
here to Socrates’ point of view. It would seem that Protarchus’ conversion was
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straightforwardly a matter of his coming to see that certain pleasures, like beliefs, are
representational states that may be false as well as true. This, indeed, is the position of
most commentators; but among those who accept this view there are significant
differences of interpretation on the details of Socrates’ position.
Some commentators assign a crucial role to the zographos analogy. In our
summary, the statement just before the second concluding statement (xv) was the
following:
(xiv) Pleasures concerning the future are connected with the writings and the
pictures in the soul (39e-40a).
In fact, in this brief passage, Socrates had introduced “a further question to answer”
(cipripevoK; Kai t65s ocTiOKpivai, 39e8):
Soc. Is not a just, pious, and good man always dear to the gods?
Prot. Of course.
Soc. And what about this: an unjust and absolutely evil man—is he not the contrary of
that?
Prot. Yes.
Soc. And are there not speeches in each of us, which we name ‘hopes’?
Prot. Yes.
Soc. And moreover painted images (xd (pavidapaxa E^ojypacpTipEva); and one often
sees gold in abundance coming to be for oneself and the many pleasures arising from it;
and one also sees oneself in the painting (EV£(!^(jOYpacpr||ievov) enjoying oneself in
earnest (39el0-40al2).
Referring to the example given in this passage, Socrates concludes a bit later on: “Then
for the bad too pleasures are no less present, painted in their souls; but these, surely, are
false” (Oi)Kouv xai xoiq KaKoiq f|6ovai ye oi)8ev f|TTOV Ttdpeiaiv Ei^^rnypatpruievai,
v|/8u681 (; 8e auxai tiou, 40b6-7). Here ‘abxai’ could refer to either ‘8d^coypa(pr|jj,evai
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or ‘f|5ovai’. Two lines later, however, Socrates concludes; “The bad, for the most part,
delight in false pleasures [n/cv)5eaiv fidovaiq xo^^po'^criv], good men in true ones.”
Thus ‘vi/CDdeaiv’ is straightforwardly applied to ‘tidovaiq.’ (40b6-7). It is here that
Protarchus first indicates concurrence with Socrates’ view, replying, “What else?”
(Ti pTiv;-40b8).
1. The Gosling-Kenny Account
Anthony Kenny (1960) claims that in this passage, the transition is made from
false pictures ofpleasure tofalse picturedpleasures, in such a way that the two are seen
as identical. Kenny thinks that ‘v}/8D68iq’ at 40b7 links with ‘8<;(0Ypa(pr|p8'vai’ rather
than with ‘libovai’ [1960; p. 52]. When, two lines later, Socrates explicitly links
‘ij/aubeaiv’ with ‘fiSovaiq’, the transition is made. Thus, on this view, anticipatory
pleasures are pictures. The concluding statement in our summary might then be rewritten
as follows:
(xv') Whenever these pictures are false, the pleasures of anticipation connected
with them are false pictures of pleasure; hence the pleasures are false pleasures.
Kenny realizes, however, that an additional premise is required here, namely, the premise
that pleasure taken in false pictures is false pleasure [1960; p. 52]. Thus, on Kenny’s
view, (xv') ought to be further rewritten as follows:
(xv") Whenever these pictures are false, the pleasures of anticipation connected
with them are false pictures of pleasure; but pleasure taken in false pictures is
false pleasure, hence the pleasures are false pleasures.
Now Kenny’s position assumes that Plato assigns a special role to pictures in his
argument. Not just any belief can be connected with pleasures of anticipation. To have a
picture of some future event in one’s mind is a special case of believing that something
111
will be so, and in certain cases to have such a picture is to anticipate an event in a way
that makes the anticipation itself a pleasurable thing. Hence, while we may believe, in a
propositional sense, that some future event will give us pleasure, in certain cases to
picture that event in our minds is not merely to believe that it will occur; it is also to
enjoy the event before it has occurred. This seems to me to be the point behind
emphasizing the role that pictures play in anticipating pleasures.
J.C.B. Gosling agrees with Kenny that pictures play a special role in anticipatory
pleasure. In an article published before Kenny’s 1960 article, and to which Kenny’s
article was a response. Gosling (1959) had proposed the following account of Protarchus’
conversion: At 39c4-5 it is said that pictures (of beliefs) can be true or false [(v) and (vi)
in our argument summary]; at 40b6-7 the expression “ painted pleasures” (1)60vai
e^coypacpriiaevai) is so used that if the i^caypacpfjjiaTa, i.e., the painted images in the
wicked man’s soul, are false, then so are the painted pleasures. To this Protarchus
indicates his assent: “Ti pTjv;” (40c3). In the remark that prompted Protarchus’ assent
(“Then for the bad too pleasures are no less present, painted in their souls, but these
surely are false”). Gosling thinks that ‘v|/eu5si(;’ is already meant to apply to either
‘(l^coypacpfjfiaTa’ or ‘fidovai.’ Socrates’ rejoinder to Protarchus’ assent to his earlier
remark [“The bad, for the most part, delight infalse pleasures (v|/Eu8eaiv fi6ovaiq
Xaipouaiv)”] shows that ‘v|/Eo6Eiq’ in the earlier remark was already being used to refer
to the painted pleasures in the wicked man’s soul. Thus Protarchus, as a result of
Socrates’ argument, had come to identify the false pleasure in the man’s soul with the
false picture that he has of himself enjoying the event he had anticipated.
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Gosling and Kenny agree on this point: that the connection is established between
the pictures and the pleasures only if Protarchus conflatesfalse pictures ofpleasure with
false picturedpleasures. But Gosling says that it’s unclear on Kenny’s account how
Protarchus is able to do this, since Kenny never justifies the premise that pleasure taken
in false pictures is false pleasure. Gosling thinks it insufficient merely to say that the
pleasure is identified with the picture. Rather, Gosling thinks that the conflation is
effected when Socrates identifies pictures of pleasure with picturing^ of pleasure [Gosling
1960; p. 44]. This step allows Socrates to ascribe falsity to pleasures that are connected
with false anticipatory beliefs. That is to say, in our summary,
(vi) Pictures of false beliefs are false
may be replaced with
(vi') Picturings of false beliefs are false
and
(viii) Pictures of false writings are false
may be taken as equivalent to
63
(viii') Picturings of false writings are false.
Accordingly, in Gosling’s terms the concluding statement of our summary is to be
rewritten as follows:
(xv'") Whenever these pictures are false, the pleasures of anticipation connected
with them are false picturings of pleasure; but false picturings of pleasure are false
pleasure, hence the pleasures are false pleasures.
The anticipatory pleasure is thus identified with the pleasurable activity of picturing the
anticipated pleasures. And so, as Gosling had concluded in his first article: “(I)t would
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Understanding the pictures and the picturings here, of course, to refer those ones that play a
role in anticipatory pleasure.
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seem that Plato is taking it that there is no difference between picturing a future pleasure
to myself and enjoying that pleasure in anticipation; thus in these cases the pleasure and
the picture are run together, and the picture of a pleasure and the pleasure of a picture
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taken to be the same”
[ 1959 , p. 52].
Thus, pleasures of anticipation are a way of enjoying some future event in
advance of its occurrence. There are at least two distinct events, however, that can be the
object of an anticipation: (a) an event e which is expected to be causally responsible for
producing an episode of pleasure; or (b) the pleasurable episode itself which comes about
as a consequence of e. Thus we can distinguish anticipation of the event from
anticipation of the pleasure that the event brings about. We might say that the direct
object of anticipation is e, and the indirect object is the anticipated pleasure. Let us
designate the anticipatory pleasure p*, to distinguish it from the anticipated pleasure p**
which is expected to follow the occurrence of e. There are then two distinct events that
p* can be about, so that p* can either be: (a) a taking pleasure in some prospective event
e which is expected to bring about another pleasure p**; or, (b) a taking pleasure in the
65
prospect of p**. Failure of occurrence, then, could refer to either of two main
conditions:
64
See also Gosling 1960, p. 44. In these works it sounds as if Gosling thinks picturing a
future pleasure to oneself is sufficient for having anticipatory pleasure. But in (1975), Gosling
makes it clear that he does not think this to be so. Moreover, Gosling thinks that Plato’s account
is restricted to anticipations where someone “gloats” over the prospect of a future pleasure. Such
gloatings constitute a sub-set of pleasures of anticipation [Gosling, 1975; p. 218], In Gosling’s
view, it is characteristic of wicked men to gloat over the prospect of future pleasures, regardless
of the objective likelihood of e and regardless of the likelihood that p** will really turn out to be
pleasurable for them.
Perhaps in many cases, pleasure in the prospect of e cannot really be distinguished from
pleasure in the prospect of p**; nevertheless the two pleasures are logically distinct.
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(Cl): e fails to occur;
(C2): e occurs, but p** fails to occur.
The second condition can also hold in different ways. That is, (C2) further divides into:
(C2.1): e occurs but p** does not occur at all;
(C2.2): e occurs, and p** occurs, but p** is not as anticipated, i.e., is of a
different quality, intensity, etc.
The general condition for the occurrence of anticipatory pleasure may then be stated in
the following way:
(AP): For someone S, S has p* at t, = def. For some event e and for some later
time tj: [(S believes/pictures e occurring at t2) & (S believes/pictures
himself having p** at t2 as a consequence of e)].
(AP) locates anticipatory pleasure as p*, and the anticipated pleasure as p**. In order to
specify falsity, however, we need to designate the two different logoi, beliefs or pictures,
separately. Hence let the beliefs (doxai) be designated as follows:
<S’s belief that e will occur at t2> 5
<S’s belief that he will have p** at t2 as a consequence of e> = 6*.
Then we have the following definitions of false anticipatory pleasure:
(Dl): S’s p* at t, is false = def. 5 is false
(D2): S’s p* at t, is false = def. 5* is false
But, in the example of the wicked man anticipating coming into possession of an
abundance of gold, it is not a propositional belief that causes the man to have a false
pleasure of anticipation but rather a picture or an image {phantasma) in his own mind of
himself in enjoyment as a consequence of coming into possession of the abundance of
gold. Thus, let
<the picture in S’s mind of e occurring at t2> = (p
<the picture in S’s mind of S enjoying himself at t2 as a consequence of e>
= (p*.
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Then we have the following further definitions of false anticipatory pleasure:
(D3): S’s p* at tj is false = def cp is false
(D4): S’s p* at t, is false = def. cp* is false.
Neither (Dl) nor (D2) provides the definition of a false anticipatory pleasure that applies
to the wicked man example, since in that example what is false is a picture in the man’s
mind. Nor can the relevant definition be (D3), because it is clearly specified that e does
occur. Hence, only (D4) remains.
How is (D4) possible? An obvious way would be if (p* were identical with p*,
that is, p* = (p*, so that if p* is false, then cp* is false. This, in essence, is the solution of
Kenny and Gosling. They share the view that Protarchus comes to accept Socrates’
argument by being made to see that anticipatory pleasures can be identified with a
representational state, be this a picture or the process of picturing. According to Kenny,
however, on Plato’s view the wicked man’s anticipatory pleasure is false not when—or
because—the anticipated event fails to occur. The wicked man’s pleasure is false
because he thinks he will enjoy having the gold in abundance, when in fact he will not.
Kenny then presents the following analogous example:
Thus a man might foresee that he will win £70,000 from a football pool; and being a
selfish man he might anticipate spending the entire sum on beer. His pleasure in this
anticipation would be a false pleasure, according to Plato, not because he is necessarily
wrong in anticipating how he will spend it; but because he is mistaken in thinking that he
will enjoy drinking seventy thousand pounds’ worth of beer [Kenny, 1960; pp. 51-52].
The man’s belief that he will be in enjoyment as a consequence of the anticipated event is
In contrast, Gosling’s account allows for p* being false because (p turns out to be false, so
that (D3) is a possible definition of false anticipatory pleasure.
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a false belief, because the picture of himself that he had in his soul having the pleasure he
anticipated proves to be false.
Now Kenny thinks the wicked man gets this picture wrong “because he is an evil
man, and the root of all evil—as Socrates explains later on, at 48c5-10—is not knowing
oneself. Which includes not knowing what one will really enjoy” [1960, p. 52]. Thus,
the man is subject to such false belief because he is a wicked man. In Kenny’s example,
the event anticipated is stipulated as occurring, and thus (Cl) is not relevant to
determining the falsity of the man’s anticipatory pleasures. In Socrates’ example at 39e-
40b this is likewise the case, although it is not clear whether the exclusion of (Cl) is
intended to specify the example of the wicked man alone, or whether Plato means this to
hold for anticipatory pleasures in general. Kenny, however, treats the wicked man
example as the paradigm case of anticipatory pleasure. Thus, for Kenny, (D3) is not a
proper definition of false anticipatory pleasure. Now the exchange at 39e-40b establishes
the claim that false pleasures of anticipation are characteristic of bad men, while true
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pleasures are characteristic of good men. Right after this exchange Socrates concludes:
“The hdd,for the most part (xa noXXd), delight in false pleasure, good men in true ones”
(40c 1-2). Hence the link is established between badness of character and false pleasures
of anticipation: wicked men tend to have false pleasures of anticipation. It is consistent
with this, however, to say that a wicked man can correctly predict (Cl). It is also
consistent with it to say that a good man can fail to predict (Cl), and thereby experience
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Although it is unclear from the text whether “true” here refers to true anticipatory pleasures
alone, or should be taken to apply to true pleasures in general.
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false anticipatory pleasure—but only by mistake. On the other hand, the wicked man’s
anticipatory pleasure is false because the picture that he has in his soul—of himself
enjoying his future possession of an abundance of gold—is false, and it turns out to be
false, surely, because he has failed to predict (C2.1), not (Cl). Thus, for the wicked man
example only (D4) defines false anticipatory pleasure.
I think, however, that there is more to the fact that the wicked man fails to predict
condition (C2.1); he fails to predict it because he is unable to, and he is unable because he
doesn’t know what will really give him pleasure. Unless we suppose this, I think, it
won’t be quite clear why Socrates draws a contrast here between the good man who is
“dear to the gods” and the wicked man who is the contrary of this. And clearly, the
wickedness of the man in the example is independent of whether he will actually come
upon the anticipated possession or not. It can hardly be that wicked men merely delight
in anticipating or hoping for pleasure-producing events that do not infact occur, on the
contrary, wicked men could be quite adept at predicting (Cl), and could take care not to
feel any pleasures of anticipation unless they are certain that they can rule out (Cl) in
their calculations. Wicked men, however, are unable as a rule to predict condition (C2.1)
because it is in their character not to be able to do so.
Just as the wickedness of the man in Socrates’ example is independent of whether
he will actually come upon the hoard of gold that he anticipates, goodness of character
does not seem to be linked to the ability to accurately predict the occurrence of pleasure-
producing events. Instead, Socrates’ view seems to me to be that goodness of character
has to do with knowing oneself, which, as Kenny pointed out, includes knowing what one
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will find pleasant. Furthermore, the good man finds pleasant that which is truly
pleasant, and that is how he knows that he will enjoy what he anticipates. The good man
has, not merely true anticipatory pleasures, but true pleasures generally. When the good
man happens to experience false pleasures of any sort, it is only by mistake—in contrast
to the evil man whose tendency to experience false anticipatory pleasures reflects his lack
of self-understanding.
But, is the wicked man example the paradigm case of false anticipatory pleasure?
And, is the first type of false pleasure identical with false anticipatory pleasure? Kenny
and Gosling both believe that the first type of false pleasures is restricted to false
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anticipatory pleasures. Now this seems to me mistaken. By introducing the example of
the wicked man, Socrates evidently meant to focus on anticipatory pleasures. This hardly
means, however, that he was thereby restricting the first type of false pleasures to
anticipatory ones; he could instead, as I think, be listing false anticipatory pleasures as a
sub-type of the first category of false pleasures. Socrates concludes the passage at
39e-40b with the remark that “for the bad too painted pleasures are no less present; but
these, surely, are false” (40c 1-2), thereby explicitly linking badness of character with
false pleasures of anticipation. But neither here nor elsewhere does Socrates give any
importance to the distinction between false writings of beliefs and false pictures of
And, as Socrates himself points out at 48c.
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Gosling 1959, pp. 44ff; Kenny 1960, pp. 50-51. Gosling reaffirms his view in Gosling
1960, in Gosling 1975, pp. 214-215, and in Gosling and Taylor 1982, pp. 431-444. McLaughlin
1969 agrees with Gosling and Kenny on this point.
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beliefs. Hopes and anticipations are written in our souls as “speeches ” i.e., writings
(?i6yoi, 40a6), and ^'moreover painted images” (Kai 6f] Kai id (pavidapaxa
8<:;coYpa(pripeva, 40a9). Socrates, I believe, focuses his attention on pictures here
because pictures do play a special role in anticipation. But it’s not clear that he does so in
order to focus on anticipatory pleasures in general, nor would it follow if this were true
that he meant thereby to restrict his discussion of the first type of false pleasures to false
anticipatory ones. Socrates was focusing momentarily on the kind of anticipatory
pleasure that is characteristic of wicked men. Wicked men, that is, tend to have images of
themselves in their minds when they anticipate a future pleasure because this allows them
to enjoy the objects of their anticipation in advance and thereby to increase their
71
pleasures. But he is clearly not saying that only wicked men experience false
anticipatory pleasures.
Either writings or pictures, then, can be connected with false pleasures. And these
writings and pictures are false whenever the doxai of which they are the representations
are false doxai. Presently, Socrates continues:
Soc. And it was agreed too, 1 think, that these things, in then producing false beliefs, also
create false believing, do they not?
Prot. Yes.
Soc. What then? Must we not render these things to pains and pleasures—a permanent
condition set over against them (xf)v xoutmv dvxiaxpocpov £^iv)—in these cases?
Prot. How?
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As Fred Miller notes, in Miller 1971, pp. 65 ff. Cf. also D. Frede 1985, pp. 174 ff.
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This suggests the following view: That the wicked man thinks of pleasure in terms of
pleasant sensations, and anticipatory pleasures allow him to have more such sensations.
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Soc. That anyone who feels pleasure in any way whatsoever and no matter how
heedlessly, always really feels pleasure; however, at times he feels pleasure at things that
neither are nor will become (xoic; ouai ppS’ etii xoiq yEyovooiv evioxe), often and
perhaps at most times at things that are neither about to be nor will ever come to be
(xoiq pti5e peUouai tcoxe yEvfjaEaftai) [40dl-10].
Here, clearly, the reference is to objects of belief both present and future, the latter being
specifically the objects of hope and anticipation. Falsity is a permanent condition (c^iq)
of all pleasures and pains that are based on beliefs, that is to say, it is an ever-present
possibility for all pleasures that are based on logoi. And to all of this Protarchus
emphatically assents: “This, too, Socrates, is necessarily thus so [ouxcoq dvayKalov,
40cl].” False pleasure is defined here in terms of logoi in general; one may feel pleasure
in connection with a belief that turns out to be false and, in that case, Plato would like to
say, the pleasure itself is false. But it need not be the thought of afuture event that one
takes pleasure in. One may simply believep to be the case whenp is not in fact the case,
and accordingly the pleasure that one took in (falsely) believingp may be termed false
too. And one may also believe p to have been the case in the past and take pleasure in
thinking so, and be mistaken in one’s belief and therefore in one’s pleasure. In all these
cases, the pleasure that one has is based on a mistaken belief. But no importance is given
to the distinction between false writings and false pictures of beliefs, as far as their
connection with false pleasures is concerned. Hopes and anticipations, with their
attendant beliefs about the future, are inscribed in our souls either as 56^ai or as
(pavidapaxa e(!^CDypa9r|fi8va; but, so can beliefs about the present and beliefs about the
past. Thus, I think that the first type of false pleasures consists not in false pleasures of
anticipation alone, but in pleasures based on false belief in general.
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2. Mooradian’s Account
Norman Mooradian (1992) presents an alternative account ofhow anticipatory
pleasures can be false. On Mooradian’s view, the analogy between believing and taking
pleasure need not be taken to imply that belief and pleasure are subject to the same kind
of falsity. Instead, the point of the analogy is that belief and pleasure could each err in
some way, but err in different though closely related ways. Mooradian locates the link
between the two ways of erring in the notion of missing the mark (d|iapiav8iv) which
Socrates employs in the discussion at 37eff. What it is for pleasure and belief to miss the
mark, and hence to be incorrect (ouk op&fiv), is unique to each [1992, p. 25]. For beliefs
to miss the mark is for their contents to be false representations, that is to say, for the
beliefs to misrepresent their objects. On the other hand, Mooradian thinks, for pleasures
to miss the mark is for them to misidentijy their objects in a certain way.
To explain the idea of misidentifying the objects of pleasure, Mooradian employs
the notion of a proper object. He explicates “proper object” as it applies to pleasure in
two ways:
(a) According to the first, “an object would be the proper object of a pleasure
because it causes the pleasure” [1992, p. 28]. More precisely, the awareness of the
proper object causes the anticipatory pleasure. In the subject’s awareness, the object is an
intentional object, but, to say that an anticipatory pleasure has aproper object is to claim
that “something in reality answers to the intentional object” (p. 28). Furthermore, if the
subject were to realize that its proper object does not exist or will not exist, he would
cease to have the anticipatory pleasure connected with it. Thus, the subject has the
anticipatory pleasure because he believes that the proper object of his pleasure will come
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about at some later time. Using our previous notation we may formulate this conception
as follows;
(Ml) For someone S, x is the proper object of S’s p* at t, = def. {x is the
intentional object of S’s awareness at t,) & (S believes that there is some
later time t2 such that x will occur at t2> & (S’s belief that x will occur at t2
causes S to have p* at t,) & [if (S believed that x will not occur at t
2) then (S
would not have p* at t,)].
Thus, X qua intentional object must correspond to x qua subsequently existing object.
That is, the intentional object must be properly identified with the object that comes about
at a later time. The following then gives the definition of false anticipatory pleasure that
corresponds to misidentification of the proper object of pleasure as defined in (Ml):
(Ml.l) For someone S, and for some intentional object x of S, S’s p* at tj isfalse
= def. (S is aware ofx at t,) & (S believes that there is no time, t
2 , such that
X will occur at 12) & (S has p* at t,).
Here we have one definition of false anticipatory pleasure that explicates the notion of
“missing the mark,” according to which an anticipatory pleasure is false whenever it is
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directed an object that the agent believes will not exist.
(b) The second notion of proper object that Mooradian thinks Socrates employs is
this: “something is the proper object of a pleasure ifwe would not want the pleasure if it
could be generated without that objecf’ [1992, p. 28]. According to this, whenever an
anticipatory pleasure has a proper object, the agent would not want to have the
anticipatory pleasure if he were to know that the object does not or will not exist.
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Bernard Williams had made a similar point in Williams 1959. He gives the example of a
man who, believing he has come upon an inheritance, is pleased. If the man finds out that the
inheritance is not real, his pleasure disappears. That is to say, the object of the pleasure can
properly cause the pleasure only //the object is real or exists. To say this is to say, in
Mooradian’s terms, that the object of the anticipatory pleasure has a proper object.
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Mooradian gives the example of someone whose beliefs are manipulated by a
brain scientist, so that he comes to have anticipatory pleasures connected with these
beliefs but he knows that these beliefs are false, that is, he knows that the objects of his
beliefs are non-existent. If such a person were to ask the scientist to manipulate his
beliefs in this way, then any anticipatory pleasures consequent upon the false beliefs
would be false, since they would lack their proper object, even though they have an
intentional object [1992, p. 28]. Here, the subject’s wishing to have the anticipatory
pleasure depends upon his not knowing that no actual object corresponds to the
intentional object of his awareness. If he knew that the intentional object of his awareness
did not have a real object corresponding to it, he would not want to feel the anticipatory
pleasure connected with having the intentional object. We may formulate this second
notion of proper object in the following way:
(M2) X is the proper object of S’s p* at t, = def. (x is the intentional object of S’s
awareness at t,) & (S believes that there is some later time, tj, such that x
will occur at t2) & (S’s belief that x will occur at tj causes S to have p* at t,)
& (S wants to have p* at t,) & [if (S knew that x will not occur at t2) then (S
would not want to have p* at t,)].
If the subject knew that the proper object of his anticipatory pleasure did not exist but he
nonetheless felt the anticipatory pleasure, then his pleasure would be false. Thus the
corollary giving the corresponding definition of false anticipatory pleasure is:
(M2.1) For someone S, and for some intentional object x of S, S’s p* at t, isfalse
= def. (S is aware ofx at t,) & (S knows that there is no time, t2 , such that x
will occur at t
2) & (S has p* at t,).
The gist of the notion of a proper object of pleasure is that a pleasure can fail to be
directed at the right object. Mooradian thus turns around the notion of missing the mark
and asks, instead, what it means for an intentional object to hit its mark. For the
intentional object, hitting the mark means getting the right object [1992; pp. 46-47].
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Hence, “we can think of the point of pleasure as consisting in its being directed at an
object proper to it. The point of my pleasure of anticipating riches is that I enjoy actual
future riches. These constitute the proper object of this pleasure. Should they fail to
materialize, my enjoyment would have been misdirected” [1992, p. 36]. Thus for
Mooradian the falsity of an anticipatory pleasure depends upon, but does not consist in,
the falsity of the representations in the subject’s soul. The falsity of the pleasure consists
in its lacking the object that is proper to it, that which gives the pleasure its point and its
worth. The proper object, we might say, is the ground of the anticipatory pleasure, and
the pleasure is false whenever it “misses” its proper object. The failure of the intentional
act is explained in terms of its having been directed at the wrong object. Thus Mooradian
thinks that a false anticipatory pleasure fails by misidentijying its intended object.
Mooradian amplifies this account in (1996). Here he proposes that Protarchus’
initial refusal to accept Socrates’ analogy between pleasure and belief must be seen in
terms of Protarchus’ acceptance of a certain thesis about the relativity of perception. This
thesis is the same one that is ascribed to Protagoras in Theaetetus 152a, in connection
with Protagoras’ claim there that knowledge is perception. According to this view,
certain perceptions, namely those that are referred to by Plato as aiaOfjacK;, are always
veridical, that is, they can never be mistaken about their objects. Among such aistheseis
are seeings and hearings, pleasures, pains, desires, and fears. The thesis of Protagorean
relativity entails that for any pleasure, “there is a pleasurable thing special to this
particular feeling of pleasure,” and that the awareness of this pleasurable thing cannot be
mistaken [1996; p. 105]. Thus, what it means for someone S to be mistaken about the
object of his pleasure x is for S to have pleasure in x and be mistaken in thinking that x is
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a pleasurable object. The “Protagorean Thesis” may then be stated as follows:
The Protagorean Thesis (PT): For any person S, and for any object of pleasure x,
if S takes pleasure in jc, then x is pleasurable.
The taking pleasure in x constitutes an aisthesis. And so, (PT) follows from the definition
of aisthesis together with the claim that all states of pleasure are aistheseis. We can then
summarize Protarchus’ view before he accepted Socrates’ argument in this way:
(A3. 1) (i) No aisthesis can be mistaken in regard to its object.
(ii) All pleasures are aistheseis.
(iii) Therefore: No pleasure can be mistaken in regard to its object.
(PT) implies that whenever anyone is having a pleasure, there must be some object
which, necessarily, is correctly described as being pleasurable. Now according to the
representationalist interpretation, Protarchus rejects Socrates’ initial argument because
Protarchus does not accept the view that pleasure is a representational state. On (PT),
however, Protarchus rejects Socrates’ argument because he thinks that argument is
irrelevant to the question whether pleasures can be false [1996; p. 108]. Pleasures are
always true because the fact of having a pleasure always means that there is some
pleasurable thing that correctly fits the pleasure as its object. Thus we get an explanation
for this remark by Socrates to Protarchus, early in the argument: “Neither in a dream nor
when awake, as you assert, neither in frenzy nor in derangement of mind, is there anyone
who ever yet thinks he is enjoying, but is not enjoying at all, nor again thinks he is in
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pain, but is nof’ (36e5-8). What Socrates takes Protarchus to have asserted was (PT).
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It is possible to put this point in terms of Mooradian’s earlier discussion in (1992);
according to the terms of that discussion, Protarchus rejects Socrates’ initial analogy between
believing and taking pleasure because, on Protarchus’ view, granting that every pleasure has an
intentional object (i.e., to f|56pevov), the intentional object could not fail to be the same as its
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Given that this is the case, how then does Socrates convince Protarchus that some
pleasures can be false?
It might be thought that Socrates convinces Protarchus by getting him to accept
the following argument:
(A3.2) (i) No aisthesis can be mistaken in regard to its object.
(ii) Some pleasures can be mistaken in regard to their objects.
(iii) Therefore'. Some pleasures are not aistheseis.
The conclusion then allows that some pleasures can be false. Now, according to
Mooradian, on the representationalist view Protarchus is persuaded by being shown
either: (a) that anticipatory pleasures are themselves cognitive states and so can be false;
or else (b) that anticipatory pleasures are similar enough to cognitive states to warrant
being called false. Mooradian rejects both these options. On his view, the scribe and
painter analogies provide Protarchus with groundsfor rejecting the application o/(PT) to
anticipatory pleasures. The analogies achieve this, according to Mooradian, “by giving
an etiology of the pleasures that undermines their claim to be self-verifying with respect
to something’s being pleasurable” [1996; p. 109]. In introducing the scribe analogy,
Socrates asks Protarchus to imagine a person who, seeing an object at a distance, is
unable to identify the object. The person makes a judgment in his own mind about what
he sees, and the judgment constitutes a kind of inner speech. This judgment, Mooradian
explains, “is clearly distinguishable from the perceptual awareness (aiaOpaiq). It arises
from memory and other unspecified TraOpiiaxa. The significance of this example is that
proper object', whereas, in the case of belief, x6 5o^a(!^6|j.8vov could fail to match its proper
object. However, Mooradian does not state it thus in (1996), nor does he there refer to his
discussion in (1992); nonetheless the later discussion is, I think, consistent with the earlier.
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the judgment (56^a) is described as being about an enduring, public object. It thus has a
duration that may continue after the visual aicOrjaiq has ceased and it thus may be
confirmed or disconfirmed by future observation. This bears directly on the general
relativist thesis. If aiaftrjaiq restricts us to the senses, then the thesis is irrelevant to
most knowledge claims, since the majority of such claims are about enduring, public
objects. If by aicftrjciq we mean any awareness, including judgment, then the thesis is
shovm to be false, since conditions for the verification and falsification of the statements
have been provided” [1996; p. 109]. Now, as regards pleasures of anticipation,
Mooradian says that their etiology makes it possible for them to false: “First, it is
possible to be wrong about whether or not one will have a pleasure. Second, it is possible
to take pleasure in the pleasurable event that does not come about. This is possible,
because this pleasure (of anticipation) comes about through judging and picturing the
pleasure. The pleasurable event is described and pictured in a certain way. Since the
anticipatory pleasure comes about from belief in the description, the pleasure can be said
to be in the future pleasure thus described. Because this is the case, the features imputed
to the anticipated event will be precisely those features that make the event pleasurable to
anticipate. This means that the relativistic thesis will not be applicable to anticipatory
pleasures. Taking anticipatory pleasure in x will not make it the case that x is pleasurable
in the way in which it is felt to be pleasurable, since it will not make it the case that x has
those features belief in which give rise to the anticipatory pleasure. To put the point in
more general terms, the description ofhow the anticipatory pleasure arises will not entail
that the event anticipated is pleasurable, as it does in those cases to which the relativistic
thesis applies. It will not do so since the pleasure is brought about by belief, and belief,
as the scribe analogy makes clear, attributes objective features to the world” [1996; pp.
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110-111, underscoring supplied]. By the etiology of an anticipatory pleasure Mooradian
means how the pleasure arises, i.e., its causation. In cases of perception where (PT)
applies, the description of how the perception arises entails the veridicality of the content
of the perception, as the following might illustrate:
(El) For any person S and for some object x of S’s aisthesis, ifx appears red to S,
then X is red.
This may be made more precise as follows:
(E2) For any person S and for some object x of S’s aisthesis, ifx appears red to S,
then X has the property redness.
In (El) and (E2), the description ‘x appears red to S’ entails that x is red or x has the
property redness. Similarly, where the aisthesis is a pleasure, it follows from (PT) that
the property “being pleasurable” is attributed to the content of the aisthesis, and this in an
incorrigible way: the causation of the aisthesis with its specific content guarantees the
veridicality of that content. However, when that content admits any doxai in its etiology,
veridicality ceases to be guaranteed because doxai attribute objective features to the
world. And so, Socrates’ point is simply that not all aistheseis are veridical, and the view
that aistheseis are necessarily veridical is what he succeeds in persuading Protarchus to
give up. At the end of the argument, Protarchus is convinced that in fact some aistheseis
involve judgment, and since judgment involves the possibility of error, then some
aistheseis can be mistaken. Socrates’ argument, then, consists in showing that premise (i)
of both (A3.1) and (A3.2) is false. But, if Mooradian is right, the scribe and the painter
analogies ought to have shown that anticipatory pleasures can be false in regard to their
objects’ being pleasurable.
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Consider once more Socrates’ example of the wicked man gleefully anticipating
coming into possession of a hoard of gold. On Mooradian’s account, the wicked man’s
anticipatory pleasure may be false for either of two reasons; (a) the man does not in fact
end up acquiring the anticipated hoard of gold; or, (b) it turns out that having the gold is
not really pleasurable. These correspond, respectively, to (Cl) and (C2.1) as introduced
in the previous section. But the example of the wicked man, as Socrates presents it,
assumes that (Cl) can be ruled out, i.e., there is no question of the man’s not acquiring
the gold, only whether he will really enjoy it when he acquires it. Nevertheless let us
consider the first of Mooradian’s stated conditions for an anticipatory pleasure’s being
false, namely, that it is possible to be wrong about whether or not one will have a
pleasure that one anticipates. Mooradian’s claim, then, is that this can be mistaken in a
way that can be understood by seeing how the anticipatory pleasure comes about, that is,
by considering its etiology.
The etiology of the man’s anticipatory pleasure presumably would include items
of belief in the man’s mind concerning such things as the objective value of gold, the
likelihood of his acquiring it, the things that he can do with it, and how much he will
enjoy having it when he does acquire it. But, surely, not all of these beliefs bear on the
question whether the anticipated pleasure will turn out to be really pleasurable for him.
Now for Mooradian, whether the anticipate^/ pleasure turns out to be really pleasurable is
what the question whether the man’s anticipator^^ pleasure is veridical or not amounts to.
We must remember that the two pleasures being compared here are: (a) the pleasure that
the man is currently having in connection with his anticipation, and (b) the pleasure that
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he expects to have in the future. Mooradian’s account implies that (a) can be veridical
with respect to (b) only if the content of (b) is part of the content of (a). It is (a) that
Socrates is calling a false pleasure, and on Mooradian’s account, (a) is false only if (b)
turns out to be false in the right way, that is, if the pleasure which the event is expected to
produce does not come about. But, after all, the only item in the etiology of the
anticipatory pleasure that is relevant to the falsity of that pleasure is the man ’s beliefthat
he will enjoy the anticipated event. The other items, such as his beliefs about the value of
gold and about the likelihood of his acquiring it, though all elements in the etiology of the
anticipatory pleasure, are irrelevant to the content of the subsequent anticipated pleasure.
Thus, he may hold mistaken beliefs concerning the likelihood that he will acquire gold, or
about the objective value of gold, and still enjoy the gold when he eventually acquires it.
On Mooradian’s account, his anticipatory pleasure would still have been true, for it is
solely the correctness of his belief that he will enjoy having the gold that determines
whether his anticipatory pleasure is true. If he does not enjoy the anticipated event, then
even if all the other beliefs that went to make up the etiology of his anticipatory pleasure
were to turn out to be true, his anticipatory pleasure would still have been false. And so,
after all, it is only the beliefthat he will enjoy himself whether this be in the form of a
A,6yoc; or of (pavidapaxa e^coypacprjpeva, that proves to be false. Here, it seems to me,
Mooradian’s view becomes indistinguishable from representationalism. For, on
Mooradian’s view, it is still (p* that turns out to be false, and it is as a consequence of the
falsity of (p* than p* is likewise claimed to be false. It is hard to see how this differs from
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representationalism in explaining why Protarchus eventually accepted Socrates’
argument.
What Mooradian’s view does explain well, however, is why Protarchus initially
could not accept Socrates claim of an analogy between the object of taking pleasure and
the object of believing. Mooradian’s discussion succeeds in illustrating how, as Socrates
thought, the term aiaOriaiq can be applied to different types of mental states. Thus,
Socrates’ argument showed that there are different kinds of aistheseis, not just the
perceptual kind. Protarchus realized that anticipatory pleasures are not just sensations;
they are complex pathemata of the soul that may involve beliefs, judgments, pictures, or
desires. Perhaps it would not be incorrect to refer to them as emotions, and to say that
Socrates’ point is that emotions may involve cognitive states as components. But, in
explaining Protarchus’ conversion, we still need to choose between the following options:
(a) Socrates shows Protarchus that anticipatory pleasures are identical with the cognitive
states associated with them; or (b) Socrates shows Protarchus that anticipatory pleasures
are closely enough associated with these cognitive states to warrant their being called
false when these cognitive states are false. But these, of course, are exactly the options
that a representationalist account makes available; Mooradian’s account does not present
a third option.
Perhaps a similar point can be made about Mooradian’s earlier account. The
notion of an intentional object corresponds to either 9 or 9* in our notation, which refer,
respectively, to two distinct objects of anticipation: e and p**. These distinctions
underlie the difference between (Cl) and (C2). Now in Mooradian’s account, (Ml.l) and
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(M2.2) both specify cases where (Cl) has not been ruled out; in both, it is either believed
or known that e does not or will not hold. On the other hand, however, in Socrates’
wicked man example it is assumed that (Cl) can be ruled out. The point of both (Ml.l)
and (M2.1) is that the intentional object of the anticipation fails to correspond to its
proper object—it misses its target, so to speak. But, to view it in this way is to mislocate
the source of the failure of fit between the picture in the man’s mind anticipating a future
pleasure and the object, i.e., the target, of this picture. Although p** is the indirect object
of the anticipation, it is the picture of this future pleasure, that is, cp*, rather than the
picture of e, that is, cp, that is pleasurable. That seems to be the point of the wicked man
example. It is the thought of the man’s future enjoyment that constitutes the intentional
object of his anticipation, which in turn constitutes p*. But the failure of the intentional
object to find its proper object is not a failure of reference, that is, the wicked man’s
anticipation fails not because he misidentifies the intentional object of his anticipation but
rather because he fails to predict a certain future event, namely the event of his not
enjoying the direct object of his anticipation.
This, however, can hardly be described as a failure to get the right object, as
Mooradian would have it. Mooradian believes that the point of the Philebus's notion of a
false anticipatory pleasure is “to demonstrate the manner in which taking pleasure in an
object depends upon judgment’s proper relation to that object and hence, upon getting the
right objecf ’ [1992; pp. 46-47]. But, suppose the wicked man really did enjoy his hoard
of gold: would this then be describable as his having got the right object of his
anticipatory pleasure? On Mooradian’ s account, it would be so describable. More
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significantly, on Mooradian’s account, this situation would be possible. But, I believe
that the point of the example is that it could not turn out that the wicked man really
enjoyed the anticipated event as he had pictured it in his own mind. His anticipation is
false, and the pleasure that constitutes the anticipation is false, because he cannot get a
certain picture right. But the picture that he cannot get right is the picture of himself
enjoying the event he anticipated, not simply the picture of the event occurring.
But suppose it were really Plato’s view that the wicked man cannot get the picture
right because he doesn’t know what things are truly pleasurable. It would nonetheless be
the case that his anticipatory pleasure is false because the belief or the picture of himself
that he has in his mind when he had his anticipatory pleasure is false, not because he
doesn’t know what things are truly pleasurable, nor even because he lacks self-knowledge
and does not know what he will really find pleasurable. The belief or the picture is false
not because it fails to get the right object of his anticipation, but because it misrepresents
his future condition with respect to being pleased. Thus, (Ml.l) and (M2.1) are really not
about misidentifying the proper object of pleasure; they are about failure of occurrence of
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the event that is expected to produce the anticipated pleasure.
Cynthia Hampton [1987; 1990] pursues the implications of the view that the wicked man
doesn’t know what things are really pleasurable. According to Hampton, the wicked man has
false beliefs about what he will find pleasurable because he has false beliefs about the intrinsic
value of things. He mistakenly thinks gold is intrinsically valuable, and “this falsifies, i.e. renders
inauthentic, the way he leads his life” [1987, p. 255]. Hampton thinks that the notion of truth that
is at work here is an ontological one; the wicked man “is not living a proper human life, one that
fulfills the human telos by accurately reflecting the proper ordering of reality, i.e., ontological
truth” [1987, p. 1 58]. This ordering according to telos is effected by the Forms, which are thus
for Hamptonfinal causes of sensible things. The Form of the Good orders all things towards a
telos, and all the other Forms are thus “aspects of the Good as Cause” [1990, p. 50]. {continued)
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J. Dybikowski [1970a] thinks that the pleasure that Socrates here calls false is the
pleasure pictured in the man ’s mind, that is, p** rather than p*. Dybikowski claims that
Socrates had made a mistake in 40b6-7, where he declares that “for the bad too pleasures
are no less present, painted in their souls; but these, surely, are false.” Here, according to
Dybikowski, Socrates meant to claim that the pleasure taken in the picture, i.e., the
anticipatory pleasure, is false, but instead makes the claim that the pictured pleasure is
false. Dybikowski thus rejects both Kenny’s and Gosling’s accounts of how, in the
argument, false pictures of pleasure are identified with pictures of false pleasure. But the
mistake is understandable, Dybikowski says, because, “in mentioning the pictured
pleasure, it would have been easy to slip into supposing that a reference had been made to
a pleasure which is experienced; and in the absence of a clear discussion of the distinction
between the pleasure of anticipation and the anticipated pleasure, it would not be plain
which was under discussion” [1970a; p. 165].
But, surely, in the discussion the distinction between the two pleasures is clear
enough; in attributing falsity to anticipatory pleasure on the basis of the falsity of the
picture of the anticipated pleasure in the man’s mind, Socrates was clearly arguing from
the falsity of one to the falsity of the other. It seems to me that Socrates’ view is that the
two pleasures are so mingled that one taints the other with its falsity. Indeed this is how
Socrates summarizes the matter a bit later on. In introducing the second type of false
The problem with such an account is that it imports into the analysis of the Philebus the
theory of Forms of the middle dialogues, especially the Republic. But the status of the middle
period Forms in the late dialogues is controversial. In my view, the most unequivocal reference
to the Forms in the Philebus is the reference to them as povdSaq, unities, at 15bff But neither
here nor elsewhere in the dialogue, it seems to me, does Socrates attempt to draw any ethical
implications from the status of the Forms as unities.
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pleasure, he contrasts this with the first type he has just finished discussing; in the first
type, false beliefs, as well as true ones, when they occurred, “filled” or “infected” the
pains and pleasures themselves simultaneously with their condition (xdq Xvnaq xc Kai
f|6ovdq dpa xou Tiap’ auxaic; TiaSfjpaxoq dvcTu'pTi^aaav, 42a8-9). Accordingly, if
the anticipated pleasure turns out to be false, then the previously felt anticipatory pleasure
is “filled” (dv87rip7T>.aaav) with its falsity. What needs explanation is, how beliefs can
be so mingled with pleasure that their truth or falsity is communicated to the pleasure
itself.
3. Fenner’s Account
The Gosling-Kenny account tries to show how, in the narrower case of
anticipatory pleasure, the picture of the anticipated pleasure in the man’s mind is
identified with the occurrent anticipatory pleasure in the man’s soul. This, however, is far
from constituting a general account of how falsity is communicated from belief to
pleasure. Terry Fenner (1970) presents what amounts to a generalization of the principle
involved in Gosling’s account. In Gosling’s account the crucial element is the conflation
of the two pleasures due to the absence of a clear distinction between the picturing of a
pleasure and the picture of a pleasure. Now Fenner maintains that in the argument at
36c-40e, a similar move towards conflation is effected by the lack of a clear distinction
between pleasure as a process, and pleasure as the product of an activity or process. The
same ambiguity characterizes belief, that is, there is an ambiguity between belief as
believing and belief as the thing believed. This “process-product ambiguity” enables
Socrates to break down Frotarchus’ objection to the view that there is an analogy between
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the object of believing and the object of taking pleasure. Penner thinks this is shown in
the following way:
(1) In the beginning of the argument at 31 al -10 Socrates establishes an analogy
between believing and taking pleasure, the point of the analogy being that believing and
taking pleasure both take objects. To express the relation between these and their objects,
Penner proposes the formal construction “cp-ing in p"
.
At 37al l-b3 it is asserted that
whether or not I rightly (p, I still really (p; from this, the following analysis of “I wrongly
(p in /?” may be derived:
(P7) There exists a cp-ing which I am doing and there exists a proposition which
that (p-ing is in and that (p-ing is wrong.
In Penner’ s analysis, (P7) provides the general principle establishing the logical
connection between taking pleasure inp and believing in p, and drawing a criterion of
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wrongness that is common to taking pleasure and believing. Wrongness is indicated in
Plato’s text as ‘not correct,’ (ouk 6p0f|), so that any cp-ing in a proposition is not correct
if the proposition that the cp-ing is in is false, so that believing in a propositionp is
oi)K opOf) ifp is false. In Plato’s text here, ‘ouk opSf)’ is used interchangeably with
‘dpapxccvouaa’ (“erring,” or “missing the mark”). At 37d7 what is opOfj is 66^a, and
here 56^a is the same as 8o^cx(^civ; thus ‘belief is understood as ‘believing’ or judging’,
‘f|5ovf|’ is understood as ‘taking pleasure in’ and is contrasted with ‘what one is pleased
at' In summary, up to 37e9 “correct” and “erring” are reserved for the cp-ing as opposed
to what the cp-ing is in [Penner, 1970; p. 173].
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Penner notes that “cp-ing in p" will often be unidiomatic, but that this does not undercut the
analogy: “(p-ing in p" can stand for “is pleased that p," “believing (in) the proposition/?,”
“believing that /?,” and the like [Penner, 1970; 173 n. 8].
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(2) At 37el0-l 1 Socrates introduces false belief in connection with taking
pleasure. According to Penner, Socrates sees this connection not as that of pleasure being
accompanied by or occurring with false believing but as that of being pleased in the false
things believed: “But now, pleasure very often seems to come to us not with true belief,
but with a false belief (Kai pfjv eoikev yc f|8ovf) 7ioA,A,dKiq ou peid bd^riq opdf^q
dA,?id pcxd v|/8u6ou<; f|piv yiyvECTOai). Here Socrates employs an existence
assumption, which Penner states as follows:
(PIO) There are pleasures ( = cases of being pleased) and there are false
propositions such that the pleasures are in one of these false propositions.
Penner does not indicate whether he thinks Socrates, in the remark just quoted, means by
56^r|q the believing or the belief, though presumably Penner understands him to mean
the believing. Protarchus’ reply to this is that in such cases the believing (xf)v 66^av) is
false but not the pleasure (37el2-38a2). Penner does not explain either why he thinks
that by xf)v 56^av Protarchus means the believing rather than the beliefas the object of
the believing, as the accusative construction would lead us to expect. Here Penner
ascribes the following view to Protarchus:
(P 1 1 ) Whenever there is a pleasure and a false proposition which occur
simultaneously, there is a believing which is in the false proposition & the
believing is false & the believing is with the pleasure & the pleasure is not
false.
Thus, Protarchus is doing either of two things: he is denying that (a) the “(p-ing in p”
relation applies to pleasure; or he is asserting that (b) all pleasure in a belief is simply




(3) Socrates must now show Protarchus that there really are cases of taking
pleasure in a belief or proposition, so that (b) is false, and that “cp-ing inp” really applies
to pleasure, so that (a) is true. This is achieved through the scribe and painter analogies.
In the course of the analogies, ‘66^a’ comes to refer to what is believed rather than to the
believing, that is, the shift is made from the “process” sense of 66^a to its “product”
sense. In the analogies, 66^a is no longer to bo^d^civ but to 5o^a(;6|i8vov (39a4,
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39bI0-cI, 39c4-5, 40b3). Writings (ypdppaTa), images (eiKOveq), and painted
pictures ((^coypacpfjpaTa) are also referred to in their “product” sense. Pleasure is related
to the “product” sense of 86^a by the use of tni (at 40c9, d8-10, 37e5), and by the use of
the dative for the object of pleasure (at 40b5-c2, 37a9). These grammatical cues indicate
that pleasure is being thought of in terms of the “cp-i^ig in p” relation [Penner, 1970; p.
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At 39a4 Socrates says that whenever our experiences write what is true in our souls,
86^a TE d7,r|0f)(; xai ^dyoi, i.e., true beliefand writings arise in us. This is the statement that is
listed as premise (ii) (“Writings of true beliefs are true”) in my argument summary earlier in this
section. At 39ac4-5, the images of true beliefs and statements (twv d>.Ti8(i)v 8o^d)v xai ?i6y(ov
eIkovec;) are said to be true, and those of false ones are false; these are premises (v) and (vi) in
the argument summary. At 39b 10 the reference is to twv 8o^aa0evTC0v as past beliefs that we
recall; 40b3 refers to t« ysypappeva as writings in the mind that are true for good men, false for
evil men.
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At 40d8-10, “takes pleasure at” is given as xotipovTi etu, which is paralleled by
8o^d^ovTi eni at 40c9; at 37e5-6 pains and pleasures are said to be capable of being mistaken
concerning that which it is pained or pleased about (ecp’ (I) XoTisiTai f) TOUvavTibv). It is at
40c 1-2 that wicked men are said to “delight in” false pleasures (vj;Eu8eaiv TjSovaiq xotlpowcriv),
good men in true ones (pbovaiq xaipouoiv d>»r|88aiv); at 37a9 to 8o^a<^6pEvov is defined as
“that in which pleasure is taken” (co to f|86pEvov fjSsTai).
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The result is that Socrates has now effected a shift, from the notion of being
pleased as accompanied by or occurring with a belief, to the notion of being pleased in a
79
belief. If the belief that one takes pleasure in is false, then the believing may be said
also to be false; and so, if a propositionp in which pleasure is taken is false, then the
pleasure taken in;? may likewise be said to admit of falsity. What is accomplished by the
shift is that the mental state of taking pleasure is shown to be analogous to the mental
state of believing, in such a way that what may be said of believing may also be said of
taking pleasure. Penner’ view is summarized in a remark he makes concerning Plato;
Penner says that Plato was the first philosopher to see that “being pleased that...” is a
propositional attitude [Penner, 1970; pp. 171-172]. Penner does not in fact claim that
Plato deliberately exploits the ambiguity of doxa to establish his argument; in fact Penner
thinks that Plato is unaware of the ambiguity. What Penner thinks Plato was aware of is
the perceptual analogy between believing and taking pleasure; in claiming such an
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analogy Plato shows an understanding that pleasures are propositional attitudes.
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Penner illustrates that distinction in the first part of his paper. The difference is that
between
(P4) I am going to win the race and I am taking pleasure in ( = enjoying) skating,
where I believe I am going to win the race but my belief does not “fall within the scope” ofmy
enjoying, and
(P6) I am going to win the race and I am pleased that I am going to win the race,
where my belief that I am going to win the race falls within the scope ofmy pleasure, so that, i.e.,
the proposition 1 am going to win the race is the object of my being pleased [Penner, 1970; p.
168].
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Dorothea Frede sustains Penner’s general account, but unlike Penner she believes not only
that Plato was aware of the ambiguity of doxa, but that Plato deliberately made use of the
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Thus, on Fenner’s interpretation, pleasures can be false for Plato because
pleasures qua propositional attitudes have objects, namely the propositions in which
pleasures are taken. Now if some pleasures are propositional attitudes, then Protarchus’
version of hedonism cannot be right. It will be recalled from Chapter Two that the
following principle applies to Protarchus’ conception of pleasure:
(R2) IfX and are F, then there is some which accompanies x and also
y, and x and are F by virtue of having
(f>.
(R2) may perhaps be expressed by saying that pleasure is an epiphenomenon or a
byproduct, e.g., it consists in some feeling or some motion in the soul that accompanies
all processes of restoration. In (R2), this epiphenomenon would be represented by
(f>,
which accompanies all pleasures and is what all instances of pleasure have in common.
But it really is what all pleasures are in common, and for Protarchus it is what pleasure
itself is. But, I have argued that for Socrates, what pleasure is, or what pleasures have in
common, i.e., the one of Pleasure, is merely its abstract nature as the process of
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restoration in living beings. If this is so, then what individuates pleasures, that is to say,
what makes Pleasure many, can’t be something that belongs to this abstract process alone.
Now, that some pleasures are propositional attitudes implies that they have objects, and
ambiguity to set up the breakdown of the distinction between believing and that which is
believed, and this in order to allow for a similar breakdown of the distinction between taking
pleasure and that in which pleasure is taken. See D. Frede 1985, pp. 169-171. Irving Thalberg
[1962; pp. 73-74] was the first to propose, as a result of the Philebus discussion, that pleasure
that and similar states be classified and analyzed as propositional attitudes.
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D. Frede makes the same point in 1985, p. 172.
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the description of their objects forms part of their descriptions as pleasures. It is in this
way that falsity and truth enter into the composition of the pleasures and create
contrarieties among their kinds.
D. Overestimation, Falsity, and Evil
A second type of false pleasure is one that results from viewing the pleasure either
from a temporal distance or in proximity with pain or with other pleasures. Here, again,
desire plays an important role. To be in need of restoration is to experience desire so
long, that is, as there is memory or present perception of the object that can restore the
body or the soul to harmony. If the body is the source of the desire, then while in the
condition of desire the body is at variance with (bi'xa) the soul, is separate (x®piq) from
it, and is divided (5i8iA.r|7rTai) from the soul in its experiences (41c2-3). Once more the
point here is that desire belongs to the soul as its own activity, even if the lack that gives
rise to the desire is a bodily lack, and even though it was the body that “supplied some
pleasure through its experience” (8ia nd^oq f|5ovf|v pv to rrapexopevov, 41c6-7).
Desires, though they may arise through bodily experiences, are perceived by the soul as
the soul’s own pathemata. The essence of desire is the soul’s longing for the object that
will replenish its own or the body’s condition, and thus in desire the soul looks forward to
the filling that will restore it to harmony. But here error is due, not to the possibility that
the future event that is expected to bring the desired replenishment will fail to occur, nor
to the possibility that its occurrence will fail to produce the expected pleasure, but rather
to the possibility that the expected pleasure, when it occurs, will not be as it was
anticipated, imagined, estimated, or otherwise projected into a future experience. Thus,
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here anticipation is involved, but this second type of false pleasure is not a form of
anticipatory pleasure. There is no claim that the pleasure that is experienced on account
of the object of anticipation is false; rather the anticipatedpleasure itself is false, because
its character turns out to be not as anticipated. This recalls (C2.2) in our previous
discussion. The error about the characteristics of the anticipated pleasure comes about as
a result of the soul’s having to project the pleasure into the future, and therefore having to
estimate its intensity or to imagine its quality. Socrates compares this to simple vision;
“In the case of sight, viewing magnitudes from afar and from near at hand obscures the
truth and makes us believe falsely (v|/eu6fi Tioiei 5o^d(!^8iv)” [41e9-42a2]; similarly with
pains and pleasures.
Now it might be thought that here we have merely a special case of the first type
of false pleasure, since here too it is a false belief that accounts for the falsity of the
pleasure. But Socrates is quite explicit in contrasting the second type of false pleasure
from the first; in the first type the false beliefs were said to infect the pains and pleasures
themselves with their falsity, while in the second type the pleasures “are on each occasion
being observed from afar and from near at hand, and at the same time are being placed
side by side” (42b). Out of the juxtaposition of pleasures both with other pleasures and
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with pain comes a distortion in the mind’s view of a future pleasure. Thus, again.
Projection into the future, of course, need not involve anticipation. Mooradian (1995)
rejects the view that the second type of false pleasure is a sub-type of false anticipatory pleasures.
The second type involves estimating the magnitude of a future pleasure [1995; pp. 98-99]. This
type of false pleasure plays a special role in akrasia; the akratic person is constantly
overestimating the magnitude of the pleasures that he looks forward to or otherwise pictures to
himself. This point was first raised by Cynthia Hampton in Hampton 1987, p. 259. Clearly,
however, estimating can take place simultaneously with anticipation.
143
falsity (and therefore evil) enters into the constitution of a pleasure. This second type of
false pleasure, like the first, involves anticipation, but in a different way.
Socrates proceeds to discuss a third sense of falsity, but it is not a sense in which
pleasures can be false; it is rather a sense in which it would be false to call something a
pleasure. We can err in categorizing neutral states as pleasurable states, that is, we can
equate pleasure with mere absence of pain. This is somewhat out of line with the
discussion up to this point, since here the putative pleasures are in reality not even
pleasures at all. That is, there is no error in the perception of a pleasure; rather there is a
categorial mistake concerning the identity of the one of Pleasure, which is equated with
absence of pain rather than with the process of replenishment. In Plato’s account,
absence of pain would refer to the state in between replenishments. One may then
mistakenly identify pleasure with this state, in which pain is absent because the soul then
perceives no condition of lack, and in which consequently the soul has no desire. At 43c,
Socrates makes a point that is crucial to his discussion of true pleasures, namely, that not
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all conditions of lack of either the body or the soul are perceived by the soul. The soul
perceives great changes (fisydA,ai pexaPoA-ai) and these produce pleasures and pains,
but “measured and small changes” (|i8TapoX,ai pexpiai X8 Kai apiKpai) produce no
pleasures and pains because the soul does not perceive them. In the subsequent
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That the discussion of the third type of falsity is relevant to the topic of true pleasures is
indicated by Socrates himself at 44d2-5.
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discussion of true pleasures, Socrates will include all those pleasures in which the lack is
unperceived.
The entire discussion of the third kind of falsity seems to me to be of the nature of
a parenthetical remark. Plato attributes the view to certain “dour persons” (oi boaxepeiq)
of his acquaintance who, out of overzealousness in rejecting sensual pleasures, end up
with “an excessive hatred of the power of pleasure” (peiiiariKOTcov Tqv trie; fibovfjq
buvapiv) and who recognize nothing healthy (oubev vyiiq) about it.^^ The point of
including it in the discussion, however, seems to be that those who think of the
neutral state as pleasurable believe falsely about what they enjoy (“v|/ED6fi 6o^d(!^ouai
Ttepi Tou xotfp^iv,” 44a9). Thus the notion of false belief provides a continuity to the
discussion.
E. Pain and Falsity: Mixed Pleasures
Gosling and Kenny both restrict Socrates’ enumeration of false pleasures to the
three that have been discussed so far. Perhaps this is because the notion of false belief
applies only to the first three kinds. But Socrates introduces a fourth category of
pleasures which he never designates as false, though he clearly considers them to be bad
pleasures. This ought to remind us that in the Philebus, Socrates is really dividing
Pleasure into good pleasures and bad. Nevertheless, I would like to argue here that.
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Nonetheless, Socrates says of their revulsion (buaxspsia) for pleasure that it is a “not
ignoble” (ouk dyswouc;, 44c6) revulsion. Schofield (1971) has argued that in this discussion,
Plato is referring to Speusippus and his followers.
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though the notion of false belief does not enter into the specification of this fourth
category, the broader notion offalsity does.
The category mixedpleasure is not equivalent to that of badpleasure . Being
mixed with pain, however, is one way in which pleasures can be bad, although this does
not mean that for Plato, pain is intrinsically evil. And yet Socrates is claiming that
mixed pleasures are bad pleasures and are inadmissible into the good life. If, then, pain is
not an intrinsic evil, how does its admixture with pleasure result in the pleasure’s
becoming bad?
The only possible explanation is that it is the fact of its being mixed that in some
sense renders the pleasure bad. What makes mixed pleasures bad is not merely that they
are usually or even always accompanied by pain; rather in the very experience of mixed
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Nor are the notions offalse pleasure and mixedpleasure identical. Hackforth [1945; p.
86ff] argues that there is no real distinction intended between false and mixed pleasures. For a
contrary view, see Dibykowski 1970b.
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Recall the exchange between Socrates and Philebus in the section on the four ontological
kinds:
Soc. Does pleasure and pain have a limit, or are they of the things that receive the more
and less?
Phil. Yes, of the more, Socrates; for pleasure would not be all good, if it did not happen
to be by nature unlimited in its fullness and increase.
Soc. Nor would pain be all bad (ticcv Kaxov), Philebus; so we must examine something
else other than the nature of the apeiron as that which provides some part of the good to
pleasure (27e5-28a3).
This passage implies that for Socrates, pain is not intrinsically bad or evil, just as pleasure is not
intrinsically good.
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pleasures, something else other than pleasure is involved. In other words, mixed
pleasures are experienced as intrinsically involving pain in some way. John Cooper
writes that, in mixed pleasures “the very experience that is enjoyed is enjoyed in part
precisely as being painful, or as involving pain in some way” [Cooper, 1977; p. 721].
Cooper goes on to describe Socrates’ view:
Thus, in Socrates’ conception of the bodily appetites as forms of distress, what is enjoyed
in satisfying an appetite is something that combines pain (the appetite) with pleasure (its
relief). If, for example, what one enjoys on some occasion is eating-while-hungry, then
an essential part of the pleasurable experience is the pain or distress of appetite. Other
similar mixed experiences include scratching an itch (46a8-9), when that is something
one takes an interest in and enjoys, masochistic sexual practices (47a3-9 may suggest
such a case), and malicious pleasures in the theater and elsewhere (48b ff ). In pure
pleasures, by contrast, what is enjoyed is something by its own nature fine and attractive
(Ka7.6v) and not, like these, interesting only because they combine distress with a
contrasting state or process of release or amusement (5 lc6-7): for example, the
discriminating sensory awareness of geometrical designs, clear musical tones, pure
colors, and fine smells, in all of which the use of the senses is not linked to the
satisfaction of appetites but is a direct response to the inherent fineness of the objects
being enjoyed, and the pleasures of disciplined discovery and learning (51c-52b)
[Cooper, 1977; p. 721].
In the experience of the mixed pleasures, in other words, pleasure is confused with its
opposite. Now to say that something jc is bad because, in our perception of x, x is being
confused with y, is not to say that x is bad because y is bad. There is a sense in which, if
we perceive x badly because we are confusing it with y, then x as we perceive it is a bad
instance of what an x is, i.e., it is a misleading instance and does not reveal what it really
is to be an x. To say that a pleasure is impure is therefore to say that it does not give us a
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true perception of the being of pleasure. Such a pleasure is a bad pleasure because it is
an untrue instance of what a pleasure really is. Thus, for Socrates impurity itself is a kind
of badness, so that mixed pleasures are by nature bad pleasures.
Cf. Vlastos 1965, p. 7.
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Earlier, Socrates had also asserted that pleasures can only be bad by being
false:
Soc. What about this: can we speak of bad beliefs, and of good ones, except in terms of
their becoming false or true?
Prot. Indeed not.
Soc. Nor, I think, can we perceive (KaxavooOpev) pleasure to be bad in any other way
except in its beingfalse.
Prot. But it’s very much the contrary, Socrates, of what you have said. For, one would
hardly set down wicked pains and pleasures as approaching falsity but as falling in with
a great, but quite another and manifold wickedness.
[axsbov ydp xtp V|/8u6si pev oi) tkxvo Tiovripdq dv xiq Xvnaq xe Kai fjbovdq &Eiri,
psydA-ri 5e d^XpKai 7ioA.^fj oopniTixouaac; 7tovr|pfa.] (40e6-41a4).
In his reply, Socrates promises to discuss a little later on the kind of wicked pains and
pleasures that Protarchus has referred to, meaning, evidently, the mixed pleasures. But,
in the portion of this passage that I have italicized, Socrates has asserted the following
premise:
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(i) Only false pleasures are bad pleasures.
And the point subsequently made about mixed pleasures is that all mixed pleasures are
bad, so that we also have:
(ii) All mixed pleasures are bad pleasures.
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Thalberg [1962; p. 69] charges Plato with confusing/a/^e pleasures and bad pleasures.
Citing the passage at 40b-c, which concludes that wicked men for the most part delight in false
pleasures and true men in good ones, Thalberg compares this with confusing (a) ‘Jones was
falsely pleased that his enemy died’ with the different statement (b) ‘Jones was wrongly pleased,
i.e., it was wicked of him to be pleased, that his enemy died’. But, (b) is a complicated example
(as Thalberg realizes; cf p. 70); it is not clear that Socrates would have analyzed (b) primarily in
terms of the first kind of false pleasure. The wickedness of the pleasure in (b) seems to me to
consist in its being a mixed pleasure (i.e., it involves malice); the question whether its component
belief, namely the belief that one’s opponent has died, is true or not, is irrelevant to its being a
mixed pleasure and irrelevant to its wickedness.
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Together, (i) and (ii) entail:
(iii) All mixed pleasures are false pleasures.
Thus, with mixed pleasures, it is not the pain mixed in with them that accounts for their
being bad but still falsity. The falsity in mixed pleasure consists in its concealment
of the true nature of pleasure, so that pleasure is experienced not as it really is but as
involving something else which it is not, and which in fact is its contrary. Pleasure is
experienced, not as replenishment simpliciter, but as a complex that involves in an
intrinsic way the contrary experience of kenosis or lack. Thus, falsity is once again
mixed in with the nature of pleasure.'
F. Conclusion
We can summarize the discussion of false pleasures in the Philebus by listing the
types of error that characterize each of the categories of false pleasure that Socrates has
just given:
(1) We can err about the propositional content of a pleasure by: a) taking
pleasure in a false proposition; b) believing falsely that we will enjoy the
object of our pleasant anticipation;
(2) We can overestimate the magnitude or the quality of a future pleasure;
(3) We can make a semantic mistake concerning the reference of the term
‘pleasure’ in our experience; and
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(4) We can err in assessing the phenomenological purity of a pleasurable
experience, mistaking pain to be intrinsically part of certain kinds of
pleasures.
The list makes it evident how different are the various senses of falsity that Plato employs
in his discussion.
It might be claimed, however, that it is the notion offalse beliefiheiX ties them all
together, since even in (4) it could be said that the fact that pleasure is mixed in with pain
engenders a false belief about the nature of pleasure. But false belief applies to the four
kinds of false pleasure in very different ways, and to (3) in a divergent way from the
others. It is notfalse beliefhuXfalsity itself that constitutes the link between them. It is
the fact that some kinds of pleasure somehow incorporate falsity in their very natures that
renders them unfit for inclusion in the good mixed life. In Socrates’ argument, therefore,
falsity is a criterion for excluding pleasures from the good life. Only pleasures that
incorporate the good-making characteristics into their natures are to be included in the
good life; their mingling with falsity, however, entails their incompatibility with the
good-making characteristics. Socrates simultaneously meant to indicate that in our
discourse, the form of falsity enters into the specification of these types of pleasure.
Socrates’ discussion consists in an enumeration of the many of Pleasure in order to show
that at the level of the many, pleasure links up with falsity in various ways, so that it
would be correct to describe the resulting kinds of pleasure as being false in some way.
To say that a pleasure is false is to imply that its correct description involves mentioning
the form of falsity. Pleasures that incorporate falsity are still pleasures but, qua possible
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elements in the good human life, they are the contraries of the true pleasures. Thus
Socrates has shown that the form Pleasure is one-and-many in a way that makes the many
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